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FRAGMENTATION, SPRAWL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Grigoriy V. Ardashev 
February 24, 2005 
 Fragmentation of governments and urban sprawl has been a subject of debate 
for a considerable time. The discussion often centers on whether space (sprawl) and 
politics (fragmentation) make a difference in the economic development of 
metropolitan areas. The hypothesis was set to follow the argument of polycentric 
school of thought on the organization of metropolitan governance. It was expected 
that competitive local public economies would be beneficial to the economic 
performance of the regions. Regarding the effect of sprawl, the study assumed that 
following the lines of free-market defense of sprawl it would be positively associated 
with economic performance of the metropolitan areas. The aim of this study was to 
examine empirical evidence and find support for either of these theories. 
The dissertation is organized in six chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
issues of metropolitan governance. Chapter II reviews dominant theories of 
metropolitan governance, defines fragmentation and sprawl, outlines the discussion 
on cost and benefits of urban sprawl, and examines theoretical and empirical research 
linking fragmentation and urban sprawl. Chapter III describes the research 
methodology by formulating specific models used for this investigation and outlining 
the variables used in the models. The results of the statistical analysis are presented in 
Chapter IV. Chapter V discusses the findings of the study in the context of the 
 v 
previous knowledge in the field. Finally, I summarize the results of the research, and 
formulate policy implications and suggestions for future research in Chapter VI. 
This study confirms the hypothesis of a positive link between metropolitan 
economic performance and fragmentation of metropolitan governance. Both 
correlations and regression models show positive link between fragmentation and 
economic performance for all metropolitan areas in the United States.  
The hypothesis about the positive impact of sprawl on economic performance 
of metropolitan areas was not confirmed. In fact, the opposite is true at least for a 
large part of US metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas with population between 
200,000 and 1,000,000 with higher levels of sprawl demonstrate weaker economic 
performance.  
The associations between sprawl, fragmentation and such desirable and 
beneficial to economic performance indicators as human capital, affluence and tax 
effort are statistically significant and they take the same direction as the ones with 
economic performance – positive for fragmentation and negative for sprawl.  
Previous research suggests that the impacts of local governance structure on 
metropolitan economic performance may be secondary to the trends in state economic 
development. Regression analysis performed in this study reveals that the impact of 
fragmentation and sprawl on economic performance of metro areas is comparable to 
that of their states’ economic performance.  
While fragmentation and sprawl are weaker predictors of economic performance 
than economic development factors (human capital and tax effort), controlling for 
these factors did not render the relationships between fragmentation, sprawl and 
economic performance statistically insignificant. This emphasizes the notion that 
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The issues of regional governance, urban sprawl, and economic development 
have spawned a significant volume of both theoretical and empirical scholarship 
concerning linkages between the organization of governance in metropolitan areas 
and urban development. However, the exact nature of the relationship between 
governance and urban development is not specified and many questions remain 
unanswered. This research explores the relationships between political fragmentation, 
urban sprawl, and economic aspects of urban development. It is designed to 
complement the current knowledge on the issues of metropolitan governance and test 
the efficacy of research tools suggested in recent literature on the subject. 
The most common indicator of the structure of metropolitan governance – 
fragmentation of governments – can be understood from different viewpoints. 
Research points out both negative consequences (inequitable development, urban 
sprawl) as well as positive sides (accountability, political representation) of 
fragmentation. Two major theories of metropolitan governmental organization 
dominate current discussion. Monocentric, or reform, theory stresses negative 
consequences of multi-centered development and views consolidation of government 
as a solution to urban ills. Supporters of polycentric, or public choice theory, tend to 
favor competitiveness and representation that are associated with multicentered 
development. The debate between the supporters of the two theories together with the 
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actual experiences of American communities with metropolitan reforms inspired a 
more recent theory of regionalism. Regionalism is “both a policy agenda and a genre 
of public sector interventions designed to deal with that agenda” (Savitch and Vogel, 
2000). It offers both extensive, comprehensive reforms as well as more limited 
gradual incremental adjustments toward a metropolitan vision.  
Today’s vision of metropolitan governance is a logical extension of more than 
a century of theoretical and practical efforts by urban scholars and city leaders to 
create mechanisms for governing fragmented American metropolitan regions. The 
first calls for metropolitan governance reform in the form of creating a single 
centralized authority appeared early in the last half of the 19th century. Since that time 
numerous attempts to understand the mechanisms of local public economies and 
create appropriate governance solutions were made (Stephens and Wikstrom, 2000). 
According to framework suggested by Wallis (1994a), the history of regionalism in 
the United States can be seen as the succession of the three waves. These waves 
correspond to the changing urban form – monocentric industrial city-region of the late 
19th century through the first half of the 20th century, polycentric metropolis of the 
1950s to the late 1970s, and today’s metropolitan regions in a post-industrial 
economy. 
The first wave of regionalism appeared with the development of the 
monocentric industrial metropolis of the end of 19th century. At that time the need to 
reorganize city government structures was caused by the realization that a city had to 
adjust in order to compete with other fast-growing communities (Norris, 2001). 
Metropolitan government was viewed as a way to balance the level of services 
throughout the city, to increase government efficiency, and to resist the influence of 
political machines (Wallis, 1994b). The research was focused on optimization of 
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government functions, on increasing accountability and on the application of 
scientific management principles to municipal government (Stephens & Wikstrom, 
2000). Perhaps the best-known example of this era is the consolidation of Manhattan 
and surrounding counties that in 1898 formed the current city of New York. 
The second wave of regionalism in the United States corresponds to the 
development of polycentric metropolis. While a number of cities, especially in the 
South and West, were able to capture some share of booming suburban growth by 
annexing adjacent territories, this process was quickly suppressed by suburban 
political interests (Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000). This period is characterized by the 
influence of federal policies that required regional cooperation for transportation 
planning and environmental protection. Due to this support, almost all metropolitan 
areas established Councils of Government designed to promote cooperation between 
local governments. By the end of 1970s federal funding of regional initiatives had 
shrunk and most of them where abandoned. 
Not all researchers agreed with the vision of centralized government for 
metropolitan areas. Public choice theory scholars following the principles of classical 
economics viewed the fragmented metropolis as a local public economy operating 
according to the same market principles as businesses do (Tiebout, 1956; Ostrom, 
Tiebout, & Warren, 1961). According to this theory, multiple local governments offer 
voter/consumer a choice of services and taxes. Residents act in rational economic 
sense and chose the best community according to their desires and financial resources 
(“vote with their feet”). Local government can achieve greater efficiency by 
distinguishing between provision and production of public services. Local 
governments are not required to deliver routine services and can hire outside 
contractors and benefit from the competition between the producers of services. 
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This third wave of regionalism reflects the realities of today’s post-industrial 
metropolitan regions that compete in a service-oriented global economy (Wallis, 
1994a). The rise of interest and public awareness in community problems of regional 
scale reappeared in the early 1990s. The new quest for regional solutions to urban 
problems was initiated with the publications of such authors as David Rusk (1993) 
and Anthony Downs (1994). Alarmed by the Census statistics that demonstrated 
disturbing trends of environmental degradation, suburban sprawl, growing disparities 
between central city and suburbs, increasing concentration of poverty in central cities, 
and suburban residential segregation (Kasarda, 1993; Ledebur & Barnes, 1992; 
Nathan and Adams, 1976, Nathan and Adams, 1989), these authors advocated the 
creation of regional authorities with wide areas of responsibility. While a variety of 
competing views on the peculiarities of organization of metropolitan governance 
exists today, there are some common themes. Among them are the interdependence of 
cities and suburbs (Savitch & Collins, 1993); a need to promote voluntary cooperation 
between local governments in metropolitan areas; a desire to minimize social 
disparities; and a search for ways to strengthen “the ability of older core cities to 
participate in and contribute to regional economic growth” (Frisken and Norris, 2001, 
p. 474).  
The logic of local governmental arrangements reflecting the values of 
American citizens had created a unique urban form – the multi-centered metropolis. 
To put the focuses of this research in perspective it is important to understand the 
historical logic of multicentered development in the United States. 
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Development of Multicentered Metropolis in the US 
 
The development of the multi-centered metropolis and associated formation of 
fragmented political systems did not happened at once. This process was shaped by a 
number of factors throughout the history of the United States. Different studies focus 
on various economic and political impacts that shaped urban development, but the 
most commonly recognized are economic restructuring, central city decline and 
suburbanization (Vogel, 1998). 
As noted above, the study by Wallis (1994) presents an important framework 
for understanding urban development in America. The previously described three 
waves of regionalism correspond to the three clearly discernible phases of 
metropolitan development in the United States. Wallis (1994) calls the first phase of 
metropolitan development in the United States the monocentric industrial city-region. 
While this first stage was characterized by economic dominance of central cities with 
concentric design of settlements and radiating commuting patterns, as early as in the 
middle of the 19th century the first patterns of metropolitanization have begun to 
emerge. This was the time when, as a response to the concentration of poverty and 
degrading environment in urban cores, a good part of the middle class began to move 
to the suburbs. The development of the first mass-transit lines allowed elites to 
commute from their suburban residences to places of work in central business 
districts. In the 1920s through early1950s, changes in the technology of 
transportation, increased immigration, along with migration of Southern blacks to 
Northern central cities, deepened patterns of social segregation and made suburbs a 
place of residence of choice for the affluent (Abu-Lughod, 1999).  
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The second stage – the polycentric metropolis of the 1950s to 1970s is 
characterized by the emergence of multiple centers along transportation corridors 
(Wallis, 1994). By that time, the American urban system was undergoing significant 
changes. Decentralization triggered by federally subsidized suburban housing, 
highways, and air travel hubs was further intensified by changes in the international 
economy and changes in the spatial configuration of places of employment (Abu-
Lughod, 1999).  
Economic restructuring, globalization, changes in geographical locations of 
industries, and increasing suburbanization continue to change the image of urban 
America. The current third stage – “postindustrial pattern”, is characterized by higher 
spatial dispersion of economic activities along with higher integration through 
communication and transportation networks. The existence of multiple jurisdictions is 
a result of economic transformations of 19th and 20th centuries. Wallis calls 
polycentric organization of regions “an expression of the maturation of industrial 
production”. 
One common point that unites followers of different perspectives on 
metropolitan governance is the assessment of the role of federal government in the 
suburbanization of America. According to one study, postwar urban development was 
determined by national suburban policy, whose elements include low-cost home 
mortgages, the secondary mortgage market, pro-homeowner tax policies, urban 
renewal, federal transportation policy, and sewage plant expansion (Rusk, 1999). All 
of the programs and policies mentioned above were initiated by the federal 
government and implemented by or with substantial assistance from the federal level. 
However, the impact of the federal government on urban form cannot be reduced only 
to its role in the decentralization of American regions. As research shows oftentimes 
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local political jurisdictions are forced to cooperate and deal with regional issues only 
under pressure of federal environmental and transportation regulation (Wachs & Dill, 
1999; Savitch & Vogel, 1996; Rusk, 1999).  
The aforementioned patterns of urban growth and corresponding patterns in 
the development of urban government have led to a condition where according to one 
study “the average metropolitan area contains roughly 117 governing units, making 
America one of most fragmented nations on Earth” (Savitch & Vogel, 1996, p.11).  
While the organization of localities in multiple political jurisdictions does not 
necessarily mean a flawed system of governance, a number of urban problems are 
traditionally associated with it. The list often includes “lack of coordination and 
cooperation among municipal police departments which results in difficulties in 
apprehending criminals who cross municipal boundaries; municipal enclaves 
containing heavy industry which pollutes the air over surrounding communities which 
are trying to implement pollution controls; and the land use zoning practices directed 
solely by local interests which promote social and racial residential segregation” 
(Barlow, 1981, p.21). The study by Phares and Louishomme (1996, p.72) suggests 
that “although taking a literal stance against fragmentation per se would be without 
basis, there are substantive problems associated with the fragmentation, 
uncoordinated regional governance, and self-interest-driven ad hoc annexations and 
incorporations.” Another study hypothesizes that ”fragmentation and lower levels of 
central-city annexation contribute to (1) a gap in personal income between the central 
city and the suburb, (2) the fiscal hardship of the core city, and (3) racial separation 
and isolation within the metropolitan area” (Morgan, & Mareschal, 1999, p.583). In 
fact, some scholars feel so strongly about this relationship that they call the 
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organization of localities in multiple jurisdictions “Balkanization” of America (Rusk, 
1999; Warren, 1964). 
There is no simple solution to the problems of reorganization of the current 
fragmented system. Difficulty in the organization of metropolitan governance arises, 
in the words of Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren (1961, p. 831), because the 
“metropolitan region is a legal non-entity […] the people of a metropolitan region 
have no general instrumentality of government available to deal directly with the 
range of problems which they share in common.” Local government “has no firm 
place within the framework of US law” (Poindexter, 1996, p.1824). Until the 
reorganization experiences of Miami and Jacksonville there was no contemporary 
model for formal metropolitan government.1 Even formal city-county arrangements 
represented by Miami-Dade and Charlotte-Mecklenburg do not present a viable model 
for regional-level decision-making, coordination and economic development.  
With this background in mind I now recapitulate the problem to be 




Goals of this Research and an Overview of the Study 
 
Differing and often contradictory models of metropolitan governance require 
an empirical analysis for assessing their relative strengths and weaknesses. An 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) report (1987) suggests 
                                               
 
1
 Earlier consolidations in the 19th century such New York’s or New Orleans’ were exceptions and bear 
little relevance to contemporary problems. 
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that we need to know which provision and production arrangements are optimal in 
different levels of governance. Another report by the National Research Council 
stresses the importance of research on metropolitan governance and its effects, on 
development and policy options (Altshuler et al., 1999). P. Lewis (1996, p.48) 
recommends that “we need to seek an appropriate quantitative measure of urban 
political fragmentation”. A substantial body of research is already dedicated to the 
development and evaluation of various quantitative measures of metropolitan 
governance. Despite the work done on this subject, Nelson and Foster (1999, p.310) 
point out that “empirical evidence linking governance structure to income growth is 
scant and inconclusive”. 
This study is designed to provide such an empirical analysis for the part of the 
debate on metropolitan governance that links politics and space with metropolitan 
economic performance. As observed by Norris (2001) the argumentation for 
governmental reforms is increasingly based on the claims to the benefits to 
metropolitan prosperity that may realize from public policy corresponding to either of 
the sides in this debate. So, an empirical statistical analysis could help determine 
appropriate directions in public policy. 
The results of such analysis may indicate the following. If the results support 
the argument of the polycentric theory it may be suggested that competition among 
multiple local governments should be encouraged. On the other hand, if the results 
offer support for the monocentric theory, corresponding changes to public policy 
advancing regional governments are warranted. If the results are mixed, this calls for 
a careful mix of policies designed to accommodate negative and positive sides of both 
arguments, and for additional research. The results that are not statistically significant 
would indicate that politics and space do not directly impact metropolitan 
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performance and thus public policy aimed at increasing regional welfare should focus 
on more traditional measures of economic development. The conceptual framework is 
outlined in the Table 1.   
 
Table 1.  


















































In addition, even if the argument for or against particular government 
structures based on the potential benefits to economic performance is powerful, it is 
not sufficient without the evaluation of the possible social costs and benefits. While 
this is not the central question of this research, a particular attention will be paid to the 
possible relationship between sprawl, fragmentation and racial residential segregation 
in order to illustrate this.  
 11 
Essentially this study deals with the relationship between the structure of local 
governance and economic performance of metropolitan areas. This research offers a 
way of measuring governmental fragmentation as it relates to urban sprawl and 
economic performance. It seeks answers to a number of questions. First, the 
dissertation examines evidence linking sprawl with fragmentation of governments.  
Second, the interaction between political fragmentation and economic performance is 
studied and discussed. Third, the links between sprawl and economic performance are 
analyzed. The study relies on quantitative methods in both operationalizing the 
variables and analyzing the relationships between them.   
The study employs two theories of local economic development as 
benchmarks for comparison of fragmentation and sprawl as the factors of 
metropolitan economic performance with a more traditional measures designed to 
improve metropolitan performance. This methodology allows for a better 
understanding of the political components of urban growth. It is possible to evaluate 
the possible links between fragmentation and sprawl in correlation models. Modeling 
metropolitan performance as a function of fragmentation, sprawl and economic 
development factors can show whether fragmentation and sprawl can act as proxies 
for each other.  
 The dissertation is organized in six chapters. The first chapter introduces the 
issues of metropolitan governance. Chapter II is divided into three distinct sections. 
The first section reviews dominant theories of metropolitan governance and defines 
fragmentation. The second section defines urban sprawl and examines the literature 
on urban sprawl by exploring evidence about its costs and benefits. The third section 
examines theoretical and empirical research linking fragmentation and urban sprawl. 
This chapter concludes with a more specific statement of the problem and a 
 12 
formulation of hypotheses for analysis. Chapter III describes the research 
methodology by formulating specific models used for this investigation. Next, I 
outline the variables used in the models. The results of the statistical analysis are 
presented in Chapter IV. Here I present tables and maps illustrating the range of 
variation in structure of governance and the degree of urban sprawl across 
metropolitan areas in the United States as measured by the indicators used in this 
study. Correlation coefficients are calculated to examine the association between the 
variables. Next, I present the results of the regression models. Chapter V discusses the 
findings of the study in the context of the previous knowledge in the field. Finally, I 
summarize the results of the research, and formulate policy implications and 












The questions of fragmentation, sprawl and economic development should be 
considered within the framework of previous theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
The discussion on the issues of governmental efficiency and organization of 
metropolitan governance goes back to the end of the 19th century. Essentially, the 
discussion centers on the dialogue between the monocentric versus polycentric 
approaches to metropolitan government. The focus of discussion on urban sprawl 
tends to concentrate on its negative consequences; however, more recently researchers 
have started to investigate possible justifications of such pattern of development. 
In this chapter I describe two dominant theories of metropolitan governance as 
they relate to the fragmentation of governments. Second, I discuss the definitions and 
measurement of urban sprawl, and review the arguments about its costs and benefits. 
Later, I present the findings of studies linking sprawl and fragmentation. Chapter II 




 Monocentric Theory of Metropolitan Governance 
 
Definition 
Stephens and Wikstrom (2000, p.48) in their summary of theory and practice 
of metropolitan governance define the monocentric theory as following: 
1) the fundamental problem of the metropolis is the decentralized, or 
fragmented, character  of local government, with its multiple number of 
local government; 2) the fragmented nature of local government results in 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness; 3) due to the disparity of wealth among 
communities, local public services are marked by inequality and lack of 
equity; 4) services that should be provided on a metropolitanwide basis are 
delivered by a multitude of local governments; 5) there is a lack of 
metropolitanwide political leadership, sensitive to the well-being and 
interests of the entire region, responsive to socioeconomic problems, and 
planning for the future; and 6) therefore should be established in every 
large urban region a metropolitanwide governmental structure. 
 
Ostrom (1998, p.6) formulates the basic assumptions of the monocentric 
theory: 
1. Urban public goods and services are relatively homogeneous and 
similarly affect all neighborhoods within a metropolitan area. 
2. Urban voters share relative similar preferences for urban goods and 
services. 
3. Voters effectively articulate their preferences for diverse urban goods 
and services through a single electoral mechanism. 
4. Large scale is needed to finance high quality services. 
5. Elected officials can best specify the levels of urban goods and services 
that should be produced to public bureaus and determine tax revenues to 
achieve these objectives. 
6. Heads of public bureaus have effective command over street-level 
bureaucrats who then produce the highest level of public goods and 
services given the budget they receive. 
7. Street-level bureaucrats deliver these goods and services to passive 
clients. 
Theory 
As noted in Chapter I, the roots of monocentric theory of metropolitan 
governance go back to the earliest attempts of metropolitan reforms in the late 19th 
century. The theory incorporates the ideas of the good government movement and 
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applies the principles of scientific management to urban governance. While a number 
of governmental reforms were conducted in the 19th century, it was not until the 1930s 
that the ideas of the monocentric theory were first articulated in the research literature. 
The main principles of the monocentric theory were first comprehensively formulated 
and discussed by Paul Studenski in his 1930 book The Government of the 
Metropolitan Areas in the United States. The author makes a claim about inefficiency 
of fragmented system of government and refers to it as a chaotic and accidental to 
past legislative decisions. He attributes to governmental fragmentation the inability of 
municipal authorities to make coherent decisions on issues of metropolitan scale. 
The study examines a variety of possible approaches to governmental 
reorganization and service delivery arrangement in metropolitan areas: consolidation, 
separation, urban service county, voluntary cooperation between local governments, 
and special districts established to address problems of regional scale. The author 
points out the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches as well as their 
applicability to future governmental reforms. He dismisses voluntary cooperation 
because of its limited effectiveness, and he is cautious about political obstacles facing 
mergers and annexations. He views special districts as a useful, but temporary 
solution. Studenski argues that a more viable alternative to consolidation given the 
political obstacles to comprehensive reforms is a federated city. In this model “the 
constituent municipalities are not completely merged but continue to exist as separate 
entities exercising a degree of local control within their boundaries” (Studenski, 1930, 
p.367). The federated city model entails a distribution of powers between local 
governments and delegation of authority to a federative metropolitan government. 
The author stresses that “recent experience appears to demonstrate that for the time 
being at least complete consolidation is not a practicable solution for any region as a 
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whole” (Studenski, 1930, p.386). Thus, the federated city model may help overcome 
difficulties in implementation of metropolitan government reform. 
Studenski summarizes his discussion in several points. He states that 1) the 
organization of governance in each region presents a special case and the solutions for 
governmental reforms will differ between metropolitan areas; 2) various models 
leading to comprehensive metropolitan government are complementary and can 
coexist;  3) consolidated metropolitan government does not necessarily lead to the 
elimination of small local governments, because it is possible to create federative and 
two-tiered arrangements; 4) local political leadership should pay more attention to the 
issues of regional scale rather than individual projects catering to the needs of small 
groups of constituents; and 5) state governments and the federal government should 
emphasize metropolitan reforms.  According to Stephens and Wikstrom (2000), 
Studenski’s work constitutes an important benchmark in the analysis of metropolitan 
government because first, it set forth a systematic discussion of metropolitan 
governance; second, it created a central working premise for scholarly discussion on 
the subject for the next 30 years and third, it was a vehicle for the subsequent efforts 
of government reforms. 
The thesis of Studenski’s work recurred in Victor Jones’ 1942 book 
Metropolitan Government. Jones characterizes the problem of metropolitan 
government as “the need for servicing a large population scattered under the 
jurisdiction of many units of local government, most of which are crippled by limited 
powers over a restricted area, by inadequate tax resources, and by such consequences 
of premature subdivision as heavy indebtedness and extensive tax arrears” (Jones, 
1942, p.24). The author describes the two sets of solutions for the problem of 
metropolitan government: solutions involving no structural changes and solutions 
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requiring fundamental structural changes. The first set of solutions includes the 
provision of services by central city to the surrounding territories, establishment of 
special districts, intergovernmental arrangements, and transfers of metropolitan 
functions to states and the federal government. Similarly to Studenski, Jones sees 
intergovernmental contracts and special districts not as tools of cooperation but rather 
as encouragement of excessive competition and reduced transparency of local 
government. He argues that the only viable answer to political fragmentation are 
permanent solutions requiring fundamental structural changes, including annexations, 
mergers, federated government, and establishment of urban county government.  
Jones highlights a number of political issues surrounding comprehensive 
metropolitan government. Starting with the politics of integration in central cities, 
Jones shows that major political players with business interests on the agenda often 
times support consolidation efforts. Businesses consider consolidation as a positive 
development because in their view it leads to the higher census rankings of the city, 
reduced costs of government and better service delivery. Describing the politics of 
integration in the suburbs, Jones points out the sources of opposition to the reforms - 
suburban municipal consciousness and distrust in central city. He advocates securing 
political support in suburbs by making concessions and by the guarantees of 
legislative representation. Finally, Jones shows the difficulties of getting metropolitan 
government reforms approved by state legislatures. He urges reform proponents to 
concentrate on well planned and technically sophisticated political campaigns with the 
focus on “symbol-reinforcing propaganda”. According to Stephens and Wikstrom 
(2000), it is the investigation of the political aspects of metropolitan reforms that 
makes Jones’s study an important milestone in the study of metropolitan government. 
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The renewed interest in the issues of metropolitan governance in the current 
urban research literature is often attributed to the new work on the premises of reform 
theory.  The first publication that has started the current wave of concern was David 
Rusk’s 1993 book Cities without Suburbs.  Cities without Suburbs raises questions 
about inequities in metropolitan economic development and examines the links 
between the socioeconomic disparities, the economic welfare of metropolitan areas, 
and the annexation policies of central cities. Rusk argues that aggressive annexation 
policies leading to the decrease in fragmentation can alleviate disparities between 
central cities and suburbs. To understand the relationship between central-city 
expansion and economic development Rusk introduced the concept of elasticity. City 
elasticity is a measure calculated as initial city density times the rate of boundary 
expansion. The cities are thus divided into elastic and inelastic: 
The cities with the greatest elasticity had vacant land to develop and the 
political and legal tools to annex new land….At the other end of the 
spectrum were the “inelastic cities” – typically older cities already built out 
at higher than average densities and, for a variety of reasons, unable or 
unwilling to expand their city limits (Rusk, 1993, p.10). 
Rusk links metropolitan economic development with city elasticity and argues 
that elastic cities perform better economically, show lower racial segregation patterns 
and have fewer economic disparities between central cities and suburbs. Based on the 
analysis of elasticity the author recommends reorganizing metropolitan governance 
favoring consolidation, annexations by central cities and restrictions on suburban 
incorporations.  
In his later book, the Inside Game/ Outside Game published in 1999, Rusk 
expands his argument and outlines what in his view are the more effective 
mechanisms of addressing central city problems. While the city elasticity concept is 
still central to the analysis, the author concentrates on a number of practices used by 
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communities throughout the nation to solve urban problems. Rusk emphasizes the 
limited effectiveness of the measures that he calls the “inside game” – small scale 
programs aimed at revitalizations of urban neighborhoods. The examples of the 
“inside game” mechanisms are community action programs,  model cities programs, 
community development block grants, urban development action grants, 
empowerment community and enterprise zone funds and tax credits (Rusk, 1999).  In 
his view, only the “outside game” – regional-scale measures such as legislative 
changes to zoning practices, urban growth boundaries and revenue sharing will 
enhance the fortunes of central cities. Because small fragmented local governments 
(the “little box” governments) are either unwilling or incapable of dealing with issues 
of regional scale, Rusk urges the creation of the “big box” governments. These 
governments can take various forms, but in general they act as an umbrella over 
existing structures coordinating regional-scale initiatives. They should change the 
attitudes of the public towards a more coherent regional vision and create new laws 
regarding economic and racial segregation of the neighborhoods. 
In another recent publication following the tradition of monocentric theory, 
Anthony Downs (1994) argues that fragmented decentralized metropolis leads to a 
number of social inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are the result of failure to 
transfer social costs from those who incur them to those who benefit from them the 
most. Downs describes the dominant vision of how American metropolitan areas 
ought to grow.  The elements of the dominant vision include: 1) ownership of 
detached single-family homes on spacious lots; 2) ownership of automobiles; 3) 
working in low-rise workplaces; 4) residence in small communities with strong local 
governments; and 5) environment free from signs of poverty. He sees the solution to 
the urban problems in changing the dominant vision to a more socially responsible 
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model. Although Downs does not insist on single areawide government as being the 
only answer to the undesirable consequences of the dominant vision, he argues that 
more centralized decision-making would benefit metropolitan areas. Alternative 




A number of attempts at empirical evaluation of the claims of the monocentric 
theory have been made, however the evidence presented does not provide sufficient 
proof to close the discussion. For example, Lions and Lowery (1989) compare the 
results of surveys of citizen satisfaction with urban services in a consolidated 
metropolitan area and in a metropolitan area with a fragmented system of governance. 
The study challenges the claims of the public choice theory to a greater citizen 
satisfaction and better knowledge about local service providers resulting from the 
competition between municipalities. The authors compare the responses of the 
residents in five matched pairs of suburban neighborhoods to a survey of their 
knowledge about and satisfaction with various government services. They found that 
for the most part the residents living in a consolidated metropolitan area were more 
satisfied and felt better informed than their counterparts living in a fragmented 
metropolitan area. While the study could have raised questions about the citizen 
satisfaction in a fragmented metropolis, the limitations in its methodology 
substantially lessen the conclusiveness of its findings. The study relied on comparison 
between the two metropolitan areas with substantial differences in population 
(Louisville-Jefferson County with 1980 population of 685,004 and Lexington-Fayette 
County with 1980 population of 204,000). Also, the differences of means in the sets 
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of results were very small and could as well have been attributed to the factors other 
than the structure of governance.  
One of the more compelling arguments for the monocentric theory in a study 
examining the links between economic performance of metropolitan areas and the 
structure of governance was made by Nelson and Foster (1999). In this study of 287 
metropolitan areas the authors analyzed the impact of metropolitan governance 
structure on income growth controlling for a variety of additional factors. The authors 
specified personal income change as a function of a comprehensive set of variables.2 
Among the controlling factors the most notable impact on the change in per capita 
personal income was made by the variables for the labor force characteristics with the 
measures of unionization and right-to-work state causing a significant negative 
impact, and educational attainment causing a significant positive impact.   
The variables for local governance structure demonstrate a statistically 
significant positive impact of elastic central cities and suburban municipalities with a 
large population. A statistically significant negative impact was associated with the 
variables for the percent of the population living in central city and the ratio of special 
purpose governments to general-purpose governments. The most notable result in the 
variables for the regional governance structure included the presence of regional 
multipurpose government in metropolitan areas, which was significant and positively 
associated with income growth. The two-tiered government structure was linked to a 
                                               
 
2
 The list of variables includes: local ecology (proximity to a large metro area, age of metro, heating 
and cooling degree days), local socioeconomic conditions (population base, percent of population in 
poverty, number of violent crimes per capita), labor force characteristics (personal per capita income, 
percent labor force employed, right-to-work state, percent union membership), economic structure 
(metropolitan economic capture rate, local effective tax rate, and separate variables for the percent of 
income from construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, FIRE, and 
services), regional location (according to Census divisions), local governance (percent central city 
population, central city annexation ratio, percent unincorporated population, suburban city average 
population, special service district dominance, school district density, elected general purpose density, 
elected special district density), and regional governance (city county consolidation, single-county two-
tier federation, regional utility district, regional multipurpose district). 
 22 
large and statistically significant decrease in per capita income growth; however, the 
authors acknowledge the possibility of this result being due to another factor 
unaccounted for in the research design. The association between the variable for the 
city-county consolidation and income growth was not statistically significant. The 
results of the analysis suggest that “elastic central cities supplemented by large 
suburban municipalities operating in a climate where resource allocation decision 
affecting the region are coordinated through cross-jurisdictional, multipurpose 
regional governance arrangements may satisfy individual welfare best” (Nelson & 
Foster, 1999, p.320). Overall, the study provides only a limited proof for the 
monocentric theory. 
To summarize the preceding discussion, the followers of monocentric theory 
emphasize economies of scale and benefits to urban development due to “regulatory 
consistency, a professionalized bureaucracy, and fewer interactions” of investors with 
government (Nelson & Foster, 1999, p.311) associated with centralized metropolitan 
government. Followers of the monocentric theory argue that a single jurisdiction can 
provide better services than a fragmented system. Traditional criticism of the reform 
approach is based on several flaws in the argument, mainly the assumptions that “one 
size fits all”; that consolidation of services necessarily leads to economies of scale; 
that provision units can not be distinguished from production units; and that benefits 
of consolidation will exceed benefits from competition (Miller et al., 1995). The 
empirical evidence in support of the monocentric theory is limited and partial. For the 
most part, the arguments are subjective and based on value judgments. When 
empirical support does emerge (Nelson and Foster, 1999), the analysis suggests 
solutions that are closer to the regional cooperation and planning than to the ideas of 
government consolidation. 
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Polycentric Theory of Metropolitan Governance 
 
While the intellectual debate on the organization of metropolitan governance 
in the first half of twentieth century was dominated by the monocentric, or “reform” 
school of thought, by the mid-twentieth century an opposing view had emerged. 
Where the metropolitan reform proponents viewed the current organization of 
governance as “a maze, a jungle, a crazy quilt, a stew, or other metaphor indicating an 
absence of rational organization”, public choice scholars suggested that fragmented 
system of governance is best described as “a complex local public economy” (Parks 
and Oakerson, 1989, p.19).  
 
Definition 
Summed up by Stephens and Wikstrom (2000, p.117), the argument of public 
choice school can be presented as follows: 
(1) a variety of local governments is more responsive to diverse service 
needs and preferences than a single metropolitan government; (2) citizens, 
acting on a rational and self-interested basis, are able, by “voting with their 
feet”, to reside in a community that best meets their service and tax 
preferences; (3) services may be delivered by a variety of governments and 
private vendors in terms of geographical size, thereby realizing the benefits 
of more efficient, effective, and responsive services and economies of 
scale; (4) multiple number of governments and private vendors providing 
services diminishes the problems associated with monopoly providers; (5) 
multiple governments provide more opportunities for citizens to become 
involved in government and to assist in the production of public services; 
and (6) the frequency and regular interactions between governments 
constitute a system of metropolitan governance that can successfully 
respond to metropolitanwide service and policy challenges. 
 
Ostrom (1998, p.8) puts together the following assumptions of the polycentric 
theory: 
1. Urban public goods and services differ substantially in regard to their 
production functions and the number of people who are simultaneously 
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affected. Public services, like education and policing, require the active 
coproduction of citizen-consumers to complement the inputs of those 
formally called producers. 
2. Individuals with relatively similar, but always evolving, preferences for 
public goods and services tend to cluster in neighborhoods. Preferences 
will be more homogeneous within neighborhoods than across an entire 
metropolitan area. 
3. Citizens who live in an urban area served by multiple jurisdictions learn 
more about the performance of any one jurisdiction by seeing or hearing 
about how problems are handled in other jurisdictions. 
4. Multiple jurisdictions with different scopes and scales of organization 
allow citizens more effective choice in selecting the package of services 
most important to them, in articulating their preferences and concerns, and, 
if necessary, in moving to other jurisdictions. 
5. Multiple jurisdictions enable fiscal equivalence to be accomplished so 
that beneficiaries are primarily responsible for costs. Redistribution is best 
assigned to very large units of government - at a state or national level. 
6. The presence of large numbers of potential producers of urban goods 
and services in a metropolitan area allows elected officials more effective 
choice of producers for their citizens as well as a way to discipline low-
performing producers by contracting with another producer. 
7. Producers who are competing for continued contracts will be more likely 
to search out innovative technologies, to operate at close to optimal scale of 
production, and to encourage effective team production as well as 
coproduction, so as to enhance their own performance. 
 
Theory 
The public choice concept was introduced by Tiebout in 1956. In his seminal 
article “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, he proposed a framework for 
optimizing the balance between a community size, level of public expenditures and 
levels of services in communities. The model uses a political economy approach for 
understanding the patterns of local governmental expenditures. Tiebout viewed 
citizens as consumer-voters that move to communities “which best satisfies [their] 
preference pattern for public goods. […] The greater the number of communities and 
the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully 
realizing his preference position” (Tiebout, 1956, p.418). The desired balance of 
public goods and local expenditures in a local public economy is achieved by 
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promoting residential mobility and increasing the public knowledge about the 
available packages of taxes and services offered by different communities. 
Tiebout acknowledged the limitations of his model and pointed out a number 
of assumptions implied in it. These assumptions include full mobility of citizens, their 
full knowledge about different patterns of public expenditures and services, a large 
number of communities to choose from, and independence of place of residence from 
place of work (all citizens are assumed to be living on dividends). While pointing out 
that public preferences are best satisfied at the local level, Tiebout recognized that in 
some cases “in which the external economies and diseconomies are of sufficient 
importance, some form of integration may be indicated” (Tiebout, 1956). He 
concludes that while the model does not perfectly mirror the political economy model 
of competitive markets, still it provides a conceptual solution to provision of public 
goods in a fragmented metropolitan setting. 
The original public choice model was expanded and applied to the issues of 
organization of government in metropolitan areas by Ostrom, Tiebout and Warren in 
their 1961 study. The authors opposed the criticism of the metropolitan reform 
proponents regarding the absence of order and logic in fragmented arrangement of 
system of governance: 
The assumption that each unit of local government acts independently 
without regard for other public interests in the metropolitan community has 
only a limited validity. The traditional pattern of government in a 
metropolitan area with its multiplicity of political jurisdictions may more 
appropriately be conceived as a “polycentric political system” (Ostrom, 
Tiebout & Warren, 1961, p.831). 
 The authors point out that the nature of public goods differs from the nature of 
goods provided privately. First, governments act upon market failures and their 
function is “to internalize the externalities – positive and negative – for those goods 
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which the producers and consumers are unable or unwilling to internalize for 
themselves” (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961, p.832). Second, some pubic goods, 
such as for example police and fire protection, are not easily packageable (users that 
are not willing to pay cannot be excluded from benefiting from them), and it is a 
function of government to provide them. Third, by viewing public goods as “the 
maintenance of preferred states of community affairs” it is possible to determine 
appropriate levels for provision of services in a community. 
While it is a function of government to provide the described above services, 
this does not necessarily mean that local governments are required to produce them. 
The authors make an important claim that “the production of goods and services 
needs to be distinguished from their provision at public expense” (Ostrom, Tiebout & 
Warren, 1961, p.834). Governments take advantage of competition among private 
providers, and “patterns of competition among producers of public services in a 
metropolitan area, just as among firms in the market, may produce substantial benefits 
by inducing self-regulating tendencies with pressure for the more efficient solution in 
the operation of the whole system” (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961, p.838). 
The research by Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren contributed to the understanding 
of organization of metropolitan governance by pointing out the logic behind the 
seemingly chaotic organization of governance in a fragmented metropolis. The 
authors introduced the concept of distinguishing between provision and production of 
public goods. Their research argued that optimum configuration of government in 
metropolitan area can be achieved without comprehensive single government. 
An important contribution to the public choice school was made by Peterson in 
his 1981 book City Limits. Peterson relaxed the constraints of Tiebout model and 
introduced a concept of the unitary interest of a city. According to the author local 
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governments operate in three policy arenas: developmental, redistributive, and 
allocational.  “Developmental policies enhance the economic position of the city. 
Redistributive policies benefit low-income residents but at the same time negatively 
affect the local economy. Allocational policies are more or less neutral in their 
economic effect. [...] Allocational policies are neither developmental nor 
redistributive; […] the housekeeping services of local government are the best 
example” (Peterson, 1981, p.41, p.44). The pursuit of competitive advantages and the 
organization of governance in cities that reflects this pursuit are best suited to address 
the issues corresponding to allocational and developmental policies. Cities tend to 
ignore redistributive policies due to the limited resources and the perception that such 
policies undermine their economic strengths. According to Peterson, redistribution is 
best achieved at the federal or state level of government. When private citizens and 
businesses act according to Tiebout sorting behavior, local governments act similarly 
to business firms and respond with competition to attract and retain their desirable tax 
bases. Thus, the unitary interest of the city is the pursuit of developmental policies.  
 
Empirical Support 
The earliest empirical support for Tiebout hypothesis was offered by 
Hamilton, Mills, and Puryear (1975). The authors examined the effects of range of 
public service offerings and intergovernmental aid to education on income 
segregation. The study found that Tiebout mechanisms work best in suburban 
municipalities. Central cities lack effective pricing system to closely resemble the 
market model described by Tiebout. Overall, “the degree to which households 
segregate themselves by demand for public service depends upon the degree to which 
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the local public service delivery resembles a market” (Hamilton, Mills and Puryear,1 
1975, p.114).  
Expanding the theses of Tiebout and Peterson, Schneider (1989) in his 
important empirical investigation of the public choice argument creates a model of 
polycentric government in suburban cities. Schneider constructs numerous regression 
models of suburban municipal expenditures as a function of demographic, 
intergovernmental, economic composition and fiscal factors. He demonstrated that 
suburban cities prioritize developmental policies to boost their attractiveness for the 
above-average income residents. Suburban municipalities tend to avoid redistribution 
that seems undesirable for middle and upper income residents – the type of taxpayers 
those communities pursue. Schneider’s analysis extends Peterson’s argument and 
demonstrates how suburban cities compete for the maximization of their tax base 
through the pursuit of the developmental policies. 
Empirical research literature provides a number of examples of studies 
supporting the public choice argument. In one of such studies, Benton and Gamble 
(1984) conducted a time-series analysis of the effects of city/county consolidation in 
Jacksonville, Florida. They examined the changes in property tax revenues, total 
expenditures and public safety expenditures prior and after the consolidation of 
government. The authors found that “city/county consolidation has produced no 
measurable impact on the taxing and spending policies of the consolidated 
government” (Benton and Gamble, 1984, p.196).  Contrary to the arguments of the 
proponents of mergers, the study observed increases in both taxes and expenditures 
following governmental consolidation. The authors suggest that while promoting 
mergers as a tool of improving urban services and streamlining the government may 
be convincing, the tax savings and expenditure reduction arguments are not valid.  
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 In a time-series study, Carr and Feiock (1999) measure changes in the number 
of manufacturing, retail, and service establishments before and after consolidation in 
nine metropolitan areas over 40 years. The results demonstrated no evidence of a 
relationship between government consolidation and economic development. The 
authors point out that these findings are important because the economic development 
argument is one of the major selling points for the reform advocates. Similarly to 
Benton and Gamble, they point out that metropolitan government may result in 
desirable consequences for metropolitan areas; however, the evidence that these 
consequences relate to economic development does not emerge. 
Traditionally, one of the stronger arguments of the supporters of governmental 
consolidation has been the relationship between political fragmentation and 
inequality. The study by Morgan and Mareschal (1999) uses multiple regression 
models to examine the links between central city/suburban inequality and 
metropolitan governance structure represented by various measures of fragmentation. 
The authors found no evidence of any impact of governmental fragmentation on 
income disparity and central-city fiscal health. However, even when the claims to the 
links between fragmentation and inequality were not revealed by the analysis, the 
authors found that fragmentation indeed played a role in segregation of black and 
white residents in metropolitan areas. Thus, the study did in fact partially substantiate 
the claims to the negative social consequences of fragmentation; however, the authors 
suggested that blaming the central-city/suburban economic disparities solely on 
governmental fragmentation is without basis. 
To summarize the preceding discussion, the followers of the public choice 
approach recognize the distinction between provision and production of public goods, 
the difference between fragmentation and complex organization, and finally the 
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necessity of citizens’ choice (Parks & Oakerson, 1989). Researchers following the 
public choice tradition argue that polycentric system offers closer match for public 
preferences in taxes and services. Competition between jurisdictions in fragmented 
systems ensures better quality and lower costs of the services provided, and it offers 
investors economic inducements that are not achievable in centralized setting (Nelson 
& Foster, 1999). Variations in size and number of governments better reflect 
differences in economies of scale for labor-intensive and capital intensive types of 
services (ACIR, 1987). While the studies discussed above show some degree of 
support for the polycentrists’ arguments, similarly to the monocentric theory, it is 
relatively indirect and not conclusive. 
 
Defining and Measuring Fragmentation 
Most often the discussion about metropolitan government and governance 
revolves around the concept of fragmentation. Fragmentation, defined as a ratio of 
number of jurisdictions to population, is a common measure used as a proxy for 
metropolitan governance (ACIR, 1987, Parks & Oakerson, 1989). While a majority of 
studies of fragmentation are focused on issues of distribution and inequality, some 
studies of local governance quantitatively examine the effects of political 
fragmentation on urban growth and metropolitan outcomes. 
Along with traditional measures such as ratio of number of governments to 
population, some researchers use additional measures of fragmentation. Savitch et al. 
(1993) examined interdependency of cities and suburbs and introduced a measure of 
inclusion – the percentage of the population of a metropolitan area residing in the 
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central city. In another example, a study examines effects of central city/suburban 
fragmentation using such measures as “(1) the number of cities within the metropolis, 
(2) the percentage of MSA land area within the central city, and (3) a measure of 
central-city annexation” (Morgan & Mareschal, 1999).  
D. Rusk’s book Cities without Suburbs introduced a new proxy for 
metropolitan governance and political fragmentation – city elasticity. City elasticity is 
measured as initial density of the central city times the rate of boundary expansion 
(Rusk, 1999). Today some scholars use the city elasticity score to substitute for 
fragmentation. A study by Hart et al.(1998, p.435) equates metropolitan governance 
with city annexation policy by measuring “the degree to which a metropolitan 
statistical area had a metropolitan government” using the elasticity score developed 
by Rusk. Critical analysis by Blair and Staley (1996) shows a number of flaws in the 
theory behind Rusk’s conclusions. To list a few, Blair and Staley demonstrate such 
weaknesses in Rusk’s argument as failure to justify the theoretical link between 
elasticity and metropolitan growth, failure to consider the possibility of land 
conversion and redevelopment, and failure to provide appropriate large-sample 
statistical tests of the elasticity hypothesis. The authors come to the conclusion that 
“central city elasticity by itself should not be viewed as a powerful tool for the 
enhancement of metropolitan economic welfare, although it may have modest effect 
in some circumstances” (Blair & Staley and Zhang, 1996, p.351). 
In his 1996 book Shaping Suburbia, Lewis uses an interesting approach to 
operationalize political fragmentation. Instead of traditional measures of 
fragmentation, which the author shows to be limited due to the failure to reflect 
variation in power and degree of control over land use, Lewis develops a Political 
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Fragmentation Index. The index is based on total expenditures per capita by land-use 
related local governments. It is calculated according to the following formula: 
 
PFI = TE (1-SSP), 
 
where TE – total expenditures per capita by land use-related local 
governments, and SSP is the sum of squared percentages of TE accounted for 
by each local government. 
Lewis (1996, p.49) explains the term (1-SSP) as “the probability that two 
randomly selected dollars of local public expenditure in a given metropolitan area 
were not spent by the same local government”. 
 This indicator differs from the traditional measure; in fact, correlation analysis 
shows no associations between the Political Fragmentation Index, number of 
governments, and ratio of governments to population. Lewis’ index allows researchers 
to observe important relationships that link the system of regional governance to 
spatial configuration of the metropolitan region. Table 2 presents a summary of 




Table 2: Measures of Government Fragmentation or Decentralization 
 
Author Fragmentation Measure 
Hawkins 1971 Governments per 100,000 persons 
Hill 1974  1. Number of municipalities  
2. Number of municipalities per capita 
Goodman 1980  1. Number of general purpose units 
2. Number of special purpose units 
Zeigler and Brun 1980 Number per 100,000 persons 
DiLorenzo 1983 Concentration of tax and expenditure in four largest 
jurisdictions in a county 
Bollens 1986 1. Number of suburban units with more than 10,000 
persons, per100,000 persons in the MSA.  
2. Percent of Metro residents in suburbs with more 
than 10,000 people 
Schneider 1986 Municipalities per 100,000 people 
Oakerson 1987 Total number of governments per 10,000 
Dolan 1990 Fiscal dispersion – standard deviation of 
expenditure by governments within a county 
Barlow 1991 1. Number of municipalities 
2. Differences in population and area of 
municipalities 
3. Scope of municipal responsibility 
4. Sources of revenue (property tax dependence)  
5. Prevalence of inter-municipal arrangements 
Parks and Oakerson1992 Governments per 10,000 persons 
Savitch et. all 1993 Inclusion – percent of metropolitan population held 
within the borders of a central city 
Lewis 1996 Herfindahl index of expenditures for land use 
governments 
Morgan and Mareschal 1999 1. Cities > 10,000 persons per 1 million MSA 
population 
2. Central-city population share 
3. Central-city area growth 1970-1990 
Carr and Feiock 1999 Incremental Dummy variable that phases in the 
consolidation effect over five years (start at 0 = not 
consolidated, then increase 0.2 per year for five 
years, to 1=consolidated) 
Post and Stein 2000 Total number of city governments per 10,000 
Miller 2000 Reverse Herfindahl index of expenditures for all 
governments 
 
Source: Partially drawn from Paytas, 2001 
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Mitchell-Weaver, Miller and Deal (2000) expanded the concept of the 
indicator of political fragmentation measuring relative political power of local 
governments according to their share of local expenditures suggested by Lewis. Their 
Metropolitan Fragmentation Index (MFI) (also called Metropolitan Power Diffusion 
Index (MPDI) in Miller, 2002; Paytas, 2001) modifies the measure that is commonly 
used in the business world to account for a market share of several firms in a 
competitive arena and is known as a Hirsh-Herfindal index. The Hirsh-Herfindal 
index uses squared percentages of market shares to arrive at the final value. However, 
this approach exaggerates contributions of the large players in the marketplace. To 
adjust this methodology to local public economy, the authors substituted square roots 
of the percentages of contributions of each local government. This reverses the scale 
of index from 0 to 1 for the Hirsh-Herfindal index, to the 1 to infinity for the 
fragmentation index, with the value of 1 indicating the total control of one local 
government, and increasing values corresponding to higher degrees of fragmentation. 
This approach allows capturing the contributions of smaller local governments more 
adequately. Where the original Herfindal index gives more weight to the larger 
contributors, Miller’s square root modification is more sensitive to the smaller 
contributors to the pool of total expenditures. The differences in these approaches to 
measuring fragmentation are illustrated on Figure 1. 
The Metropolitan Fragmentation Index (MFI or MPDI) index is formulated as 
a sum of square roots of each government’s percentage of the total spending in the 
metro area. The use of square roots of summed percentages of expenditures represents 
“market share” of units of government, substituting for the measure of political and 
economic power. In the words of Miller (2002, p.80), “expenditures serve as an 
excellent surrogate for political powering a metropolitan region […]. The act of 
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making expenditures is a representation of choice in that it reflects not only the 
expenditures being made, but also the universe of expenditures that could have been 
made somewhere else. At a broader level, they also represent a choice of who or what 
will make those expenditures”. The expenditures included in the calculation of the 
fragmentation index represent a traditional mix of services in the domain of local 
governments, and are listed in Table 3 (since Census of Governments expenditure 
codes are constant throughout the Census years, the item codes are listed in the table 
to make this research easier to replicate in future). This research defines and measures 
Region A
Expenditures: 
One “Big Box” Government: 
 $900,000 
Five “Little Box” Governments 
Each $20,000 
 







Figure 1. Comparing Measures of Fragmentation 
Expenditures: 
One “Big Box” Government: 
 $900,000 
Eleven “Little Box” Governments 
Each $9,091 
 







Source: Based on Miller (2002), Table 5.10, p 97. 
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fragmentation following the methodology by suggested by Mitchell-Weaver, Miller 
and Deal (2000). 
 
 
Table 3. Operational Expenditures Used in the Calculation of 
Fragmentation Index  
Description Item Code 
Financial Administration E23 
Fire Protection E24 
Central Staff Services E29 
General Public Buildings E31 
Health Services - Other E32 
Own Hospitals E36 
Other Hospitals E38 
Regular Highways E44 
Housing & Community Development E50 
Libraries E52 
Parking Facilities E60 
Police Protection E62 
Welfare, Federal Categorical Assistance Programs E67 
Welfare, Cash Assistance - Other E68 
Welfare, Vendor Payments for Medical Care E74 
Welfare, Vendor Payments for Other Purposes E75 
Welfare Institutions E77 
Welfare - Other E79 
Sewerage E80 
Solid Waste Management E81 
General - Other E89 
Water Utilities E91 
Electric Utilities E92 
Gas Utilities E93 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division. 2002. 1997 Census of 
Governments - Finances Technical Documentation; Mitchel-Weaver, Miller and Deal 





Defining and Measuring Sprawl 
 
 In a number of studies and policy reports governmental fragmentation is 
frequently linked to urban sprawl either as its cause or as its manifestation. While 
technically separate phenomena, they appear together in virtually all debates on the 
issues of urban development. In this section, I focus on the definitions of urban 
sprawl. The next section outlines the discussion of costs and benefits of urban sprawl. 
Later in this chapter, I discuss the evidence on the linkages between sprawl and 
fragmentation. 
Urban sprawl has been one of the central themes in both public and academic 
debate on urban policy issues in the second part of the twentieth century. Sprawl has 
oftentimes been referred to as the cause of a greater part of urban problems that 
American metropolises are facing today. Although sprawl has been the subject of 
debate for a long time, some researchers argue that until recently definitions of sprawl 
for the most part were based on subjective criteria (Galster et al. 2001, Wolman et al 
2002, 2004). For example, Lopez and Hynes (2003, p.326) point out that traditionally 
sprawl has been defined as a sum of all or some of the following  elements – “low 
density development; separation of land uses; leapfrog development; strip retail 
development; automobile-dependent development; development at the periphery of an 
urban area at the expense of its core; employment decentralization; loss of peri-urban, 
rural agriculture, and open space; and fragmented governmental responsibility and 
oversight”. In a benchmark study, Galster et al. (2001, p.682) classify traditional 
definitions of sprawl into the following categories: 
1. Sprawl is defined by an example, which is seen to embody the 
characteristics of sprawl, such as Los Angeles. 
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2. Sprawl is used as an aesthetic judgment about general urban 
development pattern. 
3. Sprawl is a cause of an externality, such as high dependence on the 
automobile, isolation of the poor in the inner city, the spatial mismatch 
between jobs and housing, or loss of environmental qualities. 
4. Sprawl is the consequence or effect of some independent variable, such 
as fragmented local government, poor planning, or exclusionary zoning. 
5. Sprawl is defined as one or more existing patterns of development. 
Those most frequently mentioned are low density, leapfrogging, distance to 
central facilities, dispersion of employment and residential development, 
and continuous strip development. 
6. Sprawl is defined as a process of development that occurs over some 
period of time as an urban area expands. 
 While the definitions listed above describe the attributes of the phenomena, 
scientific research requires a working operational definition. Galster et. al (2001, 
p.685) described sprawl as a condition characterizing an urban area and suggested the 
following  conceptual definition of sprawl: 
Sprawl (n.) is a pattern of land use in a urban area that exhibits low levels 
of some combination of eight distinct dimensions: density, continuity, 
concentration, clustering, centrality, nuclearity, mixed uses, and proximity. 
[Where:] Density is the average number of residential units per square mile 
of developable land in an urban area. Continuity is the degree to which 
developable land has been built upon at urban densities in an unbroken 
fashion. Concentration is the degree to which development is located 
disproportionately in relatively few square miles of the total urban area 
rather than spread evenly throughout. Clustering is the degree to which 
development has been tightly bunched to minimize the amount of land in 
each square mile of developable land occupied by residential or 
nonresidential uses. Centrality is the degree to which residential or 
nonresidential development (or both) is located close to the central business 
district of an urban area. Nuclearity is the extent to which an urban area is 
characterized by a mononuclear (as opposed to a polynuclear) pattern of 
development. Mixed uses means the degree to which two different land 
uses commonly exist within the same small area, and this is common 
across the urban area. Proximity is the degree to which different land uses 
are close to each other across an urban area. 
 
 Even if the studies examining sprawl are numerous, until recently there were 
only a few attempts to measure it. Wolman et al. (2004) call the common definition of 
sprawl “ambiguous” and “idiosyncratic”, which in their view prevented researchers 
from its quantitative operationalization. The common misconception of density as an 
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acceptable measure of sprawl is flawed, which can be illustrated by a well-known 
example of Los Angeles as a typical showcase for urban sprawl with one of the 
highest densities in the United States. 
The measure of sprawl described above suggested by Galster (2001) is based 
on standardized objective criteria. The calculation of the sprawl index is based on 
carefully operationalized dimensions. The index is calculated with the use of 
geographic information systems techniques. However, in its current form the method 
requires the knowledge of peculiarities of local geography.  Moreover, the 
methodology is not finalized and is currently being redesigned with regard to the units 
of analysis and the methods of identifying land areas included in the calculations 
(Wolman, et. al., 2002; 2004). With this in mind, currently the methodology 
suggested by Galster is best suited to in-depth analysis of sprawl in a particular area, 
and it is not feasible to employ this measure for statistical analysis across all the 
metropolitan areas. 
Lopez and Hynes (2003) proposed an index of sprawl aimed at making the 
indicator measurable and applicable, objective, and independent of scale (not 
influenced by the size of metropolitan areas). The index is based on Census residential 
population density data. While population density itself cannot serve as a measure of 
sprawl, Lopes and Hynes operationalize sprawl by measuring it as the difference 
between the population living in high-density census tracts and population living in 
low density census tracts. The index is calculated by the following formula: 
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SIi = 50((S%i – D%i)) +1), 
where SIi = sprawl index of metropolitan area i, 
D%i = percentage of the total population in high-density census tracts i, 
S%i = percentage of the total population in low-density tracts i. 
 
The cutoff for the high density tracts is at 3,500 persons per square mile and 
for the low density census tracts is between 3,500 and 200 persons per square mile. 
Census tracts with density below 200 persons per square mile are considered rural 
tracts and are excluded from calculations. These cutoffs represents the thresholds in 
the continuum of modes of transportation from sustainable pedestrian traffic to the 
support for mass transit and, finally, to the reliance on private vehicle trips. They are 
consistent with the density thresholds used in other studies of sprawl. 
For the purposes of this research sprawl is conceptually defined following the 
definition by Galster et al. (2001) and operationally measured by using Lopez and 
Hynes methodology which approximates two dimensions suggested by Galster – 
density and concentration.  Figure 2 shows the example of urban sprawl in Louisville, 








Figure 2: Map of Sprawl in Louisville, KY MSA:  
high-density, sprawled, and rural census tracts. 
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Costs and Benefits of Urban Sprawl 
 
The overwhelming majority of research literature tends to agree on a number 
of consequences of unlimited suburban sprawl that hurt American cities. The 
problems typically attributed to sprawl are well known and include, among others 
“inner-city abandonment, racial segregation, income inequality, destruction of open 
space, loss of farmland, excess energy use, overdependence on cars, high taxes, poor 
health, crime, destruction of community, water pollution and air pollution” (Lopes 
and Hynes, 2003, p.325).  
For example, in a case study of Memphis MSA, Ciscel (2001) points out that 
sprawl plays a major role in a number of inefficiencies of metropolitan growth. He 
shows a disproportion in the central location of jobs and the peripheral places of 
residence of workers. Similar inefficiencies are observed in educational attainment. 
The author outlines significant costs of commuting, expressed both in opportunity 
costs of time lost commuting and environmental damage caused by pollution. Finally, 
Ciscel stresses the significant capital expenditures on infrastructure that could have 
been saved in a more compact development pattern. 
Infrastructure inefficiencies outlined in the case study above are confirmed by 
the mathematical models. Speir and Stephenson (2002) construct engineering cost 
models for public expenditures on water and sewer systems. The study produces the 
expected results that confirmed the findings of previous research in the field – 
“smaller lots, shorter distances between existing centers, and lower tract dispersions 
reduce water and sewer costs” (Speir and Stephenson, 2002, p.64). Burchell and 
Mukherji (2003) examine the cost of sprawl using mathematical impact models. The 
25-year projections of conventional development patterns versus managed growth 
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demonstrated significant increases in conversion of undeveloped land, higher 
spending on new road construction, substantial local fiscal deficits and higher housing 
occupancy costs associated with the sprawl scenario.  The authors conclude that 
limiting growth to an existing urbanized area will result in significant savings of both 
human and natural resources. 
At the same time as the majority of research literature on the subject associate 
sprawl with negative externalities, some authors are less critical. In 1963 Melvin 
Webber in his article “Order in Diversity: Community without Propinquity” defends 
the private benefits that sprawl offers to American consumers. He suggests that 
regardless of the efforts that planners may take to curtail spatial dispersion of cities 
it’s unlikely to fade away – “all Americans are coming to share very similar cultural 
traits; the physical boundaries of settlements are disappearing; and the networks of 
interdependence among various groups are becoming functionally intricate and 
spatially widespread” (Webber, 1963,p.24).  
Webber points out the logic of spatially dispersed patterns of development. 
Characterizing the traditional qualities of cities, he demonstrates how agglomeration 
economies led to creation of compact cities during the period of industrialization. 
Businesses chose central locations because of the speed and ease of personal contact 
that they offered. With the progress of modern technology, this comparative 
advantage of the centralized location has begun to diminish. Traditionally, location 
decisions of businesses and individuals in a city were influenced by a balance of 
lowering rents and increasing communication costs while locating further from the 
city center. In the modern world, the decreasing transportation costs together with low 
communication costs allow cities to spread out. Rapidly declining communication 
costs make central location less valuable, while the amenities offered by peripheral 
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locations gain more significance. Webber stresses the centrality of communication 
costs to development of metropolitan settlements. He suggests that the only binding 
forces that keep cities compact today are personal communication networks, and 
social and cultural ties of its residents.   
The author urges urban planners to acknowledge the changing spatial character 
of cities and “seek that spatial distribution of urban populations and urban activities 
that will permit greater freedom for human interaction while, simultaneously, 
providing freer access to natural amenities and effective management of the landscape 
and of mineral resources” (Webber, 1963, p.54).  Although Webber’s work can hardly 
be characterized as a sprawl advocacy, it does indicate a direction toward “pragmatic, 
problem solving approach in which the spatial aspects of the metropolis are viewed as 
continuous with and defined by the progress of urban society – in which space is 
distinguished from place, in which human interaction rather than land is seen as the 
fruitful focus of attention, and in which plans limited to the physical form of the urban 
settlement are no longer put forth as synoptic statements of our goals” (Webber, 1963, 
p.25). 
 In a frequently cited article Gordon and Richardson (1997) discuss the 
desirability of compact cities as a planning goal and defend sprawl as a spatial 
phenomenon reflecting consumer preferences and economic efficiencies. The authors 
evaluate a number of traditional claims to the undesirable consequences of 
uncontrolled low-density development.  
The arguments discussed in their study can be grouped into three categories – 
the shortage of natural resources (energy and prime agricultural land), the efficiency 
of urban settlements (traffic congestion, feasibility of mass transit system), and the 
political factors (politics of downtown development, social equity, preferences of the 
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consumers). The authors dismiss the arguments based on the shortage of natural 
resources, citing the evidence to the contrary. Acknowledging the congestion 
problems, the study suggests introducing congestion pricing and emission fees. The 
subsidies for mass transit are not recommended due to the lack of evidence to their 
efficiency. The authors emphasize the evidence that current mass transit systems are 
underutilized and their expansion in today’s low-density cities is economically 
unfeasible. The study challenges the dependence of downtown redevelopment efforts 
on city political climates. The authors suggest that only few of the highly visible 
projects with an expensive price tag deliver the promised results. The funding of these 
projects is influenced by the political power of downtown real estate developers. 
There is no evidence to either enhanced social equity or efficient use of public 
finances in regard to subsidized downtown construction. Gordon and Richardson are 
highly skeptical at linking social equity with compact development. They point out 
that the only direct remedy to social inequities is income redistribution. The authors 
argue that while the suburbanization does show the signs of economic and racial 
segregation, “the link between interventions to increase compactness by promoting 
higher densities and improvements in equity is obscure at best” (Gordon and 
Richardson, 1997).  Finally, the study suggests an overwhelming preference of the 
American consumers toward the low-density development, proven by both consumer 
surveys and actual development patterns. If compact cities may have a boutique 
appeal for some residents, the attempts to impose these preferences on everybody by 
command-and-control regulation run contrary to the principles of free market 
economy and consumer sovereignty. In Gordon and Richardson’s view, either the 
alleged negative externalities of urban sprawl are far from reality or they represent 
consumer demand in the marketplace. The authors find “the alternative of attempting 
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a reversal of existing urban trends neither feasible nor desirable” (Gordon and 
Richardson, 1997). While Gordon and Richardson’s assertions can be criticized3, the 
study provides an important outlook on an alternative approaches to the study of 
urban sprawl.  
As the discussion above outlines some of the lines of argument in the 
discussion on the alleged positive and negative impacts of sprawl, the comprehensive 
discussion is a topic for separate research. Burchell et. all (1998), for example, present 
such a comprehensive review. Their summary of the alleged cost and benefits of 




                                               
 
3
 The first part of this section outlined a number of arguments against sprawl that serve as the counter-
claims to the Gordon and Richardson’s assertions. These arguments are based primarily on the costs of 
sprawl. Ewing (1997) presented a specific response to Gordon and Richardson views of sprawl as a 
desirable product of market forces. He summarizes the different views on the causes of sprawl, the 
costs of sprawl, and the possible cures. Ewing argues that sprawl is impossible without the government 
subsidies, and that it is a product of market imperfections. He makes a case that “the costs of sprawl are 
borne by all of us, not just those creating it, and include inflated public spending, loss or resource 
lands, and a waning sense of community” (Ewing, 1997). 
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Table 4. Costs and Benefits of Sprawl.  
Substantive 
Concern  Alleged Negative Impacts  Alleged Positive Impacts  
Public-Private 
Capital and 
Operating Costs  
Higher infrastructure costs  
Higher public operating costs  
More expensive private 
residential and nonresidential 
development costs  
More adverse public fiscal 
impacts  
Higher aggregate land costs  
Lower public operating costs 
Less expensive private residential 
and nonresidential development 
costs  
Fosters efficient development of 
“leapfrogged” areas  
Transportation and 
Travel Costs  
More vehicle miles traveled 
(VMT)  
Longer travel times  
More automobile trips  
Higher household 
transportation spending  
Less cost-efficient and 
effective transit  
Higher social costs of travel  
Shorter commuting times  
Less congestion  
Lower governmental costs for 
transportation  





Loss of agricultural land  
Reduced farmland 
productivity  
Reduced farmland viability 
(water constraints)  
Loss of fragile environmental 
lands  
Reduced regional open space  
Enhanced personal and public open 
space  
Quality of Life  
Aesthetically displeasing  
Weakened sense of 
community  
Greater stress  
Higher energy consumption  
More air pollution  
Lessened historic 
preservation  
Preference for low-density living  
Lower crime rates  
Enhanced value or reduced costs of 
public and private goods  
Fosters greater economic well-being  
Social Issues  
Fosters suburban exclusion  
Fosters spatial mismatch  
Fosters residential 
segregation  
Worsens city fiscal stress  
Worsens inner-city 
deterioration  
Fosters localized land use decisions  
Enhances municipal diversity and 
choice  
Source: Burchell et al, 1998. 
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Are Fragmentation and Sprawl Interlinked? 
 
 Literature on urban policy issues oftentimes tends to link sprawl and 
fragmentation. For example, Downs (1994), when examining policies of metropolitan 
development equates fragmentation with sprawl and argues that cohesive strategies of 
metropolitan governance require offsetting fragmented land use powers. In a more 
recent study, Downs (1998) included governmental fragmentation in the definition of 
suburban sprawl. While the association between fragmentation and sprawl may be 
widely accepted, it is not clear whether fragmentation stimulates sprawl, or sprawl 
creates the need to incorporate new land developments into separate jurisdictions. 
Whereas until recently there were no specific studies empirically explaining cause-
and-effect relationship between the two phenomena, current urban research suggests 
some important linkages. 
 Razin and Rosentraub (2000) examined an association between political 
fragmentation and suburban sprawl in a sample of 98 U.S. and Canadian metropolitan 
areas with population of their urbanized areas of at least 500,000 people. The authors 
question whether fragmentation and sprawl are interlinked and frame the following 
public policy dilemma: 
If governmental fragmentation is unrelated to sprawl–people may simply 
prefer smaller governing units or they may prefer low-density 
developments independent of governing structures–then those addressing 
any perceived negative consequences from sprawl will have to look at 
policy responses other than reducing the number of governmental units. If 
fragmentation does indeed lead to sprawl, and if it can be determined that 
sprawl is indeed negative, changing governance systems may be the right 
step to change land use-patterns (Razin and Rosentraub, 2000, p.822). 
The study measured sprawl for residential land uses using the following 
indicators: the percentage of dwellings in single-unit detached houses, population per 
square kilometer and housing units per square kilometer. Among the measures of 
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fragmentation included in the study are the total number of governments per capita, 
the number of general-purpose governments per capita, the indicator showing the 
presence of consolidated metropolitan government, and the proportion of population 
in the largest city. The association between fragmentation and sprawl was examined 
in correlation and regression models. 
The authors found that while correlation coefficients between sprawl and 
fragmentation are positive and significant, they are not very strong (0.38 for the 
sample of U.S. and Canadian metropolitan areas, 0.27 for U.S. metropolitan areas 
alone). The authors note that if examined individually, a large number of metropolitan 
areas display substantial levels of sprawl despite low levels of fragmentation. 
Regression models indicated a significant impact of sprawl on fragmentation; 
however, fragmentation did not predict sprawl. The authors elaborate: 
Low levels of fragmentation do not guarantee compact development. In 
contrast, the combination of high levels of fragmentation and low levels of 
sprawl is rare. Compact forms of development do not coexist with most 
fragmented municipal patterns, perhaps because fragmentation precludes 
the control of sprawl or because compact residential development reduces 
prospects for fragmentation (Razin and Rosentraub, 2000, p.834). 
Razin and Rosentraub conclude that lack of excessive fragmentation is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for compact development. Given the weak 
association between fragmentation and sprawl, it is incorrect to always assume that 
fragmentation is an integral aspect of sprawl. 
In a recent research, Caruthers and Ulfarsson (2002) investigate the 
relationship between fragmentation and sprawl in 283 counties of 14 states with the 
highest rates of state population growth. The study covers the time period between 
1982 and 1992. The authors point out that the main purpose of current urban policy is 
the reduction of “urban sprawl by promoting jurisdictional cooperation and regulatory 
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consistency across metropolitan areas” (Caruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002, p.313). The 
study evaluates fragmentation and sprawl according to such a policy goal.  
Two separate measures of sprawl are used: density and urbanized land area. 
Fragmentation is measured as per capita municipalities, and per capita special 
districts. Caruthers and Ulfarsson hypothesize the character of a cause-and-effect 
relationship between fragmentation and sprawl. According to the study, the 
relationship between fragmentation and sprawl occurs in a recursive pattern: 
(…) political structure of a metropolitan area at time t-1 affects the 
outcome of development at time t. In turn, urban sprawl leads to additional 
fragmentation in a later period (t+1) as new jurisdictions form around 
growth centers in unincorporated areas and/or separate from existing 
communities. Although the exact duration of the time periods remains 
unknown, they exist to represent the time it takes for development to 
materialize and new jurisdictions to form (Caruthers and Ulfarsson, 2002, 
p.317). 
Using a system of simultaneous equations in a regression model the study has 
found that sprawl is associated with large amounts of urbanized land, lower property 
values and greater infrastructure expenditures. Fragmentation is associated with lower 
density and lesser amounts of urbanized land. The authors found that fragmentation is 
positively correlated with urban property values. There is no evidence that 
fragmentation affects infrastructure expenditures.  
Having found that governmental fragmentation fosters such manifestations of 
sprawl as lower densities and greater land consumption, the study recommends the 
reinforcement of “the objectives of centralized form of land use governance, including 
state planning programs, regional planning organization, and elastic cities” (Caruthers 
and Ulfarsson, 2002, p.337). 
As illustrated by the examples above, and similarly to the discussion on 
fragmentation of governments between proponents of monocentric and polycentric 
theory, there is only a limited consensus on the linkages between sprawl and 
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fragmentation. The studies discussed here demonstrate with a varying degree of 
statistical significance that the linkages between fragmentation and sprawl do exist. 
However, the cause-and-effect relationship between political fragmentation and urban 
sprawl has not been firmly established.  
 
 
Problem Statement and Hypotheses 
 
As noted in Chapter I, numerous studies call for additional investigation into 
the issues of metropolitan governance, fragmentation and sprawl (ACIR, 1987; 
Altshuler et al., 1999, Lewis, 1996; Nelson and Foster, 1999). Discussion earlier in 
this chapter shows that empirical research provides support for both monocentric and 
polycentric theories of metropolitan governance; however, this evidence is limited 
and contradictory. Aesthetic preferences aside, we need to examine empirical 
evidence linking sprawl with metropolitan outcomes to understand whether sprawl, or 
at least its elements, are beneficial to metropolitan growth. 
The investigation of the possible relationships between the above-mentioned 
variables may help explain the variation in performance and development of different 
metropolitan areas. Some of the questions that this research seeks to answer are:  
- Does fragmentation discourage economic development? 
- Does urban sprawl promote higher rates of economic development? 
In exploring the answers to these questions, I employ fragmentation of 
government and urban sprawl as independent variables and metropolitan economic 
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performance as a dependent variable. Following the public choice argument it is 
hypothesized that:  
 
1. Higher levels of governmental fragmentation are positively associated with 
economic performance. 
2. Higher levels of urban sprawl are positively associated with economic 
performance4. 
                                               
 
4
 It is possible to make an argument that the opposite direction of the relationship may be true - high 
levels of economic performance may tend to result in greater sprawl. The hypotheses is formulated in 
this way primarily to examine whether economic performance may serve as a valid justification for 











Multiple linear regression analysis is a commonly used tool for analyzing links 
between metropolitan governance and performance of metropolitan areas. This 
research examines the links between governance in metropolitan areas, urban 
geography and economic performance. It is hypothesized that governmental 
fragmentation and urban sprawl will be positively associated with economic 
performance. Previous studies and theories of economic development suggest that a 
number of additional factors will influence economic performance of metro areas. 
Such factors are included in regression models as controls. In addition, two economic 
development variables are used in the regression analysis as a benchmark for 
analyzing relative importance of fragmentation and sprawl while comparing them 
with other possible tools of economic development. A derived goal of my research is 
testing of new measures of governmental fragmentation and urban sprawl proposed in 
recent urban research literature. These indicators discussed in the previous chapter are 
the index of fragmentation (Mitchell-Weaver et al, 2000), and the sprawl index by 
Lopez and Hynes (2003).  
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Units of Analysis 
 
The units of analysis of the dissertation are metropolitan areas (Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSA) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSA). The 
choice of metropolitan areas as units of analysis is not accidental. Standard & Poors’s 
DRI 1999 report calls metropolitan areas “the engines of America’s growth” and 
shows that more than 80 percent of the nation’s employment, income, and production 
of goods and services is generated by metro economies. Barnes and Ledebur (1998) 
argue that metropolitan regions are the most important elements of the US economy. 
To better understand the impacts of fragmentation and sprawl on economic 
performance it is necessary to evaluate the performance of a metropolitan region, 
rather than analyze central city data alone or in combination with a central county. 
While an argument may be made in support of studying Consolidated Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (CMSA) as geographic areas reflecting continuous regional 
economies, for the purposes of examining sprawl patterns it is more useful to 
concentrate on smaller parts of CMSAs (however, as they are not free standing and 
independent, an additional variable controlling for whether a metropolitan area is a 
part of a larger region is included as a control). The study includes 334 MSAs and 
PMSAs as defined by the United States Office of Management and Budget. Table A1 
(presented in the Appendix) lists metropolitan areas included in the study ranked by 





To answer the hypotheses, economic performance is modeled as a function of 
government fragmentation, sprawl and other controlling factors. The hypotheses are 
tested in three separate models.  In the first equation, metropolitan performance is 
modeled as a function of fragmentation, sprawl and socioeconomic controls. The 
second model estimates the impact of economic development variables together with 
socioeconomic controls on metropolitan economic performance. Theories of 
economic development examine a multitude of factors affecting economic growth; 
however, the variables relating to the organization of governance in metropolitan 
areas are rarely included in analysis. My research is designed to complement the 
argument of these theories by analyzing whether inclusion of the variables 
corresponding to governance structure of a metropolitan area will enhance the 
explanatory power of the models. So, the third model includes the policy variables 
(fragmentation and sprawl), economic development variables (described later in this 
chapter) and the controls. The three-model design is used to compare relative 
importance of fragmentation and sprawl versus the variables controlling for economic 
development by tracking changes in explanatory power (R2) of the models when 
entering additional variables. 
It is realistic to assume that metropolitan areas of different size may 
demonstrate different patterns of interaction between space, politics and economic 
development. To observe these possible differences all models are calculated four 
times: for all the metropolitan areas in the database, and separately for the population-
ranked subsets of the database – small metropolitan areas (population less than 
250,000 persons), medium metro areas (population between 250,000 and 1,000,000 
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persons), and large metro areas (population above 1,000,000 persons). These 
population cutoffs are standard and are used, for example, by the Federal Reserve 
Bank, and by the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA, 2004).  
 
Model 1: Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation; Sprawl; 
Socioeconomic Controls); 
Model 2:  Economic Performance = f (Economic Development 
Variables; Socioeconomic Controls); 
Model 3: Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation; Sprawl; 





Dependent Variable: Economic Performance. Economic performance of metro areas 
is measured as Gross Metropolitan Product per capita. The data for the year 1999 is 
used to match Census of Population data used for the other variables. The data is 
obtained from DRI-WEFA (2002). A table ranking metropolitan areas by economic 
performance is presented in the Appendix (Table A1). 
 
Policy Variables: Fragmentation. This study uses a political fragmentation index 
formulated by Mitchell-Weaver, Miller and Deal and discussed in Chapter II. The 
data is obtained form the 1997 Census of Governments. A table ranking metropolitan 
areas by the political fragmentation index is presented in the Appendix (Table A2) 
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Policy Variables: Urban Sprawl.  This study uses an urban sprawl index as 
formulated by Lopez and Hynes and discussed in Chapter II. Data is obtained from 
Lopez and Hynes (2003). A table ranking metropolitan areas by the sprawl index is 
presented in the Appendix (Table A3). 
 
Economic Development Controls: Human Capital. Theories of economic 
development provide important insights into the causes of metropolitan economic 
performance. This research employs two variables suggested by the literature on 
theories of local economic development as benchmarks to evaluate the importance of 
politics and urban development patterns on metropolitan outcomes.  
One such theory is human capital. Numerous studies have stressed an 
importance of human capital for city growth (Romer, 1986, Lucas, 1988, Mathur, 
1999). Fitzgerald (1993) equates education and training with economic development. 
Blakely (1994, p.206) calls human capital “pivotal to the economic development 
process”, and lists human resource development programs as an important tool of 
economic development professionals. Glaeser (1994) demonstrates a positive 
relationship between the percentage of population with higher education and income 
growth. Porter (1997) stresses the importance of job training as a source of inner-city 
economic development. Gottlieb and Fogarty (2003) pointed out that educational 
attainment is a driver of regional economic growth. Through regression analysis, 
these authors demonstrated statistically a significant positive relationship between 
educational attainment and per capita income growth. The study recommends human 
capital development strategy as one of the most accessible instruments of local 
economic development. Drawing upon the research of Gottlieb and Fogarty (2003), 
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the independent variable representing human capital economic development theory in 
my study is educational attainment at the bachelor’s degree level and higher for 
population older than 25 years. Data for educational attainment is obtained from the 
Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census of Population & Housing. A table ranking 
metropolitan areas by educational attainment is presented in the Appendix (Table A5). 
 
Economic Development Controls: Supply-side Theory. Eisinger (1988) distinguishes 
supply-side and demand-side approaches to economic development.  The supply-side 
approach to economic development emphasizes policies aimed at the increase in local 
production of goods and services through the increases in local productive input, 
including capital, labor, entrepreneurial talent, external economies, infrastructure, and 
natural amenities (Howland, 1993). Economic development policies corresponding to 
the solutions suggested by the human capital theory enhance local labor inputs and 
can be recognized as supply-side policies.  Nevertheless, the traditional supply-side 
incentives typically used by communities tend to focus on capital. Macroeconomic 
theory suggests that changes in the tax structure have an effect on capital 
accumulation (Lucas, 1990). While metropolitan regions do not have direct control 
over taxation of capital income, a number of supply-side policies are often used in 
local economic development practice in pursuit of economic growth. These supply-
side measures typically include tax and financial inducements, infrastructure 
improvement, and land assembly and development (Reese and Fasenfest, 1997). 
The task of estimating the prevalence of supply-side incentives in economic 
development practices of metropolitan areas can be a topic of a separate research. For 
the purposes of this study it can be assumed that the low-tax jurisdictions represent 
the supply-side approach to local economic development. As an indicator of supply-
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side policy, I use a specific variable called fiscal effort of local government. The fiscal 
effort measure has been used by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations and consists of “locally raised government revenue as a percent of personal 
income received by residents” (ACIR, 1967). Data for personal income is obtained 
from the Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census of Population & Housing. Data for the 
local tax revenue is obtained from the Bureau of the Census, 1997 Census of 
Governments. The 1999 Census of Population and Housing income data is adjusted to 
match 1997 dollars used in Census of Governments according to the Implicit Price 
Deflator obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. A table ranking 
metropolitan areas on the fiscal effort is presented in the Appendix (Table A6). 
 
Socioeconomic Controls. Research literature dealing with issues of metropolitan 
performance and governance indicates a number of additional factors that are 
important for this analysis. Apart from the main variables, the study controls for these 
additional factors. 
 
State economic performance. Metropolitan development does not occur 
independently of a larger economic system. As such, it is important to control for the 
influence of external economic processes. State economic performance net of 
economic performance of the corresponding metropolitan areas per capita is used as a 
proxy for measuring these external influences. A method of adjusting state data is 
suggested by Blair, Staley, and Zhan (1996) and later used by Post and Stein (2000). 
State economic performance per capita net of metropolitan area economic 
performance per capita variable is calculated separately for each metro following: 
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SEPi  =  ( GSPi – GMPi ) / ( SPi – MPi ), 
 
where SEPi = state economic performance net of ith metro area economic 
performance; GSP = gross state product for the ith state; GMPi = gross metro 
product for the ith metro area; SPi = state population for the ith state; MPi = 
metro population  for the ith metro area. 
 
  Gross state product net of individual metropolitan area contribution [( GSPi – 
GMPi ) ] is reported for each metro area in DRI-WEFA, 2002. Population adjustment 
calculations [( SPi – MPi )] were performed by the author. For metropolitan areas 
geographically covering areas in more than one state, adjustment of the state level 
variable is made according to the state of central city in MSA. Although this may 
introduce some degree of inaccuracy in the analysis it is difficult to allocate precisely 
each state’s share of economic performance. Data for gross state product and gross 
metropolitan product for the year 1999 are obtained from DRI-WEFA, 2002. Data for 
state and metropolitan population for the year 1999 is obtained from the Bureau of the 
Census, 2000 Census of Population & Housing. 
 
Age of the Metro. Studies suggest that age can be a predictor for the economic 
performance of metropolitan areas. The proxy for measuring age of metropolitan 
areas is suggested by Razin and Rosentraub (2000). The age of metropolitan areas is 
measured via a proxy of the percent of housing built before 1939. Data for age of the 
metro is obtained from the Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census of Population & 
Housing. The data for age of the metro is presented in the Appendix (Table A7). 
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Average household size. Smaller average household size is traditionally 
associated with the patterns of postindustrial development. To control for these 
patterns I use the average household size as a proxy for post-industrial demographic 
changes. Data is obtained from the Bureau of the Census, 2000 Census of Population 
& Housing. The data for average household size is presented in the Appendix (Table 
A7). 
 
Affluence. Affluence is measured as the percent of households earning in 
excess of $100,000. Data for affluence is obtained from the Bureau of the Census, 
2000 Census of Population & Housing. The data for affluence is presented in the 
Appendix (Table A7). 
 
Racial Segregation. Racial segregation is measured via the White-Black 
dissimilarity index5. Dissimilarity indices are often used in research literature to 
account for sorting by race and income. Data for racial segregation is obtained from 
the Lewis Mumford Center for Comparative Urban and Regional Research. The index 
is based on 2000 Census of Population data. The data for White-Black dissimilarity 
index is presented in the Appendix (Table A7). 
 
In CMSA. As previously indicated, the units of analysis in this study are 
metropolitan areas (MSA and PMSA). However, Primary MSAs by definition are a 
part of a larger regional economy and thus are not independent. To control for this, a 
                                               
 
5
 “The dissimilarity index measures whether one particular group is distributed across census tracts in 
the metropolitan area in the same way as another group. A high value indicates that the two groups tend 
to live in different tracts. D ranges from 0 to 100. A value of 60 (or above) is considered very high. It 
means that 60% (or more) of the members of one group would need to move to a different tract in order 
for the two groups to be equally distributed. Values of 40 or 50 are usually considered a moderate level 
of segregation, and values of 30 or below are considered to be fairly low” (Lewis Mumford Center for 
Comparative Urban and Regional Research, 2002).  
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dummy variable with a value of “1” indicating that a metropolitan area belongs to a 
larger region and “0” if it does not is introduced. The list of metropolitan areas that 
are a part of a larger region is presented in the Appendix (Table A8) 
 
Geographic Location. Previous studies suggest the influence of natural 
conditions such as climate and geography on regional economic performance. 
Classifying metropolitan areas according to geographic location allows me to control 
for region-specific trends of development. This is done by introducing three dummy 
variables coding metropolitan areas according to the U.S Census regions of MSA’s 
location: Midwest, South and West. The region of Northeast is the reference category. 











As indicated in the previous chapters, this study examines the links between 
governmental fragmentation, urban sprawl, and economic development while 
controlling for a number of additional socioeconomic factors. It is hypothesized that, 
following the argument of the public choice school regarding governmental 
fragmentation, and the market-oriented approach to urban sprawl, both sprawl and 
fragmentation will be positively associated with economic performance of 
metropolitan areas. 
The following chapter is arranged in three sections. The first section presents 
the descriptive statistics on fragmentation and sprawl. The second section examines 
the bivariate linear associations between fragmentation, sprawl, economic 
development variables, and other controls. The chapter concludes with testing the 
hypotheses using multiple regression analysis. 
 
Fragmentation of Metropolitan Areas 
 
 The fragmentation index indicates the degree of decentralization of control 
over expenditures by individual local governments in metropolitan regions. The full 
list of metropolitan areas ranked by the fragmentation score is included in the 
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appendix (Table A2). The ten metropolitan areas with the lowest fragmentation scores 
are:  
Honolulu, HI (1.13), Anchorage, AK (1.16), Punta Gorda, FL (1.46), Danville, VA 
(1.49), Laredo, TX (1.60), Owensboro, KY (1.61), San Angelo, TX (1.66), Santa Fe, 
NM (1.69), Las Cruces, NM (1.72), and Jacksonville, NC (1.77).  
The ten metropolitan areas with the highest fragmentation scores are: Boston, 
MA-NH (18.10),Chicago, IL (15.09), Pittsburgh, PA (14.42), St. Louis, MO-IL 
(14.10), Philadelphia, PA-NJ (12.23), Scranton-Wilkes-Barre-Hazleton, PA (10.41), 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI (10.09), Detroit, MI (9.20), Houston, TX (9.07), and 
Newark, NJ (9.01). Mean value for the fragmentation index was 4.30 with the 
standard deviation of 2.24 (Table 5). 
Miller (2002) suggests categorizing metropolitan areas into the six groups 
according to their fragmentation scores: centralized (fragmentation score between 1 
and 2), slightly centralized (2-3), slightly decentralized (3-4), moderately 
decentralized (4-5), highly decentralized (5-7.5), and super decentralized (above 7.5). 
Figure 3 illustrates the geographical variation of fragmentation among the 
metropolitan areas. Metropolitan areas are color-coded according to the classification 
described above. 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Economic Performance 313 17032.16 74169.55 35340.65 8245.06 
Fragmentation Score 318 1.13 18.10 4.30 2.24 
Sprawl Score 329 3.94 100.00 68.14 20.10 
Human Capital 331 11.05 52.38 23.74 7.46 
Tax Effort 318 1.66 20.27 4.45 1.60 
Average Household Size 331 2.18 3.75 2.56 0.20 
Age of Metro 331 0.44 47.28 14.14 10.27 
Segregation 331 20.24 84.72 51.43 13.70 
Affluence 331 3.82 39.20 10.52 5.12 
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Comparing the fragmentation scores in Census regions reveals the highest 
mean fragmentation scores in the Northeast and the Midwest. The mean value of 
fragmentation index for the 60 metropolitan areas (18.1% of all metropolitan areas) in 
the Northeast is 6.54. The next highest mean fragmentation score of 4.82 is in the 
Midwest (calculated for 80, or 24.2% of the total number). The mean value of the 
fragmentation index in the West (for 65 MSAs, or 19.6% of the total number) is 3.78. 
The most centralized metropolitan areas can be found in the South with the mean 
fragmentation index score of 3.39 (for 126 MSAs, or 38.1% of the total number). 
While the direct comparison of individual metropolitan areas on the 
metropolitan power diffusion index (MPDI) scores by Miller and fragmentation index 
values calculated in this study are not appropriate due to changing definitions of 
metropolitan areas from one census year to another, aggregate comparisons can be 
made. The data indicates that the American metropolitan areas are continuously 
decentralizing. 
In the year 1997, of a 318 metropolitan areas for which the fragmentation 
index could be calculated, roughly one-third (30.5%) falls into the centralized and the 
slightly centralized categories. Miller (2002) calculations of the fragmentation scores 
for the 1972 and 1992 have 37.6 percent and 31.8 percent of the metropolitan areas in 
the two centralized categories respectively. The absolute rate of the decline in the 
percentage of centralized metropolitan areas was 5.8 percentage points over the 20 
years, corresponding to the decline of 0.29 percentage points a year. Between the 
years 1992 and 1997 the absolute change in the percent of centralized metropolitan 
areas was 1.3 percent, which corresponds to the decline at an absolute rate of 0.26 
percentage points a year. While the rate of decline is slower than in the previous 20 
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years, the majority of the metropolitan areas are fragmented (moderately 
decentralized to super decentralized), and the decentralization trend continues. 
 
 
Sprawl: Descriptive Statistics 
  
The Lopez-Hynes Sprawl index used in this study approximates the two 
dimensions of sprawl discussed in Chapter II: density and concentration. The values 
of the index vary from 0 to 100, with a value of 0 meaning that entire population of a 
metropolitan area lives in low-density census tracts, a value of 100 indicating that the 
entire population of a metro area lives in high-density census tracts (an index score of 
50 means that the population of a metropolitan area lives equally distributed between 
high and low-density census tracts). 
Mean value for the sprawl index was 68.14 with the standard deviation of 
20.10 (Table 5). Thirteen metropolitan areas have a sprawl index score of 100 with no 
people living in the census tracts with density higher than 3,500 persons per square 
mile: Anniston, AL, Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY, Decatur, AL, Dothan, AL, 
Florence, SC, Goldsboro, NC, Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC, Jonesboro, AR, 
Myrtle Beach, SC, Ocala, FL, Rocky Mount, NC, Sherman-Denison, TX, and Sumter, 
SC.  
The ten least sprawled metropolitan areas are: Jersey City, NJ (3.94), New 
York, NY (6.72), Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA (10.61), San Jose, CA (14.89), 
Miami, FL (15.73), San Francisco, CA (16.96), Fort Lauderdale, FL (20.77), 
Stockton-Lodi, CA (21.52), Las Vegas, NV-AZ (25.54), San Diego, CA (26.85).  
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Overall, 81.5 percent of metropolitan areas are characterized by sprawl scores 
of 50 and above. Metropolitan areas with sprawl scores between 25 and 50 represent 
16.1 percent of the metropolitan areas in the United States. Only 2.1 percent are 
relatively dense with the sprawl scores below 25.  
Comparing the sprawl scores in Census regions reveals higher sprawl in the 
South and the Midwest. The mean value of sprawl index for the 126 metropolitan 
areas (38.1% of all metropolitan areas) in the South is 78.67. Following the South 
with both the next highest number of metropolitan areas (80, or 24.2%) and the 
highest sprawl index scores is the Midwest with the mean sprawl score of 67.13. The 
mean value of the sprawl index in the Northeast (for 60 MSAs, or 18.1% of the total 
number) is 63.19. The most dense metropolitan areas can be found in the West with 
the mean sprawl index score of 53.06 (for 65 MSAs, or 19,6% of the total number). 
This pattern can be observed on the Figure 4, which illustrates the geographical 












































Bivariate Relationships  
 
Tables 6-9 show the correlation matrices for all the variables used in the 
analysis. While bivariate correlations do not imply causality, they can hint of the 
possible relationships, show their strength and directions, and help focus further 
research. The correlation matrices are calculated both for all the metropolitan areas in 
the database, and separately for the population-ranked subsets of the database – small 
metropolitan areas (population less than 250,000 persons), medium metro areas 
(population between 250,000 and 1,000,000 persons), and large metro areas 
(population above 1,000,000 persons). The groups of metropolitan areas ranked by 
population are listed in the Appendix, Table A1.  
Most of the bivariate correlations are statistically significant, and, with a few 
exceptions, range from weak to moderate. Most of associations between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables are statistically significant. The 
following is a detailed description of bivariate relationships related to the research 
questions (fragmentation, sprawl and economic performance) accompanied by the 
scatterplots. Also, a number of additional notable associations between fragmentation, 






Table 6. Correlation Matrix. All Metropolitan Areas. N=331 
Xl X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 XlO XU Xl2 Xl3 Xl4 Xl5 
XI Economic Perfonuance 
X2 Fragmentation Score .297 
(**) 
X3 Sprawl Score -.310 -.269 
(**) (**) 
X4 HlUllan Capital .456 .166 -.335 
(**l (**l (**l 
X5 Tax Effort .347 .317 -.238 
.094 (**) (**) (**) 
X6 Average Household Size 
-.079 .003 -.345 -.1 46 .006 (**) (**) 
X7 Age of Metro .21') .402 -.140 
-.06 1 .375 -.261 (**) (**) (*) (**) (**) 
X8 Segregation 
.093 .48 1 -.101 -.11 6 .304 -. 121 .247 (**) (*) (**) (*) (**) 
X9 Affluence .514 .380 -.463 .674 .207 .198 
.008 .189 (**l (**) (* *l (**) (**l (**) (**) 
X I O State EP .214 
.002 -.262 .010 .328 .263 .1 42 -.002 .243 (**) (**) (**) (**) (*) (**) 
X ll Tn CMSA .214 .317 -.3R2 .2R2 .2GO .2 15 .1 44 .200 (j3 G .231 
(**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) 
X I 2 Northeast .26g .41g -.11 6 .111 .540 
-.069 .63') .IS7 .273 .273 .27') (**) (**) (*) (*) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) 
X I3 Midwest 
.013 .136 -.028 .003 -.028 -.2 16 .317 .150 - 110 -.1 13 -.096 -. 266 (*) (**) (**) (**) (*) (*) (**) 
X 14 South -.217 -.328 .413 -.210 -.1 88 
-.047 -. 562 .089 -.257 -.271 -.237 -. 369 -.443 (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) 
X I S West 
.018 -.116 -.365 .1 46 -.216 .357 -.275 -.452 .1 68 .2 18 .122 -. 233 -.279 -.388 (*) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (* *) (**) (*) (**) (**) (**) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 






Table 8. Correlation Matrix. Medium Metropolitan Areas. N=121 
Xl X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 XlO Xll Xl2 X13 Xl4 Xi5 
Xl Economic Performance 
Xl Fragmentation Score .073 
X3 Sprawl Score -.342 .073 
C**) 
X4 Human Capital .468 -.157 -.259 
C**) C**) 
X5 Tax Effort .161 .348 -.134 .053 
C**) 
X6 Average Household Size -.203 -.13R -.3 93 - 185 -040 
C*) C**) C*) 
X7 Age of Metro .347 .678 -.195 .042 .370(**) -.216 
C**) C**) C*) C*) 
X8 Segregation - .057 .446 .298 -.246 .276 -.330 .353 
(**) C**) C**) (**) (**) C**) 
X9 AfIluence .460 -.111 -.346 .720 .131 .082 .118 -.047 
C**) C**) C**) 
XlO State EP .304 .077 -.479 .025 .528 .311 .333 -.125 .328 
C**) C**) C**) C**) C**) C**) 
Xll In CMSA .133 .015 -.217 .324 .279 .105 .220 .039 .636 .335 
C*) (**) (**) C*) (* *) (**) 
Xl2 Northeast .274 .524 -.102 .117 .504 -.072 .750 .255 .29S .442 .329 
(**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) (**) 
Xl3 Midwest .050 .210 -.030 -. 004 -.018 -.207 .279 .289 -.087 -081 -.018 -.260 
(*) C*) C**) C**) C**) 
Xl4 South -.328 -.328 .611 -.238 -.195 -.119 -.594 .076 -.357 -.509 -.327 -.400 -.400 
C**) (**) C**) (**) (*) (**) C**) C**) (**) (**) C**) 
XIS West .104 -.292 -.601 .172 -.204 .421 -.316 -.635 .2 17 .309 .081 -.260 -.260 -.400 
(**) C**) (*) (**) (**) (**) (*) (**) (**) (**) (**) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 




Table 9. Correlation Matrix. Large Metropolitan Areas. N=61 
Xl Xl X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 X10 Xll X12 X13 X14 X15 
Xl Economic Performance 
X2 Fragmentation Score .276 
C*) 
X3 Sprawl Score -.202 .083 1 
X4 Human Capital .705 .188 -. 150 
(**) 
XS Tax Effort .235 .255 -.281 .130 
(*) C*) 
X6 Average Household Size .042 -.057 -A23 .OB -OB 
C* *) 
X7 Age of Metro .372 .518 -.093 .194 .593 -.280 
('*) (0*) C**) (*) 
X8 Segregation .004 .358 -.063 -.099 .574 -.273 .556 
C") (**) C*) (**) 
X9 Affluence .620 .172 -.362 .796 .191 .365 .120 -.039 
(**) (**) C**) C**) 
XIO State EP -.070 -.223 -.218 .055 .203 .337 .013 .040 .346 
(**) (**) 
Xll InCMSA .356 .224 -.556 .338 .321 .359 .167 .236 .566 .254 
(**) C**) C**) (*) (**) (**) 
Xl2 Northeast .208 .369 -.035 .138 .647 -.057 .663 .312 .268 .315 .129 
C**) C**) C**) (*) (*) (*l 
Xl3 Midwest -.086 .345 .177 -.133 -.032 -.1 97 .210 .403 -.174 -.219 -.120 -.244 
C**) (**) 
Xl4 South -.243 -A56 .320 -.134 -.191 -.162 -.526 -.103 -.300 -.193 -.224 -A05 -.365 
(0') C*) (**) (*) (*0) (.*) 
XIS West .161 -.149 -.509 .141 -.380 A23 -.232 -.553 .244 .135 .243 -.284 -.256 -A25 
(") C**) (**) (**) C*) (*) (**) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Fragmentation and sprawl 
 
For all the metropolitan areas in the database, correlation between 
fragmentation and sprawl is negative and statistically significant (r = -.269). In the 
population-ranked subsets of the database the associations are not statistically 
significant and are close to zero (small: r = -0.074; medium: r = 0.073; large: r = 
0.083). Figure 5 illustrates the bivariate associations between the fragmentation index 
scores and the sprawl index scores. As can be noticed from the first scatterplot, while 
the relationship is not very strong, the regression line has a negative slope.6 
                                               
 
6
 As it can be seen on the scatterplot for all metropolitan areas, a straight line may not be a very good 
fit. To test for the possible negative exponential relationship, the sprawl score was correlated with the 
natural log of the fragmentation score. Correlation coefficient was negative and its value was close to 
the linear correlation (-0.254; statistically significant at 0.01 level). The equation for the regression line 
was: Sprawl Score= 83.34 – 11.31*Ln(Fragmentation Score); R2 = 0.06.  
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 Fragmentation and economic performance 
 
For all the metropolitan areas in the database, correlation between 
fragmentation and economic performance is positive and statistically significant (r = 
0.297). Similar positive and statistically significant associations were observed for the 
small (r = 0.237) and large metropolitan areas (r = 0.276). For the medium 
metropolitan areas the relationship was not statistically significant and is close to zero 
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(r = 0.073). Figure 6 illustrates the bivariate associations between the fragmentation 
index scores and economic performance. The regression slope on all the scatterplots is 
positively inclined.  
 
 





Sprawl and economic performance 
 
The correlation coefficients for sprawl and economic performance variables 
are negative. Statistically significant relationships were observed for all the 
metropolitan areas (r = -0.310) and the medium metropolitan areas (r = -0.342). 
Correlation coefficients in small and large metro areas are not statistically significant. 
Figure 7 illustrates the bivariate associations between the sprawl index scores and 
economic performance. A nearly flat regression line and a highly dispersed dot 
pattern indicate a lack of statistical significance and a weak relationship in the subsets 
of database for small and large metro areas. However, for the medium metro areas and 
for all the regions in the database the association is negative and pronounced. 
 
Figure 7. Sprawl Score and Economic Performance: Scatterplots 
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Fragmentation, sprawl, and individual control variables 
 
Aside from the described above associations related to the main research 
questions, a number of additional notable associations characterizing fragmentation 
and sprawl were observed. The associations between human capital, tax effort, 
affluence and economic performance, and the associations between the policy 
variables (fragmentation, sprawl) and the above mentioned control variables suggest 
that the policy variables in their turn may serve as the confounding factors with both 
direct and indirect links to economic performance.  
Some associations between the control variables and the policy variables 
reveal additional characteristics of sprawl and fragmentation of metropolitan areas. 
These associations include correlations between the policy variables and segregation, 
age of metropolitan areas, metro areas belonging to a larger agglomeration, and 
geographic location of metropolitan areas. 
 
Fragmentation, sprawl, and human capital. 
The variable for human capital is measured as a percent of population 25 years 
old and higher with a bachelor degree and above. The variable is consistently 
positively correlated with economic performance. A statistically significant 
correlation coefficient of 0.116 indicates only a weak if present link between 
fragmentation and human capital (the association is not confirmed in the population 
ranked subsets of the database either). However, the association between sprawl and 
human capital is more notable. Overall, highly sprawled areas tend to score lower on a 
human capital scale. The correlation coefficient for all metro areas in the database is 
statistically significant and it equals -0.335. While not confirmed for the large metro 
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areas, the similar negative association is observed in small (r = -0.250) and medium (r 
= -0.259) regions. 
 
Fragmentation, sprawl, and tax effort. 
Tax effort, measured as the total local government tax revenue collected in the 
metro area as a percent of the personal income (see Chapter III), is positively 
associated with economic performance. Correlation coefficients for fragmentation and 
tax effort are statistically significant, positive, and moderate (all: r = 0.317, small: r = 
0.297, medium: r = 0.348, large: r = 0.255). The opposite association is observed 
between tax effort and sprawl (all: r = -0.238; small: r = -0.200; medium: not 
statistically significant; large: r = -0.423). 
  
Fragmentation, sprawl, and affluence. 
Affluence, measured as a percentage of households with income in excess of 
$100,000, had the highest correlation coefficients with the dependent variable. Due to 
the fact that this variable is also highly correlated with human capital it is not used 
later in the regression analysis to avoid multicollinearity. However, it is important to 
note here its relationships with sprawl and fragmentation.  
While the examination of the relationship between fragmentation and 
affluence in the individual subsets of the database did not produce a statistically 
significant result, among all the metropolitan areas this association was positive and 
statistically significant (r = 0.380).  
On the sprawl side, a statistically significant negative link was found between 
the sprawl index and the percentage of the affluent households (r = -0.463). This link 
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is not evident for the small metropolitan areas, but it is observed in medium (r = -
0.346) and large (r = -0.362) regions.  
 
Fragmentation, sprawl, and racial segregation.  
Racial segregation was measured as the White-Black dissimilarity index. The 
association between racial segregation and fragmentation is positive and statistically 
significant for all the metropolitan areas (r = 0.481). The relationship is strongest for 
the medium metro areas (r = 0.446) and the large metropolitan areas (r = 0.358). 
Small metropolitan areas demonstrate only a weak if present association (r = 0.169). 
All correlation coefficients are statistically significant. 
A positive association between sprawl and racial segregation was confirmed 
only for the medium metropolitan areas (r =0.298). 
 
Fragmentation, sprawl, and age of metro areas.  
Age of metropolitan areas is measured via a proxy of the percentage of 
housing built before 1939. The correlation coefficients for the bivariate association 
between the sprawl index and the age of the region is statistically significant, very 
weak and negative (r = -0.140). Similar relationships are found for the small areas (r = 
-0.266) and the medium areas (r = -0.195). Analysis of the relationship in the large 
metropolitan areas does not demonstrate links between sprawl and the age of the 
region.  
The relationship of age on the metropolitan areas with the fragmentation index 
is more profound. All the correlation coefficients are statistically significant. Older 
metropolitan areas tend to have higher fragmentation scores (all: r = 0.402). The most 
support for this association was found among the medium metro areas (r = 0.678), 
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followed by the small metropolitan areas (r = .578), and the large metropolitan areas 
(r = 0.518). 
 
Fragmentation, sprawl, and large regional agglomerations. 
Correlation coefficients were calculated to examine whether belonging to a 
larger agglomeration of metropolitan areas was linked to the sprawl and 
fragmentation scores. Metropolitan areas located within the Consolidated 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs) demonstrate a weak tendency to have a 
higher fragmentation scores (all metro areas: r= 0.317; small: not statistically 
significant, medium: not statistically significant, large: not statistically significant). 
Metropolitan areas in CMSAs have lower sprawl scores (all: r = -0.382). This was the 
most evident for the large metro areas (r = -0.556), followed by the medium metro 




Regression Models  
 
 To analyze the relationships between fragmentation, sprawl, and economic 
performance of the metropolitan areas, and to compare the strength of these 
relationships with the effects of economic development variables on the independent 
variable, multiple linear regression analysis was conducted. Similar to the analysis of 
the bivariate correlations, the four sets of models were created for all metropolitan 
areas in the database, and separately for the small, the medium and the large 
metropolitan areas. 
 Three regression models were created for each subset of the database. This 
design allows tracking the explanatory power of the models with different sets of 
independent variables and comparing which set offers the best explanation of 
variation in metropolitan economic performance. The first model estimates the impact 
on economic performance of the main policy variables – fragmentation index and 
sprawl index, while controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. The second 
model is introduced to compare and contrast the effects of policy variables with the 
effects of economic development variables. It estimates the impacts on economic 
performance of economic development variables – human capital and tax effort. It 
employs the same set of socioeconomic controls as the first model. The third model 
combines policy variables, economic development variables, and socioeconomic 
controls. It creates a fuller set of controls for evaluating the relationships between 
fragmentation, sprawl and economic performance. The differences in the explanatory 
power with the first two models reveals stronger predictors of the metropolitan 
economic performance. The following are the tables with the results of the analysis 
accompanied by individual descriptions. 
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Multiple regression analysis for all metropolitan areas. 
 
Table 10 presents the results of the ordinary least squares regression for the 
310 MSA in the database. Twenty metropolitan areas were excluded from the analysis 
due to unavailable and/or incompatible data7.  
 
Model 1. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Controls) 
Model 1 tests the relationship between economic performance, fragmentation, 
and sprawl, while controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. The model 
explains 21.5 percent of the variance (adjusted R2=0.215) in the dependent variable. 
The regression indicates a positive and statistically significant (at .01 level) 
relationship between fragmentation score and economic performance. The 
relationship between sprawl score and economic performance is negative and 
statistically significant at .01 level. 
Only two of the socioeconomic control variables indicate a statistically 
significant relationship. Average household size possesses a negative sign. The value 
of the regression estimate for the state economic performance net of the metro area is 
positive and statistically significant at 0.01 level.  
The dummy variable for the Western Census region indicates the negative link 
with economic performance. The statistical significance level of this relationship is 
low (.1). Neither the other two regional location dummy variables nor CMSA control 
reach a statistically significant relationship. 
                                               
 
7
 Metropolitan areas excluded from the analysis are: Waterbury, CT PMSA, Portsmouth-Rochester, 
NH-ME PMSA, New Bedford, MA PMSA, Nashua, NH PMSA, Manchester, NH PMSA, Fitchburg-
Leominster, MA PMSA, Danbury, CT PMSA, Yolo, CA PMSA, Bridgeport, CT PMSA, Stamford-
Norwalk, CT PMSA, Lowell, MA-NH PMSA, Brockton, MA PMSA, Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA, 
Worcester, MA-CT PMSA, Honolulu, HI MSA, Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA, New London-Norwich, CT-




Table 10. Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Economic performance. All Metropolitan Areas. 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
B St. Error Beta t Sig. B St. Error Beta t Sig. B St. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 60985.130 7878.70 7.741 0.000 5555.478 7754.77 .716 .474 13106.466 9614.39 1.363 0.174 
Policy Variables 
Fragmentation Score 890.040 250.21 .245 3.557 0.000 582.448 233.29 .1 60 2.497 0.013 
Sprawl Score -125.91 7 26.15 -.314 -4.815 0.000 -31.540 26.89 -.079 -1.173 0.242 
Economic Dev. Variables 
Human Capital 532.644 61.29 .477 8.691 .000 463.234 67.07 .419 6.906 0.000 
Tax Effort 1219.949 380.62 .199 3.205 .001 1202.426 378.10 .1 99 3.180 0.002 
Control Variables 
Average Household Size -9630.012 2362.42 -.243 -4.076 .000 222.046 2274.26 .006 .098 .922 -2144.254 2448.64 -.054 -.876 0.382 
Age of Metro -18.333 71.10 -.023 -.258 .797 178.289 70.21 .218 2.539 .012 153.011 69.99 .190 2.186 0.030 
Segregation -64.107 40.86 -.108 -1.569 .1 18 40.303 34.86 .067 1.156 .249 1.308 39.06 .002 .033 0.973 
State EP .269 .09 .176 2.934 .004 .180 .09 .11 6 2.1 23 .035 .223 .09 .146 2.608 0.010 
InCMSA 361.824 1260.57 .017 .287 .774 -272.158 11 71.24 -.013 -.232 .816 -1356.220 1175.62 -.065 -1.154 0.250 
Midwest -2551.977 1635.43 -.137 -1.560 .1 20 -331.286 1594.15 -.018 -.208 .836 381.828 1608.94 .021 .237 0.813 
South -1699.632 2233. 19 -.103 -.761 .447 1279.500 2114.36 .076 .605 .546 2759.807 2156.07 .167 1.280 0.202 
West -3911.518 2166.95 -.191 -1.805 .072 1354.517 2152.40 .066 .629 .530 1510.542 2200.34 .074 .687 0.493 
N 310 312 310 
R2 0.240 .349 0.367 
Adj . R2 0.215 .327 .342 
F 9.45 16.106 14.359 
Sig.F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Model 2. Economic Performance = f (Human Capital, Tax Effort, Controls) 
Model 2 tests the relationship between economic performance, human capital, 
and tax effort, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. It accounts for 32.7 
percent of variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R2=0.327). The combination 
of the two economic development variables with the controls produces the model with 
higher explanatory power than Model 1. Both human capital and tax effort variables 
are positively related to economic performance and are statistically significant at 0.01 
level. Among the controls, age of metro, and state economic performance variables 
are positive and statistically significant (at .01 and .05 levels respectively). 
 
Model 3. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Human Capital, 
Tax Effort, Controls) 
This regression model combines all the variables used in this analysis in the 
model of economic performance. The model explains 34.2 percent of the variance in 
the dependent variable. This is a difference of 12.7 percentage points comparing with 
Model 1, and of only 1.5 percentage points with Model 2.  
The relationship between fragmentation and economic performance is positive 
statistically significant (at 0.01 level). The coefficient on sprawl is negative but not 
statistically significant. Comparing the statistical significance of the sprawl variable in 
Model 1 and Model 3 shows that its statistical significance in Model 1 is explained by 
its relationships with other variables. Both human capital and tax effort variables 
possess positive signs and are statistically significant at .01 level. 
Similar to Model 2, only the controls for age of metro and state economic 
performance reach statistical significance. Both variables are positively linked to 
economic performance.  
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Multiple regression analysis for small metropolitan areas. 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis for 
metropolitan areas with population less than 250,000 (Small MSAs). The sample 
includes 141 out of 149 metropolitan areas of this size8.  
 
Model 1. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Controls) 
Model 1 tests the relationship between economic performance, fragmentation, 
and sprawl, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. The model explains 
20.9 percent of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R2=0.209). Neither 
fragmentation nor sprawl coefficients are statistically significant. 
 Six out of eight control variables are statistically significant. The only positive 
relationship observed is for the state economic performance (statistically significant at 
.01 level). Negative signs for geographic location variables for the small metropolitan 
areas in the Midwest, South and West indicate their lower economic performance 
comparing with similarly sized Northeastern metro areas. Also at a disadvantage are 
the older small metro areas and those located in CMSAs. 
 
Model 2. Economic Performance=f (Human Capital, Tax Effort, Controls) 
Model 2 tests the relationship between economic performance, human capital, 
and tax effort, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. It accounts for 30.9 
percent of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R2=0.309). The 
combination of the two economic development variables with controls produces the 
                                               
 
8
 Eight metropolitan areas excluded areas due to unavailable and/or incompatible data: Waterbury, CT 
PMSA, Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA, New Bedford, MA PMSA, Nashua, NH PMSA, 





Table 11. Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Economic performance. Small Metropolitan Areas. 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
B St. ElTor Beta t Sig. B St. ElTar Beta t Sig. B St. ElTor Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 42650.138 12410.97 3.436 .001 11199.660 13576.80 .825 .411 2,863 .1 0 16463.94 0.17 0.862 
Policy Variables 
Fragmentation Score 1065.215 759.93 .14R 1.402 .163 I , 161.1 R 692.88 0.16 16R 0.096 
Sprawl Score -48.831 48.09 -.092 -1.015 .312 18.64 47.82 0.04 0.39 0.697 
Economic. Dev. Variables 
Human Capital 276.815 101.65 .255 2.723 .007 276.33 106.87 0.26 2.59 0.011 
Tax Effort 2464.547 590.68 361 4.172 .000 2,519.24 563.57 0.38 4.47 0.000 
Control Variables 
A verage Household Size -5711.349 3948.97 -124 -1.446 .1 51 -1959. 310 4166.98 -.042 -.470 .639 -1,180.29 4389.58 -0.03 -0.27 0.788 
Age of Metro -255.142 101.49 -.323 -2.514 .013 -1 06.323 108.28 -.131 -. 982 .328 -114.23 107.01 -0.14 -1.07 0.288 
Segregation -3.362 63.13 -.005 -.053 .958 18.751 61.46 .027 .305 .761 23.55 59.13 0.03 0.40 0.691 
State EP .519 .1 3 .316 3.915 000 .438 .1 3 .261 3.414 .001 0.42 .12 0.25 3.43 0.001 
InCMSA -6180.817 2672.12 -.182 -2.313 .022 -3363.68 1 2445.87 -.101 -1.375 .171 -6,012.89 2433.99 -0.18 -2.47 0.015 
Midwest -5395.460 2595.74 -. 301 -2.079 .040 -1250.136 2592.89 -.068 -.482 .631 89.53 2588.81 0.00 0.03 0.972 
South -9015.426 371 Ll8 -.532 -2.429 .016 -3327.558 3489.61 -.192 -.954 .342 -1,131.47 3694.99 -0.07 -0.31 0.760 
West -1l821.024 3474.46 -.543 -3.402 .001 -4960.178 3496.88 -.226 -1.418 .158 -3631.29 3515.70 -0.17 -1.03 0.304 
N 141 14 1 141 
R2 
.266 .358 0.400 
Adj. R2 
.209 .309 0.344 
F 4.706 7.300 7.12 
Sig.F 
.000 .000 0.000 
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model with higher explanatory power than Model 1. Both human capital and tax effort 
variables are positively related to economic performance and are statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. Among the controls, only the state economic performance 
variable is positive and statistically significant at .01 level. 
 
Model 3. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Human Capital, 
Tax Effort, Controls) 
This regression model combines all the variables used in this study in the 
model of economic performance. The model explains 34.4 percent of the variance in 
the dependent variable. This is a difference of 13.5 percentage points comparing with 
Model 1, and of only 3.5 percentage points with Model 2.  
The relationship between fragmentation and economic performance is positive 
and statistically significant (at 0.1 level). The coefficient on sprawl is not statistically 
significant. Both the human capital and the tax effort variables possess positive signs 
and are statistically significant at .01 level. 
 As in all the previous models, the coefficient for the state economic 
performance is statistically significant. The regression model confirms the finding of 
Model 1 indicating a negative relationship between CMSA location of small 
metropolitan areas and their economic performance. No influence of the geographic 
location on economic performance is observed in this model. 
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Multiple regression analysis for medium metropolitan areas 
 
Table 12 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis for the 
metropolitan areas with population between 250,000 and 1,000,000 persons (Medium 
MSAs). The sample includes 111 out of 121 areas of this size.9 To avoid 
multicollinearity, the control variables set in these models excludes the age of metro 
which has a high zero-order correlation with fragmentation score (r = 0.678). 
 
Model 1. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Controls) 
Model 1 tests the relationship between economic performance, fragmentation, 
and sprawl, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. The model explains 24 
percent of the variance (adjusted R2=0.240). Coefficient on the fragmentation score is 
not statistically significant. The model reveals a statistically significant negative link 
(at .01 level) between the sprawl scores and economic performance. 
 Among the control variables, a positive and statistically significant (at .1 
level) relationship was observed for the state economic performance, and a 
statistically significant (at .01 level) negative relationship between the average 
household size and metropolitan economic performance was also found.  
 
Model 2. Economic Performance=f (Human Capital, Tax Effort, Controls) 
Model 2 tests the relationship between economic performance, human capital, and tax 
effort, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. It accounts for 32.5 percent 
of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R2=0.325). The combination 
                                               
 
9
  Ten metropolitan areas are excluded due to the unavailable and/or incompatible data: Bridgeport, CT 
PMSA, Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA, Lowell, MA-NH PMSA, Brockton, MA PMSA, Lawrence, 
MA-NH PMSA, Worcester, MA-CT PMSA, Honolulu, HI MSA, Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA, New 




Table 12 . Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Economic Performance. Medium Metropolitan Areas. 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
B St. Error Beta t Sig. B St. Error Beta t Sig. B St. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 69548.345 10439.62 6.662 .000 24220.379 10623.60 2.280 .025 37753.367 12482.12 3025 .003 
Policy Variables 
Fragmentation Score 42.2R6 528.00 .009 .080 .93n 279.975 493.39 .On2 .5n7 .572 
Sprawl Score -142.719 48.49 -.374 -2.943 .004 -109.912 47.27 -.288 -2.325 .022 
Economic Dev. Variables 
Human Capital 484.603 102.04 .447 4.749 .000 432.961 103.93 .400 4. 166 .000 
Tax Effort -379.174 580.77 -.072 -.653 .515 -672.303 585.19 -.128 -1.149 .253 
Control Variables 
Average Household Size -11546.237 2877.93 -.400 -4.012 .000 -5038.323 2796.67 -.175 -1.802 .075 -7041.608 2890.15 -.244 -2.436 .017 
Age of Metro * 
Segregation -65.265 65.77 -.119 -.992 .323 28.636 63.11 .052 .454 .651 17.664 63.94 .032 .276 .783 
State H1' .272 .1 6 .207 1.747 .084 .428 .16 .325 2.653 .009 .435 .16 .330 2.658 .009 
In CMSA 222.595 1671.25 .012 .133 .894 -1757.629 1617.24 -.095 -1.087 .280 -1399.812 1607.18 -.076 -.871 .386 
Midwest -1908.318 2297.12 -.11 5 -.831 .408 -2453. 155 2048.08 -.147 -1.198 .234 -2159.919 2165.15 -.130 -.998 .321 
South -2013 .614 2906.27 -.143 -.693 .490 -3772.869 2130.51 -.267 -1.771 .080 -1523 .965 2705.22 -.108 -.563 .574 
West -3227.491 2809.19 -.188 -1.149 .253 -27 12.087 2616.82 -. 158 -1.036 .302 -3936.474 2812.08 -.230 -1.400 .1 65 
N 111 III III 
R2 
.303 .3RO 0.41 3 
Adj. R2 
.240 .325 0.347 
F 4.870 6.891 6.324 
Sig.F 
.000 .000 0.000 
* excluded to avoid multicollinearity 
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of the two economic development variables with the controls produces the model with 
higher explanatory power than Model 1. In this subset of the database only human 
capital variable is positively associated with economic performance. It is statistically 
significant at 0.01 level. Among the controls, average household size is significant at 
.1 level and possesses negative sign. State economic performance variable is positive 
and statistically significant at .01 level. 
 
Model 3. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Human Capital, 
Tax Effort, Controls) 
This regression model combines all the variables used in the previous two 
models in the model of economic performance. The model explains 34.7 percent of 
the variance in the dependent variable. This is a difference of 10.7 percentage points 
comparing with Model 1, and of only 2.2 percentage points with Model 2.  
As in Model 1, the relationship between sprawl and economic performance is 
negative and statistically significant (at 0.05 level). The coefficient on fragmentation 
is not statistically significant. As in Model 2, only human capital is linked to 
economic performance. The coefficient possesses positive sign and is statistically 
significant at .01 level. 
 As in all the previous models, the coefficient for the state economic 
performance is positive and statistically significant (at .01 level). Average household 
size is negatively linked to metropolitan economic performance (statistical 
significance at 0.05 level). 
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Multiple regression analysis for large metropolitan areas 
 
Table 13 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis for the 
metropolitan areas with population higher than 1,000,000 persons (Large MSAs). The 
sample includes 59 out of 61 areas of this size (excluded areas are Hartford, CT MSA 
and Orange County, California PMSA). The sample size in these series of models is 
low and thus the results should be interpreted with caution. Statistical insignificance 
could as well be a statistical artifact due to small sample size and multicollinearity 
among independent variables. The only control variables used in these series of 
models are average household size, segregation, state economic performance net of 
metro area and CMSA. 
 
Model 1. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Controls) 
Model 1 tests the relationship between economic performance, fragmentation, 
and sprawl, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. The model explains 
only 12.1 percent of the variance (adjusted R2=0.121). Coefficient for the sprawl 
score is not statistically significant. The model reveals a statistically significant 
positive link (at .1 level) between the fragmentation score and economic performance. 
 Among the control variables, only the coefficient for CMSA was statistically 
significant (at.1 level). The sign is positive, and the large metropolitan areas, as 





Table 13 . Regression Models. Dependent Variable: Economic performance. Large Metropolitan Areas. 
Modell Model 2 Model 3 
B St. En-or Beta t Sig. B St. En-or Beta t Sig. B St. En-or Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 72284.855 21411.59 3.376 .001 17829.662 16896.61 LOSS .296 23761.033 18163.64 1.308 .197 
Policy Variables 
Fragmentation Score 693.120 363.46 .279 1.907 .062 259.600 284.23 .105 .9 13 .366 
Sprawl Score -62.260 64.73 -.154 -.962 .341 -30.779 50.34 -.076 -.611 .544 
Economic Dev. Variables 
Human Capital 869.293 140.69 .650 6.179 000 845 .823 144.19 .638 5.866 000 
Tax EffOli IOOO.g94 64g.g2 .l g6 1.543 .129 922.133 667.35 .171 1.3g2 .173 
Control Variables 
A verage Household Size -9499.790 7209.82 -.199 -1.318 .194 1164.473 5324.47 .025 .219 .828 -1266.528 5632.82 -.027 -.225 .823 
Age ofMetro* 
Segregation -140.031 102.41 -.201 -1.367 .178 -37.363 87.60 -.055 -.427 .672 -34.691 94.06 -.050 -.369 .714 
State EP -.075 .19 -.056 -.398 .692 -.237 .14 -.177 -1.747 .087 -.198 .15 -.149 -1.3 66 .1 78 




N 5g 59 5g 
R2 .214 .55 1 .566 
Adj. R2 .121 .500 .495 
F 2.310 10.649 7.991 
Sig.F .048 .000 .000 
*excluclecl clue to low number ofMSAs in the sample, ancl to avoicl multicollinearity 
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Model 2. Economic Performance = f (Human Capital, Tax Effort, Controls) 
Model 2 tests the relationship between economic performance, human capital, 
and tax effort, controlling for a number of socioeconomic factors. It accounts for 50 
percent of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted R2=0.500). The 
combination of the two economic development variables with the controls produces a 
model with a much higher explanatory power than Model 1. In this subset of the 
database only human capital variable is a positively associated with economic 
performance. It is statistically significant at 0.01 level. The tax effort variable is not 
statistically significant. In the group of control variables, state economic performance 
coefficient which demonstrated positive relationship in the other subsets of the 
database, reverses its sign to a negative. It is statistically significant at .1 level. 
 
Model 3. Economic Performance = f (Fragmentation, Sprawl, Human Capital, 
Tax Effort, Controls) 
This regression model combines all the variables used in the previous two 
models in the model of economic performance. The model explains 49.5 percent of 
the variance in the dependent variable. This is a difference of 37.4 percentage points 
comparing with Model 1, and of a negative 0.5 percentage points with Model 2.  
The only statistically significant coefficient (at.01 level) in this model is for 










 Chapter IV presented the results of the correlation analysis and the regression 
analysis. The following chapter examines the most important findings of the analyses 
and puts them into context of broader discussion on the links between metropolitan 
governance, urban sprawl, and economic performance and social equity.  
 
 
Links between Fragmentation and Sprawl 
 
 The central question of this research is the relationship between economic 
performance of metropolitan areas, their structure of governance (represented by 
fragmentation) and spatial form (represented by the degree of urban sprawl). Still, the 
question of whether there is a link between fragmentation and sprawl, and what is its 
magnitude and direction underlies any investigation of the extent to which economic 
performance is affected by the two abovementioned variables. The often-assumed 
causal link between fragmentation and sprawl substantiates policies of governmental 
reforms, which are expected to alleviate negative social and environmental 
externalities of urban sprawl. Little empirical evidence, however, exists to prove this 
causal link. If this link is absent, or if the relationship is due to other external factors, 
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fighting sprawl with government centralization may only eliminate the possible 
economic benefits of intergovernmental competition.  
Conceptually, the link between fragmentation and sprawl seems self-evident. 
Nevertheless, the empirical support of the causal link between fragmentation and 
sprawl is either limited or contradictory. For example, Lewis (1996) used the Political 
Fragmentation Index (described earlier in Chapter II) and density gradients measuring 
the decline in density with the increase in distance from the city center to test the 
hypothesis about the link between fragmentation and sprawl. He has found that 
fragmentation was linked to lower densities.  However, recognizing the small sample 
size (14 metropolitan areas) and nonrandom character of the sample, he warns about 
drawing conclusions from the model and suggests that fragmentation may acts as a 
proxy for other variables correlated with it.  He concludes that “while it cannot be 
conclusively stated that political fragmentation is associated with less compact urban 
areas, neither did the analysis of density gradients disprove such a thesis” (Lewis, 
1996). 
The study by Razin and Rosentraub (2000) discussed earlier in Chapter II 
suggest that sprawl may be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for fragmentation. 
The authors have found no statistically significant impact of fragmentation on sprawl. 
Razin and Rosentraub conclude that fragmentation and sprawl are not “inherent 
attributes” of each other, and that the “assessments of sprawl and fragmentation 
should address these phenomena separately (p.835)”. In another study discussed in the 
Chapter II, Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2002) examined the relationship between 
governmental fragmentation and density, urbanized land area, property values and 
public expenditures on infrastructure in a simultaneous equations framework. Their 
results link fragmentation with both lower density and lesser amounts of urbanized 
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land. The authors explain this mathematical anomaly as a result of the efforts of 
suburban municipalities to limit densities and preserve open spaces, while the 
annexation policies of consolidated governments that lead to greater urbanized land. 
Given the well-documented political difficulties that annexation efforts face in the 
most metropolitan areas (Rusk, 1999) the argumentation seems uncertain. 
Additionally, recent research questions the efficacy of using county-level data for 
analysis of sprawl (Lang, 2003 cited in Wolman et al., 2004). 
 Statistical analysis performed here provides a different outlook on this issue 
compared with the previous research literature. The results of this analysis suggest a 
weak to moderate negative correlation between fragmentation and sprawl when 
calculated for all the metropolitan areas in the US. None of the correlation coefficients 
between fragmentation and sprawl have reached statistical significance when 
calculated separately for small, medium and large metropolitan areas. This finding 
contradicts the traditional view of fragmentation as at least the necessary condition for 
sprawl. Because correlation analysis cannot establish a causal link, this result can be 
viewed from three perspectives. First, research literature suggested that low density 
sprawled development reduces the sense of community (Ewing, 1997). It may be 
possible that sprawl distances residents of communities to the degree that it is 
impossible to create a sustainable grass-roots effort for incorporation of new 
municipalities. Second, the link can be interpreted as following.  Strong local 
governments in fragmented metropolitan areas attract residents with their independent 
packages of tax and services thus keeping the residents within the boundaries of the 
existing jurisdictions and reducing new sprawling developments. However keeping in 
mind the results of the previous empirical literature, a third perspective on the issue 
may explain the dissimilarities in the findings. It is likely that fragmentation and 
 99 
sprawl are not direct consequences of one another, but are the manifestations of other 
trends in urban development. Additional confirmation for this is offered by European 
research, which suggests that fragmentation and sprawl are not a uniquely American 
phenomenon. Bäck (2004) discussed sprawl and fragmentation in Swedish 
metropolitan areas using the methodology similar to the one used in this research. 
Sprawl was measured using the Lopez and Hynes index, and fragmentation was 
measured via a modification of Herfindahl’s index slightly different from the one used 
here. Bäck demonstrated the presence of both sprawl and fragmentation in Swedish 
metropolitan areas. In fact, using the same density cutoff as suggested by Lopez and 
Hynez and used here, the author found sprawl level of Swedish cities to be 
comparable to American regions (Stockholm’s sprawl index score was above 40, 
while the sprawl index value for Göteborg has reached 100). If European cities 
demonstrate the comparable levels of sprawl and fragmentation with American 
metropolitan areas, while operating in an obviously different political context, it 
might as well be possible that both phenomena reflect global trends of 
suburbanization and citizen’s preferences in the post-industrial world. 
If sprawl and fragmentation are not causes of each other, but are in fact the 
results of a different external processes they should be treated as such and deserve 
separate policy responses. Additional research is needed to understand the factors that 
link the two phenomena together. What is important however is that that the negative 
relationship between the two variables enforced by the absence of statistically 
significant correlations in the population-ranked subsets of the database, points out 
that the assumption of the firm interdependency of sprawl and fragmentation may be 
incorrect. Also, while the link between sprawl and fragmentation observed in the 
correlation analysis was not strong, the regression models suggest that the impact of 
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sprawl and fragmentation on economic performance of metropolitan areas is indeed 
reverse. This underscores the dissimilarities between the two variables and brings us 




Fragmentation and Economic Performance of Metropolitan Areas 
 
The questions of the possible impacts of regional governance structure on 
metropolitan outcomes are central to the discussion of the optimal configuration of 
governance in metropolitan areas and to this research. Whether it is the efficiency of 
local governments, social equity, economic growth, or productivity, the supporters of 
different theories often attribute the desired outcomes to their preferred governmental 
arrangements. This discussion invariably leads to the necessity of statistical analysis 
to substantiate these claims. There are several ways to evaluate the advantages of the 
specific governmental arrangements or the needs for governmental reforms in regard 
to both the optimal service-delivery and the possible effect of such reforms on various 
measures of economic well-being of metropolitan areas. This research examines 
whether the structure of governance affects economic performance of the metro areas. 
To put the discussion of the results of statistical analysis presented in Chapter IV in a 
broader context of research literature I discuss here the previous empirical evidence 
on the links between the structure of government and metropolitan outcome and 
compare their findings with the results of my analysis. 
Since the 19th century the argumentation for metropolitan reforms has 
constantly shifted, but the underlining assumptions of economic benefits were always 
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present. Initially the argument for introducing metropolitan-level government 
structures was largely based on the desires to reduce the influence of political 
machines. At the same time the assertion that streamlined government would bring a 
competitive edge to a city was always a common theme. In the 1990s the renewed 
attention to the possible regional-level solutions to urban problems was substantiated 
by growing central-city/suburban disparities and unequal opportunities embedded in 
the spatial arrangements of American metropolis. However, the political climate of 
the decentralized metropolis makes is very difficult to get approval by the majority-
suburban constituencies of any measures that may threaten to reduce their power to 
exclude the undesirable land uses or to avoid sharing fiscal resources throughout the 
region. So, as observed by Norris (2001), the argumentation for metropolitan reform 
has recently shifted from the emphasis on government efficiency and social equity to 
the perceived benefits to economic development and metropolitan competitiveness 
that may be realized following governmental reforms.  
Recent studies illustrate this trend. For example, Fleischmann (2000) 
conducted a survey of local political and business leaders of four small metropolitan 
areas considering city-county consolidation. Survey respondents viewed economic 
development as a regional issue; and expected that consolidation of city and county 
governments would boost economic growth and reduce competition between city and 
county for economic development. Additional evidence that city-county 
consolidations today are promoted based on the assumption that governmental 
reforms will bring better economic growth and prosperity is offered by Savitch and 
Vogel (2004). In a case study of governmental reorganization of Louisville and 
Jefferson County, KY they pointed out the argumentation of reform proponents: 
“consolidated government […] would enable the community to adopt a “single 
 102 
vision” so that Louisville could speak with “one voice” in recruiting companies; […] 
consolidated government would help Louisville negotiate incentives or convince 
businesses that a “streamlined” government would facilitate development (Savitch 
and Vogel, 2004).”  
A number of studies examined various aspects of the relationships between the 
structure of governance and metropolitan outcomes. The questions of government 
efficiency often underline the discussion on the optimal configuration of governance 
in metropolitan regions. It is often assumed that the “streamlined” consolidated 
government is more efficient which should translate to better economic performance 
of the regions. Research literature offers an ample evidence to challenge this claim. 
For example, Benton and Gamble (1984) refute the claim that consolidation lead to 
less costly government by pointing out the increases in both taxes and expenditures 
after consolidation in Jacksonville, Florida. Schneider (1986a) shows that competition 
between suburban municipalities result in slower growth of local government 
expenditures and service levels. Eberts and Gronberg (1988) demonstrate that 
fragmentation constrains government spending and argue that competition increases 
efficiency in public service provision. 
Where the relationship between the competitiveness in public sector and its 
efficiency finds empiric support, the evidence to the effect of fragmented government 
on metropolitan economic outcomes is less consistent. The difficulty in comparing the 
results of different studies lies in the variety of both the measures of government 
structure, and the economic performance employed. As such, empirical research 
offers a degree of support both for the public choice theory, and for the proponents of 
metropolitan governments. To provide a few example of the support for the public 
choice argument, for example, Feiock and Carr (1999) used the annual growth in 
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manufacturing, retail and service establishment to evaluate the relationship between 
economic development and city-county consolidation. The effect of consolidation was 
accounted for by using a time-lagged dummy variable. The authors have not found 
any support for the claims that consolidation enhances economic development. No 
statistically significant relationship between fragmentation (the per capita number of 
governments and the geographic density of city governments within a metropolitan 
area) and economic growth (the change in suburban per capita income 1985 – 1989) 
was found in the study by Post and Stein (2000). On the other side of the debate, 
Nelson and Foster (1999) used a number of variables capturing local and regional 
governance structure to estimate changes in metropolitan per capita income in a 
period of 1976-1996. The results of their study provide mixed evidence that can be 
interpreted to support either argument.  The local government structure variables 
positively associated with income growth included central city annexation ratio, and 
suburban city average population. The variables for the percentage of central city 
population, the ratio of special purpose to general-purpose governments, and the 
number of elected special purpose district officials per capita were negatively linked. 
The statistically significant positive impact of regional multipurpose governments 
found by Nelson and Foster suggests the benefits from regional planning and 
coordination. However, the “single-county, two tier” federated form of metropolitan 
governance was shown to be linked to substantial declines in income growth. In 
addition, no statistically significant impact of city-county consolidation on income 
growth was found. 
In the context of this study the research by Paytas (2001) warrants a special 
attention because the fragmentation index used in his study allows direct comparison 
with my findings (more on this follows the summary of both results). Paytas used the 
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shift-share technique to operationalize metropolitan economic performance. This 
technique breaks down the change in employment into the three components – 
national trends, local industry mix and the residual that is attributed to the competitive 
strength of local economy. The shift-share residual – “metropolitan competitiveness” 
was used as the measure of economic performance. The data analyzed was for the 
1972-1997 time period. The study controlled for the centralization of state-local 
relations, and accounted for whether the metropolitan area was a state capital. Paytas 
found a significant negative impact of fragmentation on metropolitan competitiveness. 
State capital location was only a weak predictor of economic performance. In regard 
to the state-local relations, Paytas observed that the combination of unified 
metropolitan region with decentralized state powers offered the best advantages to 
metropolitan competitiveness. The worst performers were the fragmented 
metropolitan regions in centralized states. Overall, this study offers an important 
insight into the link between governance and metropolitan economic performance. 
Most importantly, it confirms that the patterns of governance do matter. 
While understanding the links between governance and the measures of 
growth used in the described above studies is important, these measures of growth 
alone do not paint the complete picture of the interaction of governance with 
metropolitan outcomes.  As argued by Gottlieb (2002), not all metropolitan areas are 
interested in growth, because population growth and employment growth can be 
associated with a number of negative consequences: increased resource use, increased 
infrastructure costs, growth of low-paying jobs reducing average pay in the region, 
etc. My analysis looks at the relative standing of metropolitan areas on the scales of 
economic performance at a point in time. As Blair and Zhang (1996) put it, 
“economic theory holds that productivity is a key to increasing incomes and reducing 
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poverty”. The measure of economic performance employed here – gross metropolitan 
product per capita is at its core a measure of productivity. 
Correlation analysis presented in Chapter IV suggests the presence of positive 
link between economic performance of metropolitan areas and their levels of 
fragmentation. Statistically significant positive correlations were observed across all 
metropolitan areas and in large and small metropolitan areas. The correlation 
coefficient for medium metropolitan areas was not statistically significant. Regression 
analysis validated the positive links between fragmentation and economic 
performance. For the full dataset, fragmentation was positively associated and 
statistically significant at 0.01 levels in all the models. Similar, but weaker 
relationship was found in small and large metropolitan areas. Additionally, 
fragmentation was found to be moderately and positively correlated with the other 
factors positively associated with economic performance of metropolitan areas: 
human capital, tax effort, and affluence. 
The use of the same operational measure of fragmentation allows direct 
comparison of this study with the results of Paytas’ (2001) investigation. While the 
results of the two studies seem contradictory, this can be explained by the differences 
in the measures of economic performance. As Miller (2002, p. 129) elaborates on the 
findings by Paytas:  “The more diffused (high scores on the MPDI) power is in a 
metropolitan region, the less likely economic expansion in that region will be a 
function of local policies. Clearly, highly diffuse metropolitan regions could still see 
considerable economic expansion”. Essentially, fragmented regions exert less control 
over job creation via their own policies and are more susceptible to the 
macroeconomic trends. My results suggest that, while fragmented regions may lag 
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behind other metro areas in terms of their control over rates of growth, they still are 
more productive when compared with other regions.  
Does decentralized control over expenditures by local governments enhance 
economic performance of the metropolitan areas?  The results of the analysis in this 
study suggest that that may be the case. While the use of cross-sectional data does not 
allow for drawing conclusions about causation, the results show that in the year 2000 
fragmented metropolitan areas were more productive. Comparing the regression 
models with the different set of control reveals a relatively lesser role that both 
fragmentation and sprawl play in predicting the economic performance of 
metropolitan regions. However, judging by the values of the standardized regression 
coefficients, the influence of fragmentation, while not a match for the impact of the 
human capital, is substantial and ranks close to the effects of state economic 
performance. Consistent with the arguments of polycentric theory, metropolitan areas 
with more decentralized governance and competition between local governments 
show better economic performance. 
 
 
Urban Sprawl and Economic Performance of Metropolitan Areas  
 
As discussed earlier, there is a considerable disagreement in research literature 
on the issues of costs and benefits of urban sprawl. Nonetheless, the positive 
relationship between economic well-being, economic development and sprawl is 
implicitly assumed by the defenders of sprawl. The defense of sprawl is usually based 
on the neoclassical economic theory, which as some argue is not a neutral 
methodology but “a political theory favoring individual self-interest and consumerism 
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over public-spirited behavior and deliberative political choices” (Ellis, 2002). In the 
free-market economics view sprawl is perceived as an outcome of individual 
consumer choices that maximize individual’s welfare thus maximizing welfare of the 
society as a whole (Burchell et all, 1998). It is argued that that sprawl is a welcomed 
product of a market forces. It reduces congestion, provides housing that is relatively 
more affordable than in high density and/or planned communities, and most 
importantly, represents an overwhelming consumer preference for low-density 
detached housing (Gordon and Richardson, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2001). What is 
missing from the argument however, is the empirical evidence of the impact of sprawl 
on metropolitan economic outcomes. My research attempted to examine one aspect of 
the possible relationship between urban sprawl and economic well-being of 
metropolitan areas – the relationship between urban sprawl and economic 
performance. The sprawl advocates assume that, as a product of free market, sprawl 
should be beneficial to economic performance. My findings, however, suggest that 
some sprawled metropolitan areas are less productive when compared with denser 
regions. Excessive levels of sprawl may hurt, rather than enhance economic 
performance in metropolitan areas.  
Correlation analysis performed in this study suggests that the link between 
sprawl and economic performance is negative and moderate. Statistically significant 
correlations were found in for all metropolitan areas in the United States and for the 
subset of medium metropolitan areas. However, regression analysis shows that only in 
medium metropolitan areas this relationship stands after controlling for other factors. 
Medium metropolitan areas with higher levels of sprawl rank lower on the scale of 
economic performance. In these metropolitan areas a one-point increase in the sprawl 
index corresponded to $109 drop in per capita gross metropolitan product. Not only 
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sprawl have been shown here to have the direct negative effect on economic 
performance of one subset of metropolitan areas, but it was found to be negatively 
correlated with human capital, tax effort and affluence. High scores on all the three 
variables mentioned above are positively associated with regional economic 
performance. 
These findings are consistent with previous research literature linking density 
and economic performance. For example, Ciccone and Hall (1996) show that increase 
in employment density at county level leads to increase in state productivity. Cervero 
(2001) examined metropolitan-level data linking economic output with the shape of 
metropolis. Using regression models for macro-scale and micro-scale (intra-
metropolitan) analysis, he found that employment densities are positively associated 
with productivity levels. Both studies point out the cause-and-effect relationship 
between employment densities and economic performance. The sprawl index used in 
my research, however, relies on measures of population density. The link between 
population density and employment density is illustrated by Glaeser and Kahn (2001). 
Their study demonstrates a strong correlation between the two variables. Because the 
question of causation is not critical in this context it may be concluded that the 
negative link between residential sprawl and economic performance found in this 
study closely conforms to the previous literature on the linkages between the 
concentration of employment and economic productivity. 
 Additional empirical evidence to the relationship between urban sprawl and 
economic performance is provided in a recent study by Nelson and Peterman (2000). 
The authors investigated the impact of growth management programs on economic 
performance. The sample included 182 metropolitan areas with the population 
between 100,000 and 500,000 people.  Economic performance was measured as a 
 109 
region’s share of total income in the pool of all metropolitan areas in the sample. 
Growth management measures such as urban growth boundaries, urban service limits, 
and state or regional oversight of local planning were represented as dummy variables 
indicating the presence of such programs in a metropolitan area. The regression model 
controlled for the economic structure (initial share of income in the pool of studied 
regions, share of income from manufacturing, proximity to major metropolitan areas, 
and location in right-to-work states), socioeconomic ecology (metro age and central 
city elasticity), and regional location. Nelson and Peterman found that metropolitan 
areas that implement growth controls measures are able to capture larger market share 
(measured by personal income). The findings of Nelson and Peterman study are 
important in the context of my research because they demonstrate that while, as 
indicated here, sprawled metropolitan areas perform worse than denser regions, 
proactive metropolitan efforts as well as the state and regional measures aimed at 
curtailing sprawl result in an enhanced economic performance.  
Overall, the results of this research question the free-market defense of sprawl. 
Metropolitan areas with higher sprawl scores are less productive. In addition, without 
implying causation, sprawl was found to be associated with lower percentages of 
college-educated population, lower percentages of affluent households, and lower 
local tax effort, all of which are positively linked to economic performance. 
Comparing the economic performance impact of sprawl and fragmentation shows that 
the two variables work in the opposite directions. Given the negative association 
between fragmentation and sprawl discussed before, it is can be concluded that the 




 Fragmentation, Sprawl and Racial Segregation 
 
 Having discussed the impacts of fragmentation and sprawl on metropolitan 
economic performance, it is important to look at the social costs of the variables. 
Whereas a comprehensive discussion of social costs of fragmentation and sprawl is 
not the primary goal of this study, a brief examination of their links with racial 
residential segregation serves as an indication of their social impacts.  
Urban sprawl has been often been suspected to be a contributor to residential 
segregation (Downs, 1994; Lopez and Hynes, 2003). Burchell et all (1998) however 
note that there is no clear consensus in the literature on whether sprawl fosters 
residential segregation. When sprawl is assumed to be the driving force behind 
residential segregation, oftentimes it is also implied that there is necessarily a causal 
relationship between sprawl and fragmentation, and that it is the fragmented local 
governance that fosters segregation. The data analyzed here suggests that sprawl by 
itself is not a major contributor to racial residential segregation. Correlation 
coefficients between sprawl and Black-White dissimilarity index were not statistically 
significant for all metropolitan areas, and for both the small and the large regions. 
Only medium metropolitan areas confirmed the link, and correlation coefficient 
indicates only a week association. It appears that sprawl, as the predominant mode of 
suburban development in the United States is equally attractive to both White and 
Black Americans. 
The link between fragmentation and segregation is more apparent. Correlation 
coefficients demonstrate a positive association between the index of fragmentation 
and the dissimilarity index. This association was observed across all the regions in the 
United States as well as in the population-ranked subsets of the database. This result 
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is consistent with previous literature on the subject. Miller (2002) calculated 
correlation coefficients for the association between White-Black dissimilarity index 
and fragmentation (Metropolitan Power Diffusion) index for 1990. Calculations were 
made with both the composite fragmentation index and using three separate 
components of the fragmentation index (county governments, municipal governments, 
and special purpose governments). While all the measures of fragmentation were 
positively linked to the dissimilarity index, the strongest link was attributed to 
municipal governments. Additionally, regression models of Black dissimilarity index 
controlling for size of metropolitan areas and regional location validated the 
relationship between fragmentation and sorting by race in metropolitan areas. The 
correlation coefficient calculated in this study for the 2000 data is close to Miller’s 
calculations and it shows that this link persisted over the last decade. 
Empirical studies of the relationship between race and political structure using 
other measures of fragmentation also back up the results observed here. For example, 
Morgan and Mareschal (1999) used three measures of fragmentation to examine the 
relationship between political fragmentation and inequality. Residential segregation 
was measured using a Black-White dissimilarity index. Of the three measures of 
fragmentation, two (central-city population share, and central-city area growth, 1970-
1990) did not reach statistical significance. The third measure of fragmentation – the 
number of suburban municipalities in the metropolitan area was statistically 
significantly linked to higher racial residential segregation. The authors conclude that 
“fragmentation does appear to facilitate efforts by white urban dwellers to minimize 
contact with black residents” (Morgan and Mareschal, 1999).  
A strong empirical confirmation for the relationship between fragmented 
governance and residential segregation is offered by Burns (1994). Burns examined 
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the formation of new local governments in the United States from 1959s to 1980s. A 
simple random sample of 200 counties was used in a series of a regression models to 
examine the role which service provision needs, desires for racially segregated living, 
and drive to lower taxes played in the formation of both general purpose governments 
and special service districts. The results of the analysis have shown that in the 1950s 
and 1960s new municipalities were incorporated primarily for the purposes of racial 
exclusion. After controlling for the impact of lower-income populations on the 
formation of new municipalities, she concluded that, “the operative concern here was 
race, and not simply the presence of lower-income populations. The founders’ goal, it 
seems, was the exclusion if African-Americans” (Burns, 1994, p.91). Burns’ 
statistical analysis has conclusively proved the role that race played in explaining new 
municipal incorporations.  
 Overall, the clear link between fragmentation and segregation here reinforces 
the notion that governmental fragmentation is often used as a tool of racial residential 
segregation. Burns’ analysis of the formation of local governments in 1950-1980s, 
Miller’s use of Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index to demonstrate the links between 
fragmentation and segregation in the beginning of 1990s, and the calculations 
performed in this study point out that the desires for racially segregated living are 
revealed by the proliferation of multiple jurisdictions in metropolitan areas. These 
trends were sustained over the second half of the 20th century and are still evident 
today. 
 The discussion above does not cover of course all the social costs of 
fragmentation and sprawl. However, the example of residential segregation should 
draw the attention to the possible negative consequences of the decisions that deal 
with governance. Economic performance argument in substantiation of government 
 113 
reforms does not address the issues of inequality and therefore does not represent a 
fully sufficient argument for or against particular public policies. Public policy on the 
issue of metropolitan governance should carefully balance economic benefits of 










The final chapter presents the summary of the findings, and outlines the policy 
implications of the study. In addition, the limitations of the study and the 
recommendations for future research are discussed. 
 
 
Summary of the findings 
 
Fragmentation of governments and urban sprawl has been a subject of a debate 
for a considerable time. The discussion often centers on whether space (sprawl) and 
politics (fragmentation) make a difference in the economic development of 
metropolitan areas. The operational hypothesis was set to follow the argument of the 
polycentric school of thought on the organization of metropolitan governance. It was 
expected that competitive local public economies would be beneficial to the economic 
performance of the regions. Regarding the effect of sprawl, the study assumed that 
following the lines of free-market defense of sprawl, it would be positively associated 
with economic performance of the metropolitan areas. The aim of this study was to 
examine empirical evidence and find support for either of theses theories. 
Research data have confirmed the hypothesis of the positive link between 
economic performance and fragmentation of metropolitan governance. On the other 
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hand, the hypothesis about the positive impact of sprawl on economic performance of 
metropolitan areas was not validated. Aside from the direct linkages to economic 
performance, both sprawl and fragmentation were found to be associated with human 
capital, affluence and tax effort, which, in turn, are positively linked to economic 
performance. These associations took the same direction as the ones with economic 
performance – positive for fragmentation and negative for sprawl.  
A number of controls allow observing some other important linkages. While 
previous research suggests that the impacts of local governance structure may be 
secondary to the trends in state economic development (Blair and Zhang, 1994; Blair, 
Staley and Zhang 1996), regression analysis performed here shows that the 
importance of the link between economic performance, fragmentation, and sprawl is 
comparable to that of the link between state and metropolitan economic performance.  
The impact of fragmentation and sprawl on economic performance is not as 
strong as the impact of human capital and tax effort. However, inclusion of these 
economic development controls together with socioeconomic controls did not render 
the relationships between fragmentation and economic performance (for all 
metropolitan areas) and sprawl and economic performance (medium metropolitan 
areas) statistically insignificant. This emphasizes the notion that politics and space do 
play significant role in regional economic outcomes. 
It must be noted that the regression models used in this study are not meant to 
be comprehensive models of economic performance in metropolitan areas. They are 
designed to evaluate the links between fragmentation, sprawl and economic 
performance. The models also serve a purpose of comparing the impacts of these 
policy variables with the impacts of some possible economic development measures 
available to local governments. This demonstrates whether policy choices concerning 
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the structure of governance or configuration of urban space can be as useful as the 
direct economic development measures such as the investment in human capital or tax 
reform, if productivity is a goal. 






Table 14. Summary of the Findings. 
Question Method Relationship 
All Metro Areas Small Metro Areas Medium Metro Areas Large Metro Areas 
Fragmentation Correlation • Negative Not statistically Not statistically Not statistically 
and Sprawl • Weak to moderate significant significant significant 
Correlation • Positive • Positive Not statistically • Positive 
• Weak to moderate • Weak 
significant 
• Weak to moderate 
Fragmentation • Positive • Positive 
and Regression 
• B: $890; ~: .245 Not statistically Not statistically • B: $693; ~: .279 (F,S,Controls) significant significant Economic 
• st. significance level: 0.01 • st. significance level: 0.1 Performance 
Regression • Positive • Positive 
(F, S, ED, • B: $582; ~: .160 • B: $1,16l;~: .16 Not statistically Not statistically significant significant 
Controls) • st. significance level: 0.01 • st. significance level: 0.1 
Correlation • Negative Not statistically • Negative Not statistically 
• Weak to moderate significant • Weak to moderate significant 
Sprawl and 
Regression • Negative • Negative Economic 
• B: -$126;~: -.314 
Not statistically 
• B: -$143;~: -.374 
Not statistically 
(F,S,Controls) significant significant Performance 
• st. significance level: 0.01 • st. significance level: 0.01 
Regression • Negative 
(F, S, ED, Not statistically Not statistically • B: -$109; ~: -.288 Not statistically significant significant significant 




Table 15. Additional Findings. 
Pulicy Currelatiun 
Variable 
All Metro Areas Small Metro Areas Medium Metro Areas Large Metro Areas 
Fragmentation • Positive • Positive • Positive • Positive 
• Moderate • Weak • Moderate • Weak to moderate 
Segregation 
Sprawl Not statistically Not statistically • Positive Not statistically significant significant 
• Weak to moderate 
significant 
Fragmentation • Positive Not statistically :{ot statistically Not statistically 
• Weak 
significant significant significant 
Human Capital 
Sprawl • Negative • Negative • Negative Nol statistically 
• Weak to moderate • Weak • Weak significant 
Fragmentation • Positive • Positive • Positive • Positive 
• Weak to moderate • Weak to moderate • Weak to moderate • Weak to moderate 
Tax Effort 
Sprawl • Negative • Negative :{ol statisLically • Negative 
• Weak • Weak 
significant 
• Weak to moderate 
Fragmentation • Positive Not statistically ~ot statistically Not statistically 
• Weak to moderate 
sigu i.fi{;<tlL1 sign ificant siguwcmtl 
Affiuenee 
Sprawl • Negative Nol statis tically • Negative • Negative 
• Moderate 
significant 
• Weak to moderate • Weak to moderate 
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Policy Implications  
 
The results of this research suggest several implications for public policy. 
They can provide policymakers with information on the patterns of interaction 
between politics, space and economic performance in the metropolitan regions of the 
United States. However, because the cross-sectional design of the study does not 
establish causal relationships, these implications are best viewed as topics for public 
policy discussion and additional research. 
As suggested by the National Research Council, “First, even the least 
fragmented urban areas display high levels of segregation and inequality. Second, the 
fragmented system of local government has many positive features – involving 
efficiency, choice, and grass-roots accountability – that might be lost in a more 
consolidated system. In short, there may be very real trade-offs between these benefits 
of a fragmented local government system and the equity gains of a more consolidated 
system (Altschuller et all, 1999).” The models in my study point out that there may be 
another possible trade-off – economic performance. Thus the major policy implication 
following this result should be a caution in implementing government reforms, as 
centralizing governance may hurt economic productivity. However, because the units 
of analysis in this study are metropolitan areas, the observation above is applicable 
only at the metropolitan level. It would be incorrect to assume without additional 
research that exactly the same effect will be observed for government centralization 
on a scale other than metropolitan (for example, city-county consolidation). Also, 
another warning must be added. No variables in the analysis specifically account for 
cooperative interlocal agreements or regional-level institutions providing coordination 
and planning. Wong (1998) suggests, for example, that implementation of economic 
development programs in fragmented and divisive Miami has been undermined by the 
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lack of effective coordination and planning. This requires additional research as to 
whether the economic performance advantages demonstrated by decentralized 
metropolitan regions would be even better, if a level of cooperation was accounted 
for. 
The results emphasize the dilemmas of higher economic performance and 
consumer choice, and greater social costs. As numerous researches suggests, local 
governments are either unwilling or unable to address these problems. However, if the 
exclusive municipalities are beneficial for the prosperity of metropolitan areas, it may 
be the role of state and federal governments to mitigate the misbalances in the 
distribution of cost and benefits of urban development. 
 The examination of the links between economic performance and sprawl has 
shown its possible negative effects. If, as it is often argued, sprawl represents an 
overwhelming consumer preference, additional research is needed to determine 
whether the supply of alternatives to sprawled residential housing can make a 
difference. While, as revealed by the regression models, this issue may not concern all 
the metropolitan areas, it may be especially important for metropolitan areas with 
population between 250,000 and 1,000,000 where the negative link between sprawl 
and economic performance was apparent. 
Finally, the results suggest that together with the traditional tools of economic 
development, policies influencing urban space and governance may have an impact 
on economic performance. The research literature offers some examples that the 
former do not always work as designed. For example, if the human capital 
development strategy seems logical and easier to implement than the governance or 
sprawl strategy, recent research suggests that states’ investment in education do not 
guarantee retaining highly educated professionals (Florida, 2002; Stephan et al., 
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Limitations of this Study and Directions for Future Research 
 
Limitations of this study can be generally put into three categories: limitations 
relating to the cross-sectional design, limitations due to the metropolitan area 
definitions, and limitations due to operationalization of some variables. Future 
research should address these limitations, and improve upon the methodological 
strengths of the measures used in this study to add to the knowledge on the linkages 
between governance and metropolitan outcomes. 
First, being a cross-sectional study, the results should be interpreted 
accordingly. The analysis describes the state of metropolitan regions in the year 2000. 
It cannot be used to predict future changes. The study examines static, rather than 
dynamic variables. There is no way to determine from its results that fragmentation is 
positively associated with growth in the gross metropolitan product, or sprawl is 
negatively associated with it. The results only reflect relative standings of 
metropolitan areas compared to each other. This means that the findings can be more 
useful for metropolitan areas more interested in productivity than in growth. While 
the comparative cross-sectional research design has its advantages, future research 
should also consider using future Census data to update the indices of sprawl and 
fragmentation and examine the effects of their change on changes in metropolitan 
economic performance. 
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The second limitation is related to metropolitan area definitions. Metropolitan 
area definitions are not constant. This makes the analysis difficult to replicate. Even if 
it is possible to recalculate, for example, the fragmentation index using the earlier and 
the latest definitions of metropolitan areas, this still does not allow for an adequate 
comparison (it either includes the recently added counties in the old metropolitan area 
definitions, or ignores the newest changes). However, the metropolitan definitions are 
determined for the specific political purposes rather than for their suitability for 
research. Unfortunately, this is most likely to be the case in future.  
The third limitation relates to operationalization of some variables. The 
measure of sprawl used in this study relies on a certain density cutoff for determining 
whether a given census tract belongs to a “sprawled” part of a metropolitan area or 
not. There may be a substantial disagreement among metropolitan areas as to what 
represents their desired density thresholds. Also, the Lopez-Hynes sprawl index 
captures only two conceptual dimensions of sprawl suggested by Galster and outlined 
in Chapter II. While currently the calculation of sprawl scores for all the 
aforementioned dimensions requires the knowledge of local geography, the 
technological advances and the increased availability of satellite imagery should soon 
make the calculation of an index reflecting all the conceptual dimensions possible. 
With the availability of such data, future research should incorporate additional 
dimensions of sprawl in the index. 
In addition, alternative measures of economic performance of metropolitan 
areas may be used. For example, P. Gottlieb (2002) suggested a “growth without 
growth” measure that should approximate how successful a given metropolitan area is 
in achieving income growth while avoiding possible negative consequences of the 
population growth.  This measure reflects a goal of an accumulation of wealth in a 
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metropolitan area while avoiding deterioration of quality of life often associated by 
constituents with increasing population. Whether this goal is appropriate for all 
metropolitan areas is debatable; however, this concept is gaining increased attention 
in a number of urban areas. As a result, currently not all metropolitan areas focus their 
development goals and efforts on increasing population and employment.  Gottlieb 
suggests the way of calculating growth without growth index in a metropolitan region 
by subtracting the population growth rate from the real per-capita income growth. 
While this way of operationalizing this concept has its mathematical problems, if the 
“growth-without growth” measure formulated in a mathematically correct way can be 
an adequate dependent variable for the relationship in question.  
 Finally, the fragmentation index used in this study measures the degree of 
decentralization of control over expenditures by local governments in a metropolitan 
area. Given the findings that metropolitan areas with decentralized expenditure 
patterns are characterized by higher economic performance and the nature of the 
index itself, it may be useful to decompose the index and measure the degrees of 
decentralization separately for different expenditures or different sets of expenditures. 
This may reveal the single articles of expenditures with possible linkages to higher 
economic performance, and which may be targeted separately as a tool of economic 
development. A similar methodological technique may also be used to analyze other 
links between elements of local government finances (for example, distribution of 
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1 Los Angeles--Long Beach, 
CA  
9,519,338 
2 New York, NY  9,314,235 
3 Chicago, IL  8,272,768 




6 Detroit, MI  4,441,551 
7 Houston, TX  4,177,646 
8 Atlanta, GA  4,112,198 
9 Dallas, TX  3,519,176 
10 Boston, MA--NH ;  3,406,829 
11 Riverside--San Bernardino, 
CA  
3,254,821 
12 Phoenix--Mesa, AZ  3,251,876 
13 Minneapolis--St. Paul, MN--
WI  
2,968,806 
14 Orange County, CA  2,846,289 
15 San Diego, CA  2,813,833 
16 Nassau--Suffolk, NY  2,753,913 
17 St. Louis, MO--IL  2,603,607 





Clearwater, FL  
2,395,997 
21 Oakland, CA  2,392,557 
22 Pittsburgh, PA  2,358,695 




25 Denver, CO  2,109,282 




28 Kansas City, MO--KS  1,776,062 
29 San Francisco, CA  1,731,183 
30 Fort Worth--Arlington, TX  1,702,625 
31 San Jose, CA  1,682,585 
32 Cincinnati, OH--KY--IN  1,646,395 
33 Orlando, FL  1,644,561 
34 Sacramento, CA  1,628,197 
35 Fort Lauderdale, FL  1,623,018 
36 Indianapolis, IN  1,607,486 
37 San Antonio, TX  1,592,383 
38 Norfolk--Virginia Beach--
Newport News, VA--NC  
1,569,541 
39 Las Vegas, NV--AZ  1,563,282 
Rank Metropolitan Area Population 
40 Columbus, OH  1,540,157 
41 Milwaukee--Waukesha, WI  1,500,741 
42 Charlotte--Gastonia--Rock 
Hill, NC--SC  
1,499,293 
43 Bergen--Passaic, NJ  1,373,167 
44 New Orleans, LA  1,337,726 
45 Salt Lake City--Ogden, UT  1,333,914 
46 Greensboro--Winston-Salem-
-High Point, NC  
1,251,509 
47 Austin--San Marcos, TX  1,249,763 
48 Nashville, TN  1,231,311 
49 Providence--Fall River--
Warwick, RI--MA  
1,188,613 
50 Raleigh--Durham--Chapel 
Hill, NC  
1,187,941 
51 Hartford, CT  1,183,110 
52 Buffalo--Niagara Falls, NY  1,170,111 
53 Middlesex--Somerset--
Hunterdon, NJ  
1,169,641 
54 Memphis, TN--AR--MS  1,135,614 
55 West Palm Beach--Boca 
Raton, FL  
1,131,184 
56 Monmouth--Ocean, NJ  1,126,217 
57 Jacksonville, FL  1,100,491 
58 Rochester, NY  1,098,201 
59 Grand Rapids--Muskegon--
Holland, MI  
1,088,514 
60 Oklahoma City, OK  1,083,346 




62 Richmond--Petersburg, VA  996,512 
63 Greenville--Spartanburg--
Anderson, SC  
962,441 
64 Dayton--Springfield, OH  950,558 
65 Fresno, CA  922,516 
66 Birmingham, AL  921,106 




69 Tucson, AZ  843,746 
70 Tulsa, OK  803,235 
71 Ventura, CA  753,197 
72 Syracuse, NY  732,117 
73 Omaha, NE--IA  716,998 
74 Albuquerque, NM  712,738 
75 Tacoma, WA  700,820 
76 Akron, OH  694,960 
77 Knoxville, TN  687,249 
78 El Paso, TX  679,622 
Table A1: Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Population (2000). 
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79 Bakersfield, CA  661,645 
80 Allentown--Bethlehem--
Easton, PA  
637,958 
81 Gary, IN  631,362 
82 Harrisburg--Lebanon--
Carlisle, PA  
629,401 
83 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--
Hazleton, PA  
624,776 
84 Toledo, OH  618,203 
85 Jersey City, NJ  608,975 
86 Baton Rouge, LA  602,894 
87 Youngstown--Warren, OH  594,746 
88 Springfield, MA  591,932 




91 Little Rock--North Little 
Rock, AR  
583,845 




94 Stockton--Lodi, CA  563,598 
95 Charleston--North Charleston, 
SC  
549,033 
96 Wichita, KS  545,220 
97 New Haven--Meriden, CT  542,149 
98 Mobile, AL  540,258 
99 Columbia, SC  536,691 
100 Vallejo--Fairfield--Napa, CA  518,821 
101 Colorado Springs, CO  516,929 
102 Worcester, MA--CT  511,389 
103 Fort Wayne, IN  502,141 
104 Daytona Beach, FL  493,175 
105 Lakeland--Winter Haven, FL  483,924 
106 Johnson City--Kingsport--
Bristol, TN--VA  
480,091 
107 Lexington, KY  479,198 
108 Augusta--Aiken, GA--SC  477,441 
109 Melbourne--Titusville--Palm 
Bay, FL  
476,230 
110 Lancaster, PA  470,658 
111 Chattanooga, TN--GA  465,161 
112 Bridgeport, CT  459,479 
113 Santa Rosa, CA  458,614 
114 Des Moines, IA  456,022 
115 Kalamazoo--Battle Creek, MI  452,851 
116 Lansing--East Lansing, MI  447,728 
117 Modesto, CA  446,997 
118 Fort Myers--Cape Coral, FL  440,888 
119 Jackson, MS  440,801 
Rank Metropolitan Area Population 
120 Flint, MI  436,141 
121 Boise City, ID  432,345 
122 Madison, WI  426,526 
123 Spokane, WA  417,939 
124 Pensacola, FL  412,153 
125 Canton--Massillon, OH  406,934 
126 Saginaw--Bay City--Midland, 
MI  
403,070 
127 Salinas, CA  401,762 
128 Santa Barbara--Santa Maria--
Lompoc, CA  
399,347 
129 Lawrence, MA--NH  396,230 
130 Shreveport--Bossier City, LA  392,302 
131 Newburgh, NY--PA  387,669 
132 Lafayette, LA  385,647 
133 Beaumont--Port Arthur, TX  385,090 
134 York, PA  381,751 
135 Corpus Christi, TX  380,783 
136 Reading, PA  373,638 
137 Rockford, IL  371,236 













144 Atlantic--Cape May, NJ  354,878 
145 Stamford--Norwalk, CT  353,556 
146 Trenton, NJ  350,761 
147 Peoria--Pekin, IL  347,387 
148 Salem, OR  347,214 




151 Reno, NV  339,486 
152 Brownsville--Harlingen--San 
Benito, TX  
335,227 
153 Montgomery, AL  333,055 
154 Hamilton--Middletown, OH  332,807 
155 Springfield, MO  325,721 
156 Eugene--Springfield, OR  322,959 
157 Macon, GA  322,549 






160 Killeen--Temple, TX  312,952 
161 Fayetteville--Springdale-- 311,121 
Table A1: Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Population (2000). 
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Rogers, AR  
162 Fayetteville, NC  302,963 
163 Lowell, MA--NH  301,686 




166 New London--Norwich, CT--
RI  
293,566 
167 Savannah, GA  293,000 
168 Boulder--Longmont, CO  291,288 
169 Tallahassee, FL  284,539 
170 Erie, PA  280,843 
171 Dutchess County, NY  280,150 
172 Columbus, GA--AL  274,624 
173 South Bend, IN  265,559 
174 Anchorage, AK  260,283 
175 Ocala, FL  258,916 
176 Santa Cruz--Watsonville, CA  255,602 
177 Brockton, MA  255,459 
178 Mayaguez, PR  253,347 
179 Binghamton, NY  252,320 
180 Charleston, WV  251,662 
181 Fort Collins--Loveland, CO  251,494 
182 Naples, FL  251,377 
183 Lincoln, NE  250,291 




185 San Luis Obispo--Atascadero-
-Paso Robles, CA  
246,681 
186 Duluth--Superior, MN--WI  243,815 
187 Portland, ME  243,537 
188 Lubbock, TX  242,628 




191 Odessa--Midland, TX  237,132 
192 Roanoke, VA  235,932 
193 Wilmington, NC  233,450 
194 Johnstown, PA  232,621 
195 Bremerton, WA  231,969 
196 Waterbury, CT  228,984 
197 Green Bay, WI  226,778 
198 Asheville, NC  225,965 
199 Yakima, WA  222,581 
200 Danbury, CT  217,980 
201 Gainesville, FL  217,955 
Rank Metropolitan Area Population 
202 Amarillo, TX  217,858 
203 Lynchburg, VA  214,911 
204 Waco, TX  213,517 
205 Merced, CA  210,554 
206 Longview--Marshall, TX  208,780 
207 Olympia, WA  207,355 




210 Chico--Paradise, CA  203,171 
211 Springfield, IL  201,437 
212 Manchester, NH  198,378 
213 Myrtle Beach, SC  196,629 
214 Houma, LA  194,477 




217 Cedar Rapids, IA  191,701 
218 Nashua, NH  190,949 
219 Racine, WI  188,831 
220 Lake Charles, LA  183,577 
221 Lafayette, IN  182,821 
222 Elkhart--Goshen, IN  182,791 
223 Medford--Ashland, OR  181,269 
224 Greeley, CO  180,936 
225 Champaign--Urbana, IL  179,669 
226 Mansfield, OH  175,818 
227 New Bedford, MA  175,198 
228 Tyler, TX  174,706 
229 Las Cruces, NM  174,682 
230 Fargo--Moorhead, ND--MN  174,367 
231 Sioux Falls, SD  172,412 
232 Fort Walton Beach, FL  170,498 
233 Topeka, KS  169,871 
234 Burlington, VT  169,391 
235 Yolo, CA  168,660 
236 St. Cloud, MN  167,392 
237 Bellingham, WA  166,814 
238 Tuscaloosa, AL  164,875 
239 Redding, CA  163,256 
240 Barnstable--Yarmouth, MA  162,582 
241 Benton Harbor, MI  162,453 
242 Yuma, AZ  160,026 
243 Charlottesville, VA  159,576 
244 Jackson, MI  158,422 
245 Joplin, MO  157,322 
Table A1: Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Population (2000). 
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246 Lima, OH  155,084 
247 Athens, GA  153,444 
248 Wheeling, WV--OH  153,172 
249 Bryan--College Station, TX  152,415 




252 Bloomington--Normal, IL  150,433 
253 Jacksonville, NC  150,355 
254 Kenosha, WI  149,577 
255 Terre Haute, IN  149,192 
256 Eau Claire, WI  148,337 
257 Panama City, FL  148,217 
258 Santa Fe, NM  147,635 
259 Monroe, LA  147,250 
260 Vineland--Millville--
Bridgeton, NJ  
146,438 
262 Decatur, AL  145,867 
263 Rocky Mount, NC  143,026 
264 Florence, AL  142,950 
265 Fitchburg--Leominster, MA  142,284 
266 Punta Gorda, FL  141,627 
267 Pueblo, CO  141,472 
268 Wichita Falls, TX  140,518 
269 Jamestown, NY  139,750 
270 Yuba City, CA  139,149 
271 Dothan, AL  137,916 
272 State College, PA  135,758 
273 Columbia, MO  135,454 




276 Hagerstown, MD  131,923 
277 Texarkana, TX--Texarkana, 
AR  
129,749 
278 Billings, MT  129,352 
279 Altoona, PA  129,144 
280 Waterloo--Cedar Falls, IA  128,012 
281 La Crosse, WI--MN  126,838 
282 Dover, DE  126,697 
283 Abilene, TX  126,555 
284 Alexandria, LA  126,337 
285 Wausau, WI  125,834 
286 Florence, SC  125,761 
287 Glens Falls, NY  124,345 
288 Rochester, MN  124,277 
289 Sioux City, IA--NE  124,130 
Rank Metropolitan Area Population 
290 Flagstaff, AZ--UT  122,366 
291 Albany, GA  120,822 
292 Bloomington, IN  120,563 
293 Sharon, PA  120,293 
294 Williamsport, PA  120,044 
295 Muncie, IN  118,769 
296 Grand Junction, CO  116,255 
297 Auburn--Opelika, AL  115,092 
298 Lawton, OK  114,996 
299 Decatur, IL  114,706 
300 Goldsboro, NC  113,329 
301 Sheboygan, WI  112,646 
302 Anniston, AL  112,249 
303 Hattiesburg, MS  111,674 
304 Iowa City, IA  111,006 
305 Sherman--Denison, TX  110,595 
306 Danville, VA  110,156 
307 Jackson, TN  107,377 
308 Sumter, SC  104,646 
309 San Angelo, TX  104,010 
310 Kankakee, IL  103,833 
311 Gadsden, AL  103,459 
312 St. Joseph, MO  102,490 
313 Cumberland, MD--WV  102,008 
314 Kokomo, IN  101,541 
315 Lawrence, KS  99,962 
316 Grand Forks, ND--MN  97,478 
317 Missoula, MT  95,802 
318 Bismarck, ND  94,719 
319 Owensboro, KY  91,545 
320 Elmira, NY  91,070 
321 Bangor, ME  90,864 
322 Lewiston--Auburn, ME  90,830 
323 Dubuque, IA  89,143 
324 Rapid City, SD  88,565 
325 Pittsfield, MA  84,699 
326 Pine Bluff, AR  84,278 
327 Victoria, TX  84,088 
328 Jonesboro, AR  82,148 
329 Cheyenne, WY  81,607 
330 Great Falls, MT  80,357 
331 Corvallis, OR  78,153 
332 Pocatello, ID  75,565 
333 Casper, WY  66,533 
334 Enid, OK  57,813 
Table A2: Metropolitan Areas Ranked by Fragmentation Index. 
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Rank Metro Area F 
1 Boston, MA-NH PMSA 18.10 
2 Chicago, IL PMSA 15.09 
3 Pittsburgh, PA MSA 14.42 
4 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 14.10 
5 Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 12.23 
6 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--
Hazleton, PA MSA 
10.41 
7 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
MSA 
10.09 
8 Detroit, MI PMSA 9.20 
9 Houston, TX PMSA 9.07 




12 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 8.85 
13 Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 8.59 
14 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 8.58 
15 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 8.37 
16 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 
MSA 
8.32 
17 Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 
PMSA 
8.32 
18 Atlanta, GA MSA 8.30 
19 Johnstown, PA MSA 8.14 
20 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
PMSA 
7.95 
21 Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 7.85 
22 Denver, CO PMSA 7.84 









26 Hartford, CT MSA 7.45 
27 Rochester, NY MSA 7.44 
28 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
PMSA 
7.28 
29 Dallas, TX PMSA 7.15 
30 Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 7.12 
31 Indianapolis, IN MSA 6.99 




Holland, MI MSA 
6.91 
34 Columbus, OH MSA 6.86 
35 Lancaster, PA MSA 6.68 
36 Syracuse, NY MSA 6.62 
37 Providence-Fall River-
Warwick, RI-MA MSA 
6.55 
38 Davenport-Moline-Rock 
Island, IA-IL MSA 
6.53 
39 York, PA MSA 6.50 
Rank Metro Area F 
40 Louisville, KY-IN MSA 6.49 
41 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
6.45 
42 Reading, PA MSA 6.44 






45 Utica-Rome, NY MSA 6.41 
46 Oakland, CA PMSA 6.36 
47 Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 
PMSA 
6.24 
48 Youngstown-Warren, OH 
MSA 
6.21 
49 Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 6.20 
50 Rockford, IL MSA 6.14 
51 Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 6.12 
52 Bangor, ME MSA 6.07 
53 Orange County, CA PMSA 6.06 
54 Omaha, NE-IA MSA 5.98 
55 Fort Wayne, IN MSA 5.96 
56 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 
MSA 
5.93 
57 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 5.86 
58 Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC MSA 
5.85 
59 Birmingham, AL MSA 5.84 
60 Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 5.82 
61 Sacramento, CA PMSA 5.72 
62 Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 5.62 




65 San Francisco, CA PMSA 5.51 
66 Springfield, MA MSA 5.51 
67 Pittsfield, MA MSA 5.47 
68 Little Rock-North Little Rock, 
AR MSA 
5.44 
69 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
PMSA 
5.41 
70 St. Cloud, MN MSA 5.35 
71 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 
MSA 
5.33 
72 Gary, IN PMSA 5.31 
73 Williamsport, PA MSA 5.26 
74 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, 
MI MSA 
5.23 
75 Wheeling, WV-OH MSA 5.22 
76 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 
MSA 
5.13 
77 Tulsa, OK MSA 5.12 
78 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 
MSA 
5.11 
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79 Sharon, PA MSA 5.06 




High Point, NC MSA 
5.04 
82 Wichita, KS MSA 5.02 
83 New London-Norwich, CT-RI 
MSA 
5.00 
84 Oklahoma City, OK MSA 4.98 
85 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 
PMSA 
4.98 
86 Mobile, AL MSA 4.97 
87 San Diego, CA MSA 4.92 
88 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, 
NC-SC MSA 
4.92 
89 Orlando, FL MSA 4.90 
90 Akron, OH PMSA 4.89 
91 Portland, ME MSA 4.89 
92 Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL MSA 
4.88 
93 Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 4.87 
94 Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 
MSA 
4.86 
95 State College, PA MSA 4.83 
96 Toledo, OH MSA 4.82 
97 Johnson City-Kingsport-
Bristol, TN-VA MSA 
4.81 
98 Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 4.80 
99 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, 
NC MSA 
4.79 
100 Benton Harbor, MI MSA 4.76 
101 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, 
FL MSA 
4.73 
102 Greeley, CO PMSA 4.72 
103 Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 4.71 






106 Glens Falls, NY MSA 4.66 
107 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 
MSA 
4.64 
108 Bakersfield, CA MSA 4.64 
109 Madison, WI MSA 4.64 
110 Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 4.60 
111 Nashville, TN MSA 4.59 
112 Fresno, CA MSA 4.58 
113 Springfield, IL MSA 4.58 
114 Kankakee, IL PMSA 4.58 
115 Knoxville, TN MSA 4.54 
116 Erie, PA MSA 4.53 
117 Charleston, WV MSA 4.53 
Rank Metro Area F 
118 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 
MSA 
4.52 
119 Altoona, PA MSA 4.52 
120 Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 4.52 
121 Joplin, MO MSA 4.49 
122 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 4.44 
123 Boise City, ID MSA 4.42 
124 Dutchess County, NY PMSA 4.40 
125 Lima, OH MSA 4.39 
126 Binghamton, NY MSA 4.38 
127 Brazoria, TX PMSA 4.37 
128 Provo-Orem, UT MSA 4.33 
129 Charleston-North Charleston, 
SC MSA 
4.33 
130 Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 4.32 
131 Salem, OR PMSA 4.27 
132 Mansfield, OH MSA 4.27 
133 Galveston-Texas City, TX 
PMSA 
4.26 
134 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 
PMSA 
4.25 
135 Lexington, KY MSA 4.25 
136 Eau Claire, WI MSA 4.23 
137 Terre Haute, IN MSA 4.23 
138 Jamestown, NY MSA 4.22 
139 Wausau, WI MSA 4.22 
140 Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 
MSA 
4.20 
141 Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 4.20 
142 Des Moines, IA MSA 4.16 
143 Salinas, CA MSA 4.14 
144 Fayetteville-Springdale-
Rogers, AR MSA 
4.05 
145 Bellingham, WA MSA 4.05 
146 Jackson, MS MSA 4.01 
147 Macon, GA MSA 4.00 
148 Decatur, IL MSA 3.98 
149 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC MSA 
3.94 




152 Modesto, CA MSA 3.87 
153 La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 3.85 
154 Yakima, WA MSA 3.84 
155 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 3.83 
156 Ventura, CA PMSA 3.81 
157 Tacoma, WA PMSA 3.80 
158 Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 3.79 
159 Lafayette, LA MSA 3.77 
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160 Bremerton, WA PMSA 3.76 




163 Daytona Beach, FL MSA 3.72 
164 Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 3.72 
165 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
3.69 
166 Trenton, NJ PMSA 3.66 




169 Bismarck, ND MSA 3.59 
170 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 
MSA 
3.59 
171 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-
Paso Robles, CA MSA 
3.58 
172 Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 3.57 
173 Sheboygan, WI MSA 3.56 
174 Sioux Falls, SD MSA 3.55 
175 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm 
Bay, FL MSA 
3.54 
176 Lafayette, IN MSA 3.54 
177 Waco, TX MSA 3.53 
178 San Jose, CA PMSA 3.52 
179 Green Bay, WI MSA 3.50 
180 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 
MSA 
3.50 
181 Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 3.49 
182 Flint, MI PMSA 3.48 
183 Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 
MSA 
3.43 
184 St. Joseph, MO MSA 3.41 
185 Baltimore, MD PMSA 3.41 
186 Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 3.39 
187 Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 
PMSA 
3.35 
188 Olympia, WA PMSA 3.35 
189 Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 3.34 
190 Spokane, WA MSA 3.34 
191 Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX MSA 
3.33 
192 Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 3.33 
193 Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 3.33 
194 Florence, AL MSA 3.32 
195 Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 3.32 
196 New York, NY PMSA 3.32 
197 Montgomery, AL MSA 3.31 
198 Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 3.30 
199 Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 3.28 
200 Gadsden, AL MSA 3.27 
Rank Metro Area F 
201 Yuba City, CA MSA 3.27 
202 Springfield, MO MSA 3.27 
203 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 
MSA 
3.26 
204 Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 3.24 
205 San Antonio, TX MSA 3.23 
206 Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 3.19 
207 Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 3.17 
208 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 
PMSA 
3.17 
209 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 
MSA 
3.17 
210 Jersey City, NJ PMSA 3.16 
211 Savannah, GA MSA 3.16 
212 New Orleans, LA MSA 3.15 
213 Merced, CA MSA 3.14 
214 Racine, WI PMSA 3.12 
215 Casper, WY MSA 3.09 
216 Grand Junction, CO MSA 3.09 
217 Dothan, AL MSA 3.09 
218 Jackson, MI MSA 3.09 
219 Corpus Christi, TX MSA 3.06 




222 Redding, CA MSA 3.00 
223 Kokomo, IN MSA 2.99 
224 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 
PMSA 
2.98 
225 Rapid City, SD MSA 2.96 
226 South Bend, IN MSA 2.96 
227 Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 2.91 
228 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
MSA 
2.88 
229 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 
MSA 
2.88 
230 Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 
MSA 
2.88 
231 Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 2.85 
232 Florence, SC MSA 2.85 
233 Miami, FL PMSA 2.85 
234 Anniston, AL MSA 2.84 
235 Pine Bluff, AR MSA 2.81 
236 Wichita Falls, TX MSA 2.78 
237 Elmira, NY MSA 2.78 
238 Colorado Springs, CO MSA 2.77 
239 Wilmington, NC MSA 2.77 
240 Yolo, CA PMSA 2.77 
241 Muncie, IN MSA 2.77 
242 Decatur, AL MSA 2.76 
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243 Goldsboro, NC MSA 2.75 
244 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 2.74 
245 Jacksonville, FL MSA 2.73 
246 Topeka, KS MSA 2.73 
247 Columbus, GA-AL MSA 2.73 
248 Columbia, SC MSA 2.72 
249 Asheville, NC MSA 2.69 
250 Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 2.69 
251 Rocky Mount, NC MSA 2.65 
252 Panama City, FL MSA 2.64 
253 Pensacola, FL MSA 2.61 
254 Naples, FL MSA 2.59 
255 Bloomington, IN MSA 2.58 
256 Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 2.58 
257 Dover, DE MSA 2.56 
258 Tyler, TX MSA 2.54 
259 Athens, GA MSA 2.54 
260 Kenosha, WI PMSA 2.54 
261 Huntsville, AL MSA 2.52 
262 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 2.51 
263 Pueblo, CO MSA 2.50 
264 Lynchburg, VA MSA 2.49 
265 Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 2.48 
266 Dubuque, IA MSA 2.46 
267 Jonesboro, AR MSA 2.43 
268 Columbia, MO MSA 2.42 
269 Billings, MT MSA 2.40 
270 Missoula, MT MSA 2.39 
271 Gainesville, FL MSA 2.38 
272 Reno, NV MSA 2.37 
273 Albuquerque, NM MSA 2.34 




276 Tucson, AZ MSA 2.31 
277 Great Falls, MT MSA 2.30 
278 Lincoln, NE MSA 2.30 
279 Enid, OK MSA 2.29 
280 Charlottesville, VA MSA 2.29 
281 Pocatello, ID MSA 2.27 
282 Hagerstown, MD PMSA 2.25 
283 Alexandria, LA MSA 2.23 
284 El Paso, TX MSA 2.23 
285 Abilene, TX MSA 2.21 
286 Iowa City, IA MSA 2.20 
287 Rochester, MN MSA 2.20 
Rank Metro Area F 
288 Lake Charles, LA MSA 2.20 
289 Albany, GA MSA 2.16 
290 Cheyenne, WY MSA 2.13 
291 Tallahassee, FL MSA 2.09 
292 Roanoke, VA MSA 2.07 
293 Greenville, NC MSA 2.07 
294 Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 2.07 
295 Bryan-College Station, TX 
MSA 
2.07 
296 Lubbock, TX MSA 2.02 
297 Amarillo, TX MSA 2.00 
298 Hattiesburg, MS MSA 1.99 
299 Corvallis, OR MSA 1.99 
300 Yuma, AZ MSA 1.94 
301 Lawton, OK MSA 1.93 
302 Ocala, FL MSA 1.92 
303 Sumter, SC MSA 1.89 
304 Victoria, TX MSA 1.82 
305 Monroe, LA MSA 1.80 
306 Fayetteville, NC MSA 1.80 
307 Houma, LA MSA 1.79 
308 Jackson, TN MSA 1.77 
309 Jacksonville, NC MSA 1.77 
310 Las Cruces, NM MSA 1.72 
311 Santa Fe, NM MSA 1.69 
312 San Angelo, TX MSA 1.66 
313 Owensboro, KY MSA 1.61 
314 Laredo, TX MSA 1.60 
315 Danville, VA MSA 1.49 
316 Punta Gorda, FL MSA 1.46 
317 Anchorage, AK MSA 1.16 
318 Honolulu, HI MSA 1.13 
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1 Decatur, AL MSA 100.00 
1 Dothan, AL MSA 100.00 
1 Florence, SC MSA 100.00 
1 Goldsboro, NC MSA 100.00 
1 Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 
MSA 
100.00 
1 Jonesboro, AR MSA 100.00 
1 Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 100.00 
1 Ocala, FL MSA 100.00 
1 Rocky Mount, NC MSA 100.00 
1 Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 100.00 
1 Sumter, SC MSA 100.00 
2 Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC MSA 
98.76 
3 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 
MSA 
98.23 
4 Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 97.36 
5 Jacksonville, NC MSA 97.32 
6 Gadsden, AL MSA 97.27 
7 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, 
TN-VA MSA 
97.27 
8 Dover, DE MSA 97.21 
9 Asheville, NC MSA 96.95 
10 Panama City, FL MSA 96.86 
11 Brazoria, TX PMSA 96.63 
12 Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 96.26 
13 Punta Gorda, FL MSA 96.22 
14 Albany, GA MSA 96.13 
15 Florence, AL MSA 96.13 
16 Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 95.86 
17 Pensacola, FL MSA 95.71 
18 Huntsville, AL MSA 94.84 
19 Lynchburg, VA MSA 94.78 
20 Benton Harbor, MI MSA 94.76 
21 Knoxville, TN MSA 94.17 
22 Fayetteville, NC MSA 94.09 
23 Rapid City, SD MSA 93.72 
24 Olympia, WA PMSA 93.39 
25 Monroe, LA MSA 93.11 
26 Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 92.59 
27 Macon, GA MSA 92.53 
28 Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 
MSA 
92.46 
29 Wilmington, NC MSA 92.39 
30 Jackson, TN MSA 92.26 
Rank Metropolitan Area Sprawl 
31 Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 
MSA 
92.15 
32 Hattiesburg, MS MSA 91.92 
33 Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 
MSA 
91.86 





High Point, NC MSA 
91.77 
37 Lafayette, LA MSA 91.60 
38 Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME 
PMSA 
91.58 
39 Pine Bluff, AR MSA 91.44 
40 Redding, CA MSA 90.86 
41 Grand Junction, CO MSA 90.63 
42 Roanoke, VA MSA 90.55 
43 Wheeling, WV-OH MSA 90.14 
44 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 
MSA 
88.98 
45 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, 
NC-SC MSA 
88.06 
46 Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 87.78 
47 Alexandria, LA MSA 87.68 
48 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
MSA 
87.38 
49 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 
MSA 
87.31 
50 Wichita Falls, TX MSA 87.31 
51 Cumberland, MD-WV MSA 87.26 
52 Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 
MSA 
87.20 
53 Lake Charles, LA MSA 87.05 
54 Columbia, SC MSA 87.02 
55 Cheyenne, WY MSA 86.99 
56 New London-Norwich, CT-RI 
MSA 
86.72 
57 Tyler, TX MSA 86.32 
58 Little Rock-North Little Rock, 
AR MSA 
85.93 
59 Montgomery, AL MSA 85.65 
60 Charleston-North Charleston, 
SC MSA 
85.64 
61 Bremerton, WA PMSA 85.46 
62 Houma, LA MSA 84.96 
63 Danville, VA MSA 84.91 
64 Daytona Beach, FL MSA 84.74 
65 Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 84.67 
66 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, 
FL MSA 
84.38 
67 Danbury, CT PMSA 84.01 
68 Enid, OK MSA 83.75 
69 Athens, GA MSA 83.64 
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70 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 
MSA 
83.64 
71 Columbus, GA-AL MSA 83.60 
72 Springfield, MO MSA 83.50 
73 Charleston, WV MSA 83.00 
74 Dutchess County, NY PMSA 82.77 
75 Mobile, AL MSA 82.72 
76 Birmingham, AL MSA 82.67 
77 Jackson, MS MSA 82.54 
78 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, 
NC MSA 
81.91 
79 Wausau, WI MSA 81.52 
80 Pocatello, ID MSA 81.19 
81 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 
MSA 
81.15 
82 Kokomo, IN MSA 81.08 
83 Atlanta, GA MSA 80.65 
84 Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 80.23 
85 Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 80.06 
86 Columbia, MO MSA 79.88 
87 Pittsfield, MA MSA 79.60 




90 Nashua, NH PMSA 79.02 
91 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 
PMSA 
78.94 
92 Terre Haute, IN MSA 78.87 
93 Tallahassee, FL MSA 78.60 
94 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 78.46 
95 San Angelo, TX MSA 78.25 
96 Bellingham, WA MSA 77.75 
97 Mansfield, OH MSA 77.70 
98 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 
MSA 
77.67 
99 Killeen-Temple, TX MSA 77.62 
100 Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 77.62 
101 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 
MSA 
77.60 
102 Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 77.60 
103 Bangor, ME MSA 77.36 
104 Las Cruces, NM MSA 77.35 
105 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 
MSA 
77.27 
106 Lancaster, PA MSA 77.13 
107 Johnstown, PA MSA 77.09 
108 Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA 77.05 




Rank Metropolitan Area Sprawl 
111 Gainesville, FL MSA 76.61 
112 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 
MSA 
76.15 
113 St. Cloud, MN MSA 76.14 
114 Williamsport, PA MSA 75.81 
115 Jackson, MI MSA 75.55 
116 Fort Wayne, IN MSA 75.49 
117 Jacksonville, FL MSA 75.35 
118 Fitchburg-Leominster, MA 
PMSA 
75.20 
119 Greenville, NC MSA 75.10 
120 Naples, FL MSA 75.04 
121 Eau Claire, WI MSA 74.91 
122 Portland, ME MSA 74.86 




125 Flint, MI PMSA 74.60 
126 Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 74.41 
127 Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 74.35 
128 Great Falls, MT MSA 74.08 
129 Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 73.28 
130 Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 
MSA 
73.04 
131 Lima, OH MSA 72.92 
132 Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 72.84 
133 Waco, TX MSA 72.58 
134 Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 72.47 
135 Burlington, VT MSA 72.39 
136 Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 72.15 
137 Hagerstown, MD PMSA 71.93 
138 Galveston-Texas City, TX 
PMSA 
71.71 
139 Indianapolis, IN MSA 71.69 
140 Topeka, KS MSA 71.67 
141 Worcester, MA-CT PMSA 71.52 
142 Hartford, CT MSA 71.46 
143 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-
Paso Robles, CA MSA 
71.36 
144 Muncie, IN MSA 71.31 
145 Utica-Rome, NY MSA 70.95 
146 Springfield, IL MSA 70.87 
147 Corvallis, OR MSA 70.71 
148 Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 70.69 
149 Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 70.56 
150 Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA 70.40 
151 Glens Falls, NY MSA 70.23 
152 Abilene, TX MSA 70.14 
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153 Jamestown, NY MSA 69.68 
154 Rockford, IL MSA 69.57 
155 Gary, IN PMSA 69.51 
156 Casper, WY MSA 69.35 
157 Billings, MT MSA 69.34 
158 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA 68.85 
159 Akron, OH PMSA 68.75 
160 Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 68.57 
161 Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA 68.47 
162 Dubuque, IA MSA 68.39 
163 Savannah, GA MSA 68.35 
164 Brockton, MA PMSA 68.18 
165 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 68.05 
166 Decatur, IL MSA 67.90 
167 Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI MSA 
67.82 
168 Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 67.49 
169 Yakima, WA MSA 67.49 
170 Waterbury, CT PMSA 67.39 
171 La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 67.24 
172 Manchester, NH PMSA 67.13 






175 Lowell, MA-NH PMSA 66.61 
176 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 66.34 
177 Green Bay, WI MSA 65.88 
178 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 65.22 
179 St. Joseph, MO MSA 65.08 
180 Rochester, NY MSA 65.02 
181 Wichita, KS MSA 64.91 
182 Kankakee, IL PMSA 64.74 
183 Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 64.68 
184 Elmira, NY MSA 64.35 
185 Orlando, FL MSA 64.34 
186 Reading, PA MSA 64.30 
187 Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 64.20 
188 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, 
IA-IL MSA 
64.06 
189 Santa Fe, NM MSA 63.88 
190 Sharon, PA MSA 63.82 
191 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 63.81 
192 Tulsa, OK MSA 63.78 
193 Bloomington, IN MSA 63.45 
194 Springfield, MA MSA 63.43 
195 Syracuse, NY MSA 62.85 
Rank Metropolitan Area Sprawl 
196 Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 62.78 
197 Merced, CA MSA 62.69 
198 Yuba City, CA MSA 62.48 
199 Missoula, MT MSA 62.12 
200 Louisville, KY-IN MSA 61.90 
201 Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 
PMSA 
61.78 
202 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 61.64 
203 Racine, WI PMSA 61.58 
204 Binghamton, NY MSA 61.51 
205 Sheboygan, WI MSA 61.38 
206 Boise City, ID MSA 61.37 
207 Charlottesville, VA MSA 61.36 
208 Tacoma, WA PMSA 61.06 
209 Sioux Falls, SD MSA 61.06 
210 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--
Hazleton, PA MSA 
61.04 
211 Des Moines, IA MSA 60.99 
212 South Bend, IN MSA 60.72 
213 Rochester, MN MSA 60.11 
214 Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX MSA 
59.89 
215 Yuma, AZ MSA 59.36 
216 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
MSA 
59.11 




219 Oklahoma City, OK MSA 58.15 
220 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 57.98 
221 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 
MSA 
57.84 
222 Pittsburgh, PA MSA 57.74 
223 New Haven-Meriden, CT 
PMSA 
57.64 
224 Lexington, KY MSA 57.43 
225 Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 57.01 
226 Erie, PA MSA 57.01 
227 Bryan-College Station, TX 
MSA 
56.74 
228 Madison, WI MSA 56.53 
229 Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 56.50 
230 Providence-Fall River-
Warwick, RI-MA MSA 
56.50 
231 Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 56.20 
232 Trenton, NJ PMSA 56.13 
233 Toledo, OH MSA 55.92 
234 Lawrence, KS MSA 55.64 
235 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 55.44 
236 Salem, OR PMSA 55.25 
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237 Lafayette, IN MSA 55.25 
238 Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA 54.20 
239 Bridgeport, CT PMSA 54.02 
240 Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 53.81 
241 Reno, NV MSA 53.60 
242 Columbus, OH MSA 53.16 
243 Kenosha, WI PMSA 53.01 
244 Bismarck, ND MSA 52.89 
245 Provo-Orem, UT MSA 52.12 
246 Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 51.80 
247 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 
MSA 
51.77 
248 State College, PA MSA 51.62 
249 Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 51.08 
250 Amarillo, TX MSA 51.02 
251 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
PMSA 
50.95 
252 New Bedford, MA PMSA 50.59 
253 Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL MSA 
50.13 
254 Middlesex-Somerset-
Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 
50.11 
255 Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 50.05 
256 Corpus Christi, TX MSA 49.79 
257 Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 
PMSA 
49.41 
258 Victoria, TX MSA 49.19 
259 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
PMSA 
48.74 
260 Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 
PMSA 
48.50 
261 Colorado Springs, CO MSA 48.14 
262 Spokane, WA MSA 48.05 
263 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 
PMSA 
47.95 
264 Bakersfield, CA MSA 47.86 
265 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 
MSA 
47.70 
266 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 
MSA 
47.69 
267 Baltimore, MD PMSA 47.63 
268 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC MSA 
47.42 
269 Albuquerque, NM MSA 46.87 
270 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, 
FL MSA 
46.86 
271 Tucson, AZ MSA 46.61 
272 Boston, MA-NH PMSA 46.57 
273 Pueblo, CO MSA 46.53 
274 Altoona, PA MSA 46.13 
275 Houston, TX PMSA 45.87 
276 Iowa City, IA MSA 45.15 
Rank Metropolitan Area Sprawl 
277 San Antonio, TX MSA 45.04 
278 Dallas, TX PMSA 44.34 
279 Anchorage, AK MSA 44.19 
280 Omaha, NE-IA MSA 43.96 
281 Greeley, CO PMSA 43.70 
282 Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 43.36 
283 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 
PMSA 
42.45 
284 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 
PMSA 
41.99 
285 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
PMSA 
41.97 
286 Detroit, MI PMSA 41.76 
287 Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 
PMSA 
40.99 
288 Fresno, CA MSA 40.21 
289 Lubbock, TX MSA 39.65 
290 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
37.87 
291 Newark, NJ PMSA 37.41 
292 Salinas, CA MSA 36.01 
293 Honolulu, HI MSA 35.46 
294 Modesto, CA MSA 34.84 
295 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 34.80 
296 Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 34.80 
297 Ventura, CA PMSA 34.57 
298 El Paso, TX MSA 34.18 
299 Lincoln, NE MSA 33.88 
300 Sacramento, CA PMSA 32.89 
301 New Orleans, LA MSA 32.20 
302 Denver, CO PMSA 32.19 
303 Laredo, TX MSA 31.50 
304 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 31.46 
305 Chicago, IL PMSA 30.71 
306 Oakland, CA PMSA 27.78 
307 Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 27.52 
308 San Diego, CA MSA 26.85 
309 Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 25.54 
310 Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 21.52 
311 Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 20.77 
312 San Francisco, CA PMSA 16.96 
313 Miami, FL PMSA 15.73 
314 San Jose, CA PMSA 14.89 
315 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
10.61 
316 New York, NY PMSA 6.72 
317 Jersey City, NJ PMSA 3.94 
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1 Boston, MA-NH PMSA $74,170 
2 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA 
MSA 
$71,942 
3 San Francisco, CA PMSA $65,084 
4 Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA $62,961 
5 Portland, ME MSA $57,888 
6 Yolo, CA PMSA $56,892 
7 Pittsfield, MA MSA $55,543 
8 Springfield, IL MSA $55,380 
9 Odessa-Midland, TX MSA $55,278 
10 Trenton, NJ PMSA $54,754 
11 Middlesex-Somerset-
Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 
$54,485 
12 San Jose, CA PMSA $54,086 
13 Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 
PMSA 
$53,789 
14 Burlington, VT MSA $53,063 
15 Roanoke, VA MSA $52,903 
16 Anchorage, AK MSA $51,181 
17 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
PMSA 
$50,785 
18 Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA $50,005 
19 Orange County, CA PMSA $49,268 
20 New York, NY PMSA $49,175 
21 Jersey City, NJ PMSA $48,555 
22 Newark, NJ PMSA $48,070 
23 Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA $47,887 
24 Dallas, TX PMSA $46,418 
25 Rochester, MN MSA $45,976 
26 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA $45,876 
27 Green Bay, WI MSA $45,323 
28 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 
PMSA 
$45,148 
29 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 
MSA 
$45,126 
30 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 
MSA 
$45,042 
31 Reno, NV MSA $44,869 
32 Victoria, TX MSA $44,726 
33 Bangor, ME MSA $44,668 
34 Denver, CO PMSA $44,577 
35 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
$44,422 




38 Houston, TX PMSA $44,254 
39 Des Moines, IA MSA $44,003 
40 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, 
NC-SC MSA 
$43,912 
Rank Metro Area GMPPC 
41 Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA $43,877 
42 Lafayette, LA MSA $43,849 
43 Madison, WI MSA $43,744 
44 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-
Paso Robles, CA MSA 
$42,750 
45 Rochester, NY MSA $42,704 
46 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 
MSA 
$42,541 
47 Syracuse, NY MSA $42,528 
48 Redding, CA MSA $42,464 
49 Cedar Rapids, IA MSA $42,408 
50 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
MSA 
$42,339 
51 Longview-Marshall, TX MSA $42,132 
52 Chicago, IL PMSA $41,653 
53 Hagerstown, MD PMSA $41,144 
54 Binghamton, NY MSA $41,092 
55 Atlanta, GA MSA $41,092 
56 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA $40,852 
57 Columbus, OH MSA $40,806 
58 Elmira, NY MSA $40,726 
59 Utica-Rome, NY MSA $40,683 
60 Oakland, CA PMSA $40,614 
61 Jacksonville, FL MSA $40,467 
62 Houma, LA MSA $40,391 
63 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
$40,361 
64 Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA $40,254 
65 Spokane, WA MSA $40,242 
66 Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA $40,025 




Holland, MI MSA 
$39,674 




71 Chico-Paradise, CA MSA $39,535 
72 San Diego, CA MSA $39,514 
73 Topeka, KS MSA $39,500 
74 Sacramento, CA PMSA $39,448 
75 Decatur, IL MSA $39,386 
76 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--
High Point, NC MSA 
$39,311 
77 Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA $39,255 
78 Wausau, WI MSA $39,229 
79 Louisville, KY-IN MSA $38,994 
80 Baltimore, MD PMSA $38,888 
81 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, $38,805 
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NC MSA 
82 Macon, GA MSA $38,796 
83 St. Cloud, MN MSA $38,773 
84 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA $38,462 
85 Waco, TX MSA $38,323 
86 Florence, SC MSA $38,311 
87 Nashville, TN MSA $38,285 
88 Jackson, TN MSA $38,279 
89 Lincoln, NE MSA $38,138 
90 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA $38,065 
91 Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 
PMSA 
$37,937 
92 Lubbock, TX MSA $37,936 
93 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 
MSA 
$37,897 
94 San Angelo, TX MSA $37,786 
95 Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA $37,712 
96 Casper, WY MSA $37,690 
97 Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 
PMSA 
$37,619 
98 Omaha, NE-IA MSA $37,525 
99 La Crosse, WI-MN MSA $37,495 
100 Rockford, IL MSA $37,491 
101 Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 
PMSA 
$37,447 
102 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
PMSA 
$37,410 
103 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 
MSA 
$37,368 
104 Albuquerque, NM MSA $37,343 
105 Indianapolis, IN MSA $37,335 
106 Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 
MSA 
$37,300 
107 Sheboygan, WI MSA $37,263 
108 Lexington, KY MSA $37,232 
109 Fort Wayne, IN MSA $37,231 
110 Albany, GA MSA $37,227 
111 Monroe, LA MSA $37,021 
112 Columbia, SC MSA $36,959 
113 Columbia, MO MSA $36,906 
114 Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA $36,836 
115 Lynchburg, VA MSA $36,803 
116 Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA $36,777 
117 Orlando, FL MSA $36,759 
118 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, 
IA-IL MSA 
$36,705 
119 Gainesville, FL MSA $36,565 
120 Birmingham, AL MSA $36,377 
121 Tampa-St. Petersburg- $36,324 
Rank Metro Area GMPPC 
122 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT 
MSA 
$36,252 
123 Charlottesville, VA MSA $36,090 
124 Lima, OH MSA $36,029 
125 Lancaster, PA MSA $35,928 
126 Salinas, CA MSA $35,865 
127 Detroit, MI PMSA $35,864 
128 Joplin, MO MSA $35,814 
129 Colorado Springs, CO MSA $35,782 
130 Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA $35,737 
131 Pittsburgh, PA MSA $35,631 
132 Savannah, GA MSA $35,623 
133 Columbus, GA-AL MSA $35,605 
134 Tallahassee, FL MSA $35,562 
135 Abilene, TX MSA $35,510 
136 Toledo, OH MSA $35,456 
137 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA $35,435 
138 Ventura, CA PMSA $35,350 
139 Dubuque, IA MSA $35,340 
140 Williamsport, PA MSA $35,324 
141 Glens Falls, NY MSA $35,316 
142 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA $35,267 
143 Asheville, NC MSA $35,244 
144 Wichita Falls, TX MSA $35,139 
145 Amarillo, TX MSA $35,136 
146 San Antonio, TX MSA $35,029 
147 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA $34,895 







151 Jamestown, NY MSA $34,799 
152 Dutchess County, NY PMSA $34,789 
153 Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 
MSA 
$34,719 
154 Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA $34,708 
155 New Orleans, LA MSA $34,696 
156 Rocky Mount, NC MSA $34,632 
157 Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA $34,580 
158 Bryan-College Station, TX 
MSA 
$34,566 
159 Reading, PA MSA $34,537 
160 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 
MSA 
$34,476 
161 Huntsville, AL MSA $34,365 
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162 Wilmington, NC MSA $34,289 
163 Kokomo, IN MSA $34,280 
164 Wichita, KS MSA $34,190 
165 Corpus Christi, TX MSA $34,182 
166 Myrtle Beach, SC MSA $34,179 
167 Springfield, MO MSA $34,044 
168 Rapid City, SD MSA $33,962 
169 Athens, GA MSA $33,942 
170 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--
Hazleton, PA MSA 
$33,891 
171 Baton Rouge, LA MSA $33,878 
172 Charleston, WV MSA $33,841 
173 Jackson, MS MSA $33,832 
174 Altoona, PA MSA $33,787 
175 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, VA-NC MSA 
$33,611 
176 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA $33,562 
177 Miami, FL PMSA $33,556 
178 Modesto, CA MSA $33,448 
179 Boise City, ID MSA $33,442 
180 Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA $33,390 




183 Iowa City, IA MSA $33,147 
184 Cheyenne, WY MSA $33,117 
185 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 
MSA 
$33,031 
186 Bellingham, WA MSA $33,007 
187 Greenville, NC MSA $33,007 
188 Laredo, TX MSA $32,950 
189 Little Rock-North Little Rock, 
AR MSA 
$32,935 
190 Canton-Massillon, OH MSA $32,910 
191 Ann Arbor, MI PMSA $32,886 
192 Knoxville, TN MSA $32,851 
193 Grand Junction, CO MSA $32,807 
194 South Bend, IN MSA $32,770 
195 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 
MSA 
$32,733 
196 York, PA MSA $32,676 
197 Mansfield, OH MSA $32,589 
198 Eau Claire, WI MSA $32,525 
199 Akron, OH PMSA $32,483 
200 Lake Charles, LA MSA $32,455 
201 Montgomery, AL MSA $32,407 
202 Benton Harbor, MI MSA $32,195 
Rank Metro Area GMPPC 
203 Owensboro, KY MSA $32,161 
204 Tulsa, OK MSA $32,121 
205 Dothan, AL MSA $32,086 
206 State College, PA MSA $32,032 
207 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 
MSA 
$31,969 
208 Lafayette, IN MSA $31,768 
209 Danville, VA MSA $31,758 
210 Sherman-Denison, TX MSA $31,726 
211 Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA $31,663 
212 Corvallis, OR MSA $31,654 
213 Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC MSA 
$31,459 
214 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 
MSA 
$31,438 
215 Kankakee, IL PMSA $31,409 
216 Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA $31,382 
217 Missoula, MT MSA $31,331 
218 St. Joseph, MO MSA $31,207 
219 Bakersfield, CA MSA $31,173 
220 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, 
FL MSA 
$31,123 
221 Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA $31,048 
222 Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA $30,946 
223 Panama City, FL MSA $30,894 
224 Bloomington, IN MSA $30,796 




227 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 
MSA 
$30,494 
228 Tuscaloosa, AL MSA $30,464 




Bristol, TN-VA MSA 
$30,350 
231 Oklahoma City, OK MSA $30,349 
232 Olympia, WA PMSA $30,335 
233 Fresno, CA MSA $30,222 
234 Billings, MT MSA $30,185 
235 Sharon, PA MSA $29,999 
236 Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA $29,978 
237 Muncie, IN MSA $29,927 
238 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 
MSA 
$29,853 
239 Santa Fe, NM MSA $29,740 
240 Goldsboro, NC MSA $29,721 
241 Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA $29,571 
242 Alexandria, LA MSA $29,449 
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243 Johnstown, PA MSA $29,391 
244 Yakima, WA MSA $29,249 
245 Dover, DE MSA $29,228 
246 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 
PMSA 
$29,130 
247 Bismarck, ND MSA $29,096 
248 Jonesboro, AR MSA $29,019 
249 Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA $28,939 
250 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA $28,918 
251 Fayetteville, NC MSA $28,791 
252 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 
PMSA 
$28,700 
253 Tacoma, WA PMSA $28,684 
254 Pueblo, CO MSA $28,679 
255 Terre Haute, IN MSA $28,553 
256 Greeley, CO PMSA $28,537 
257 Anniston, AL MSA $28,517 
258 Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA $28,496 
259 Yuba City, CA MSA $28,419 
260 Merced, CA MSA $28,329 
261 Enid, OK MSA $28,293 
262 Jackson, MI MSA $28,026 
263 Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA $27,929 
264 Charleston-North Charleston, 
SC MSA 
$27,905 
265 Medford-Ashland, OR MSA $27,849 
266 Wheeling, WV-OH MSA $27,848 




269 Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA $27,583 
270 Tucson, AZ MSA $27,376 
271 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
MSA 
$27,196 
272 Salem, OR PMSA $27,014 
273 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
PMSA 
$26,932 
274 Racine, WI PMSA $26,849 
275 Cumberland, MD-WV MSA $26,817 
276 Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA $26,705 
277 Lawrence, KS MSA $26,614 
278 Sumter, SC MSA $26,546 
279 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL 
MSA 
$26,466 
280 Bremerton, WA PMSA $26,422 
281 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm 
Bay, FL MSA 
$26,410 
282 Great Falls, MT MSA $26,231 
283 Mobile, AL MSA $26,148 
Rank Metro Area GMPPC 
284 Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 
MSA 
$26,140 
285 Flint, MI PMSA $26,093 
286 Pine Bluff, AR MSA $25,825 
287 Gary, IN PMSA $25,697 
288 Hattiesburg, MS MSA $25,598 
289 Providence-Fall River-
Warwick, RI-MA MSA 
$25,597 
290 Naples, FL MSA $25,597 
291 Pocatello, ID MSA $25,558 
292 Pensacola, FL MSA $25,535 
293 Decatur, AL MSA $25,402 
294 Galveston-Texas City, TX 
PMSA 
$25,136 
295 Brazoria, TX PMSA $24,691 







299 Florence, AL MSA $23,676 
300 Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX MSA 
$23,418 
301 Provo-Orem, UT MSA $22,919 
302 Gadsden, AL MSA $22,442 
303 Ocala, FL MSA $22,338 
304 Las Cruces, NM MSA $22,063 
305 Lawton, OK MSA $22,046 
306 Jacksonville, NC MSA $21,954 
307 Kenosha, WI PMSA $20,976 
308 Daytona Beach, FL MSA $20,701 
309 Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA $20,566 






312 Yuma, AZ MSA $18,835 
313 Punta Gorda, FL MSA $17,032 
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1 Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 52.38 
2 Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA 49.43 
3 Iowa City, IA MSA 47.60 
4 Corvallis, OR MSA 47.39 
5 San Francisco, CA PMSA 43.59 
6 Lawrence, KS MSA 42.68 
7 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 
PMSA 
41.82 
8 Columbia, MO MSA 41.73 
9 Madison, WI MSA 40.64 
10 San Jose, CA PMSA 40.48 
11 Charlottesville, VA MSA 40.08 
12 Santa Fe, NM MSA 39.92 
13 Bloomington, IN MSA 39.63 
14 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA 39.53 
15 Boston, MA-NH PMSA 39.47 
16 Danbury, CT PMSA 39.38 
17 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, 
NC MSA 
38.91 
18 Gainesville, FL MSA 38.70 




21 Burlington, VT MSA 37.18 
22 Bryan-College Station, TX MSA 36.99 
23 Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 36.91 
24 Tallahassee, FL MSA 36.73 
25 Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 36.69 
26 State College, PA MSA 36.28 
27 Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 36.17 
28 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
PMSA 
35.87 
29 Oakland, CA PMSA 34.95 
30 Rochester, MN MSA 34.71 
31 Denver, CO PMSA 34.24 
32 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 
PMSA 
34.18 
33 Yolo, CA PMSA 34.14 
34 Athens, GA MSA 34.08 
35 Trenton, NJ PMSA 33.96 
36 Portland, ME MSA 33.56 
37 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA 33.47 
38 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
MSA 
33.26 
39 Nashua, NH PMSA 33.18 
40 Missoula, MT MSA 32.80 
41 Lincoln, NE MSA 32.57 
42 Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 32.50 
Rank Metropolitan Area HC 
43 Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME 
PMSA 
32.19 
44 Atlanta, GA MSA 32.05 
45 Colorado Springs, CO MSA 31.76 
46 Newark, NJ PMSA 31.54 
47 Provo-Orem, UT MSA 31.46 
48 New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA 31.43 
49 Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 31.34 
50 Huntsville, AL MSA 30.90 
51 Orange County, CA PMSA 30.81 
52 Chicago, IL PMSA 30.10 
53 Dallas, TX PMSA 29.97 
54 Olympia, WA PMSA 29.84 
55 Hartford, CT MSA 29.79 
56 San Diego, CA MSA 29.52 
57 Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 29.46 
58 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
29.42 
59 Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 29.40 
60 Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA 29.28 
61 Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA 29.21 
62 Baltimore, MD PMSA 29.20 
63 Columbia, SC MSA 29.20 
64 New York, NY PMSA 29.16 
65 Columbus, OH MSA 29.05 
66 Anchorage, AK MSA 28.91 
67 Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 
PMSA 
28.84 
68 Des Moines, IA MSA 28.72 
69 Lexington, KY MSA 28.68 
70 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 28.54 
71 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 28.50 
72 Albuquerque, NM MSA 28.40 
73 Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 28.38 
74 Lafayette, IN MSA 28.23 
75 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 
MSA 
28.21 
76 Jackson, MS MSA 28.10 
77 Lowell, MA-NH PMSA 28.08 
78 Springfield, IL MSA 28.05 
79 Omaha, NE-IA MSA 27.96 
80 Bridgeport, CT PMSA 27.93 
81 Naples, FL MSA 27.92 
82 Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 27.91 
83 Honolulu, HI MSA 27.87 
84 Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 27.75 
85 Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 27.73 
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86 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, 
FL MSA 
27.71 
87 Worcester, MA-CT PMSA 27.66 
88 Dutchess County, NY PMSA 27.63 
89 Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 
PMSA 
27.57 
90 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 27.57 
91 Bellingham, WA MSA 27.23 
92 Houston, TX PMSA 27.16 
93 Rochester, NY MSA 27.10 
94 Manchester, NH PMSA 27.01 
95 Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 
PMSA 
26.95 
96 Ventura, CA PMSA 26.95 
97 Nashville, TN MSA 26.85 
98 Tucson, AZ MSA 26.75 
99 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-
Paso Robles, CA MSA 
26.70 
100 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 26.53 
101 Boise City, ID MSA 26.48 
102 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, 
NC-SC MSA 
26.47 
103 Bangor, ME MSA 26.42 
104 Greenville, NC MSA 26.40 
105 Billings, MT MSA 26.38 
106 Wilmington, NC MSA 26.07 
107 Topeka, KS MSA 26.04 
108 Sioux Falls, SD MSA 25.91 
109 Sacramento, CA PMSA 25.85 
110 Indianapolis, IN MSA 25.83 
111 Bismarck, ND MSA 25.54 
112 Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 25.51 
113 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 25.33 
114 Bremerton, WA PMSA 25.33 
115 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 25.32 
116 Jersey City, NJ PMSA 25.28 
117 New London-Norwich, CT-RI 
MSA 
25.13 
118 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 25.08 
119 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
PMSA 
25.07 
120 Charleston-North Charleston, SC 
MSA 
25.03 
121 Spokane, WA MSA 25.02 
122 Rapid City, SD MSA 24.98 
123 Pocatello, ID MSA 24.95 
124 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 24.94 
125 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
24.86 
126 Orlando, FL MSA 24.80 
Rank Metropolitan Area HC 
127 Little Rock-North Little Rock, 
AR MSA 
24.77 
128 Montgomery, AL MSA 24.72 
129 Wichita, KS MSA 24.71 
130 Birmingham, AL MSA 24.71 
131 Springfield, MA MSA 24.64 
132 Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 24.58 
133 La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 24.57 
134 Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 24.55 
135 Asheville, NC MSA 24.48 
136 Oklahoma City, OK MSA 24.45 
137 Lubbock, TX MSA 24.37 
138 Hattiesburg, MS MSA 24.30 
139 Akron, OH PMSA 24.28 
140 Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 24.24 
141 Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 24.24 
142 Syracuse, NY MSA 24.08 
143 Pittsfield, MA MSA 24.06 
144 Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 24.03 
145 Pittsburgh, PA MSA 23.84 
146 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport 
News, VA-NC MSA 
23.80 
147 Reno, NV MSA 23.72 
148 South Bend, IN MSA 23.63 
149 Providence-Fall River-Warwick, 
RI-MA MSA 
23.62 
150 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, 
FL MSA 
23.55 
151 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 
PMSA 
23.48 
152 Knoxville, TN MSA 23.47 
153 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 
MSA 
23.46 
154 Cheyenne, WY MSA 23.45 
155 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 
MSA 
23.32 
156 Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 
PMSA 
23.31 
157 Tulsa, OK MSA 23.22 
158 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA 23.21 
159 Savannah, GA MSA 23.16 
160 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 22.98 
161 Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI MSA 
22.91 
162 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--
High Point, NC MSA 
22.88 
163 Jacksonville, FL MSA 22.87 
164 Detroit, MI PMSA 22.77 
165 Monroe, LA MSA 22.73 
166 Galveston-Texas City, TX 
PMSA 
22.71 
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167 Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 22.69 
168 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 
PMSA 
22.66 
169 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 
MSA 
22.61 
170 New Orleans, LA MSA 22.56 
171 Tyler, TX MSA 22.55 
172 Salinas, CA MSA 22.50 
173 Green Bay, WI MSA 22.47 
174 Roanoke, VA MSA 22.46 
175 Abilene, TX MSA 22.45 
176 San Antonio, TX MSA 22.45 
177 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 
MSA 
22.43 




180 Las Cruces, NM MSA 22.29 
181 Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 22.28 
182 Louisville, KY-IN MSA 22.17 
183 Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 22.15 
184 Eau Claire, WI MSA 22.12 
185 Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 22.08 
186 Binghamton, NY MSA 22.04 
187 Grand Junction, CO MSA 21.95 
188 Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 21.84 
189 Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL MSA 
21.69 
190 Miami, FL PMSA 21.68 
191 Brockton, MA PMSA 21.67 
192 Greeley, CO PMSA 21.65 
193 Toledo, OH MSA 21.61 
194 Pensacola, FL MSA 21.53 
195 Great Falls, MT MSA 21.48 
196 Waterbury, CT PMSA 21.42 




199 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA 21.23 
200 Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 21.14 
201 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA 21.10 
202 Amarillo, TX MSA 21.00 
203 St. Cloud, MN MSA 20.96 
204 Jonesboro, AR MSA 20.94 
205 Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 20.92 
206 Erie, PA MSA 20.87 
207 Salem, OR PMSA 20.80 
208 Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC MSA 
20.73 
Rank Metropolitan Area HC 
209 Tacoma, WA PMSA 20.59 
210 Lancaster, PA MSA 20.51 
211 Charleston, WV MSA 20.40 
212 Muncie, IN MSA 20.38 
213 Racine, WI PMSA 20.27 
214 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, 
IA-IL MSA 
20.26 
215 Jackson, TN MSA 20.07 
216 Casper, WY MSA 20.02 
217 Mobile, AL MSA 19.87 
218 Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 
MSA 
19.74 
219 Wichita Falls, TX MSA 19.70 
220 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 19.70 
221 Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 19.67 
222 Benton Harbor, MI MSA 19.62 
223 Brazoria, TX PMSA 19.61 
224 Enid, OK MSA 19.55 
225 San Angelo, TX MSA 19.50 
226 Fitchburg-Leominster, MA 
PMSA 
19.49 
227 Macon, GA MSA 19.48 
228 Fort Wayne, IN MSA 19.38 
229 Lynchburg, VA MSA 19.26 
230 Kenosha, WI PMSA 19.20 
231 Lawton, OK MSA 19.11 
232 Fayetteville, NC MSA 19.11 
233 Waco, TX MSA 19.10 
234 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 
MSA 
19.07 
235 Glens Falls, NY MSA 18.90 
236 Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 18.72 
237 Florence, SC MSA 18.68 
238 Dover, DE MSA 18.64 
239 Terre Haute, IN MSA 18.61 
240 Elmira, NY MSA 18.58 
241 Columbus, GA-AL MSA 18.56 
242 Rockford, IL MSA 18.52 
243 Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 
MSA 
18.49 
244 Reading, PA MSA 18.49 
245 Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 18.38 
246 York, PA MSA 18.38 
247 Pueblo, CO MSA 18.34 
248 Wausau, WI MSA 18.30 
249 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 
MSA 
18.13 
250 Killeen-Temple, TX MSA 18.07 
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251 Daytona Beach, FL MSA 18.03 
252 Sheboygan, WI MSA 17.91 
253 Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 17.88 
254 Corpus Christi, TX MSA 17.80 
255 Utica-Rome, NY MSA 17.74 
256 Gary, IN PMSA 17.70 
257 Panama City, FL MSA 17.68 
258 Albany, GA MSA 17.65 
259 Punta Gorda, FL MSA 17.58 
260 Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 
MSA 
17.55 
261 Lafayette, LA MSA 17.55 
262 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--
Hazleton, PA MSA 
17.37 
263 Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 17.32 
264 Sharon, PA MSA 17.29 
265 New Bedford, MA PMSA 17.25 
266 Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 17.24 
267 St. Joseph, MO MSA 17.18 
268 Kokomo, IN MSA 17.14 




271 Jamestown, NY MSA 16.94 
272 Decatur, IL MSA 16.92 
273 Dothan, AL MSA 16.89 
274 Lake Charles, LA MSA 16.86 
275 Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 16.82 
276 Florence, AL MSA 16.78 
277 Fresno, CA MSA 16.76 
278 Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 16.68 
279 El Paso, TX MSA 16.61 
280 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, 
TN-VA MSA 
16.60 
281 Redding, CA MSA 16.60 
282 Alexandria, LA MSA 16.55 
283 Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 16.39 
284 Joplin, MO MSA 16.37 
285 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
PMSA 
16.27 
286 Jackson, MI MSA 16.26 
287 Victoria, TX MSA 16.25 
288 Flint, MI PMSA 16.23 
289 Sumter, SC MSA 15.82 
290 Decatur, AL MSA 15.81 
291 Pine Bluff, AR MSA 15.68 
292 Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 15.51 
293 Yakima, WA MSA 15.30 
Rank Metropolitan Area HC 
294 Anniston, AL MSA 15.22 
295 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 
MSA 
15.16 
296 Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA 15.08 
297 Williamsport, PA MSA 15.06 
298 Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 
MSA 
15.03 
299 Goldsboro, NC MSA 14.99 
300 Kankakee, IL PMSA 14.96 
301 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 
MSA 
14.92 
302 Jacksonville, NC MSA 14.77 
303 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX MSA 14.71 
304 Wheeling, WV-OH MSA 14.64 
305 Hagerstown, MD PMSA 14.63 




308 Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA 14.35 
309 Modesto, CA MSA 14.05 
310 Laredo, TX MSA 13.93 
311 Rocky Mount, NC MSA 13.88 
312 Altoona, PA MSA 13.88 
313 Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 13.79 
314 Ocala, FL MSA 13.69 
315 Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 
MSA 
13.62 
316 Bakersfield, CA MSA 13.52 
317 Cumberland, MD-WV MSA 13.44 
318 Lima, OH MSA 13.44 
319 Gadsden, AL MSA 13.42 
320 Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX MSA 
13.36 
321 Yuba City, CA MSA 13.22 
322 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 
MSA 
12.91 
323 Johnstown, PA MSA 12.71 
324 Houma, LA MSA 12.30 
325 Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 
MSA 
12.07 
326 Yuma, AZ MSA 11.84 
327 Mansfield, OH MSA 11.82 
328 Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 
PMSA 
11.75 
329 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 
MSA 
11.50 
330 Danville, VA MSA 11.27 
331 Merced, CA MSA 11.05 
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1 New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA 20.27 
2 New York, NY PMSA 10.59 
3 Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 9.73 
4 Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 9.53 
5 Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA 8.37 
6 Jamestown, NY MSA 8.36 
7 Glens Falls, NY MSA 8.30 
8 Bangor, ME MSA 8.19 
9 Binghamton, NY MSA 7.96 
10 Utica-Rome, NY MSA 7.80 
11 Syracuse, NY MSA 7.79 
12 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA 7.65 
13 Lake Charles, LA MSA 7.62 
14 Galveston-Texas City, TX PMSA 7.61 
15 Boston, MA-NH PMSA 7.55 
16 Pittsfield, MA MSA 7.48 
17 Rochester, NY MSA 7.41 
18 Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 7.38 
19 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 
MSA 
7.28 
20 Dutchess County, NY PMSA 7.15 
21 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX MSA 6.80 
22 Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA 6.73 
23 Elmira, NY MSA 6.69 
24 Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH 
PMSA 
6.61 
25 Corpus Christi, TX MSA 6.47 
26 Portland, ME MSA 6.44 
27 Laredo, TX MSA 6.40 
28 Chicago, IL PMSA 6.36 
29 Toledo, OH MSA 6.29 
30 Gary, IN PMSA 6.26 
31 Miami, FL PMSA 6.11 
32 Newark, NJ PMSA 6.09 
33 Burlington, VT MSA 6.01 
34 Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 5.98 
35 Trenton, NJ PMSA 5.95 
36 Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 5.94 
37 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 
PMSA 
5.88 
38 Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 5.88 
39 New Orleans, LA MSA 5.88 
40 Alexandria, LA MSA 5.81 
41 Akron, OH PMSA 5.80 
42 Savannah, GA MSA 5.79 
43 El Paso, TX MSA 5.78 
Rank Metro Area TE 
44 Victoria, TX MSA 5.76 
45 Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI 
PMSA 
5.73 
46 Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 5.70 
47 Rapid City, SD MSA 5.66 
48 Columbus, OH MSA 5.66 
49 Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 5.65 
50 Monroe, LA MSA 5.63 
51 Houston, TX PMSA 5.54 
52 Kenosha, WI PMSA 5.53 




55 Hartford, CT MSA 5.48 
56 Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 5.48 
57 Madison, WI MSA 5.44 
58 Albany, GA MSA 5.44 
59 Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 
MSA 
5.41 
60 Jersey City, NJ PMSA 5.37 
61 Lincoln, NE MSA 5.33 
62 Bryan-College Station, TX MSA 5.29 
63 Brazoria, TX PMSA 5.28 
64 Roanoke, VA MSA 5.22 
65 Pittsburgh, PA MSA 5.21 
66 Sioux Falls, SD MSA 5.20 
67 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 
MSA 
5.19 
68 Reading, PA MSA 5.16 
69 Topeka, KS MSA 5.12 
70 Omaha, NE-IA MSA 5.09 
71 Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 5.09 
72 Dallas, TX PMSA 5.07 
73 Mansfield, OH MSA 5.06 
74 Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport 





76 Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 4.98 
77 Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 
PMSA 
4.96 
78 Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 4.91 
79 Williamsport, PA MSA 4.87 
80 Rockford, IL MSA 4.86 
81 West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, 
FL MSA 
4.85 
82 New London-Norwich, CT-RI 
MSA 
4.85 
83 Columbus, GA-AL MSA 4.84 
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84 Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 
MSA 
4.83 
85 Pueblo, CO MSA 4.79 
86 Baltimore, MD PMSA 4.79 
87 San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-
Paso Robles, CA MSA 
4.79 
88 Baton Rouge, LA MSA 4.78 
89 Denver, CO PMSA 4.77 
90 Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 4.74 
91 Bakersfield, CA MSA 4.74 
92 Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 4.73 
93 Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA 4.72 
94 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA 4.72 
95 Grand Junction, CO MSA 4.67 
96 Greeley, CO PMSA 4.67 
97 Abilene, TX MSA 4.66 
98 Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 4.65 
99 Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 4.63 
100 Wichita Falls, TX MSA 4.63 
101 Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--
Hazleton, PA MSA 
4.61 
102 Waco, TX MSA 4.61 
103 Sheboygan, WI MSA 4.61 
104 Providence-Fall River-Warwick, 
RI-MA MSA 
4.60 
105 Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA 
PMSA 
4.59 
106 Fort Wayne, IN MSA 4.59 
107 Lima, OH MSA 4.57 
108 Missoula, MT MSA 4.56 
109 Wausau, WI MSA 4.55 
110 Indianapolis, IN MSA 4.54 
111 Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA 4.53 
112 Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 4.53 
113 Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 4.53 
114 San Antonio, TX MSA 4.52 
115 Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA 
MSA 
4.52 
116 St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 4.50 
117 Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 4.49 
118 Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA 4.48 
119 Des Moines, IA MSA 4.48 
120 La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 4.47 
121 Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 4.47 
122 Terre Haute, IN MSA 4.47 
123 Orlando, FL MSA 4.47 
124 Amarillo, TX MSA 4.47 
Rank Metro Area TE 
125 Brownsville-Harlingen-San 
Benito, TX MSA 
4.46 
126 Birmingham, AL MSA 4.43 
127 Punta Gorda, FL MSA 4.42 
128 Lubbock, TX MSA 4.42 
129 Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 4.41 
130 Macon, GA MSA 4.40 
131 Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA 4.40 
132 Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY 
MSA 
4.39 
133 Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 4.39 
134 Erie, PA MSA 4.37 
135 Green Bay, WI MSA 4.37 
136 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA 4.36 
137 Dubuque, IA MSA 4.31 
138 Houma, LA MSA 4.31 
139 Daytona Beach, FL MSA 4.30 
140 Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 
PMSA 
4.30 
141 Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 4.30 
142 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
4.29 
143 Springfield, MA MSA 4.29 
144 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, 
IA-IL MSA 
4.29 
145 San Angelo, TX MSA 4.28 
146 Lancaster, PA MSA 4.28 
147 Atlanta, GA MSA 4.27 
148 Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 4.26 
149 Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI 
MSA 
4.26 
150 Kankakee, IL PMSA 4.25 
151 Knoxville, TN MSA 4.19 
152 Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 4.19 
153 Athens, GA MSA 4.18 
154 Tucson, AZ MSA 4.17 
155 Lafayette, IN MSA 4.15 
156 Tyler, TX MSA 4.15 
157 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
MSA 
4.14 
158 Redding, CA MSA 4.14 
159 Nashville, TN MSA 4.14 
160 Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV 
MSA 
4.14 
161 Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 4.12 
162 Yuma, AZ MSA 4.11 
163 Salinas, CA MSA 4.09 
164 Eau Claire, WI MSA 4.08 
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165 Johnstown, PA MSA 4.08 
166 Hagerstown, MD PMSA 4.08 
167 Yuba City, CA MSA 4.07 
168 Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, FL MSA 
4.07 
169 Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 4.07 
170 Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 4.06 
171 South Bend, IN MSA 4.05 
172 Panama City, FL MSA 4.05 
173 San Francisco, CA PMSA 4.02 
174 Bellingham, WA MSA 4.02 
175 Fresno, CA MSA 4.01 
176 St. Joseph, MO MSA 4.00 
177 Hamilton-Middletown, OH 
PMSA 
4.00 
178 Oakland, CA PMSA 3.99 
179 Lawrence, KS MSA 3.98 
180 Jackson, TN MSA 3.98 
181 York, PA MSA 3.97 
182 Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 3.95 
183 State College, PA MSA 3.94 
184 Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS 
MSA 
3.92 
185 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
3.92 
186 Corvallis, OR MSA 3.91 
187 Muncie, IN MSA 3.91 
188 Springfield, IL MSA 3.90 
189 Racine, WI PMSA 3.90 
190 Charlottesville, VA MSA 3.89 
191 Charleston, WV MSA 3.89 
192 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
PMSA 
3.89 
193 Bloomington, IN MSA 3.88 
194 San Jose, CA PMSA 3.88 
195 Yolo, CA PMSA 3.87 
196 Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA 
MSA 
3.83 
197 Spokane, WA MSA 3.81 
198 Pine Bluff, AR MSA 3.80 
199 St. Cloud, MN MSA 3.80 
200 Cumberland, MD-WV MSA 3.80 
201 Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH 
MSA 
3.79 
202 Wheeling, WV-OH MSA 3.79 
203 Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 3.78 
204 Naples, FL MSA 3.78 
205 Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 3.78 
Rank Metro Area TE 
206 Tallahassee, FL MSA 3.78 
207 Wichita, KS MSA 3.77 
208 Bismarck, ND MSA 3.77 
209 Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 3.76 
210 Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 3.76 
211 Altoona, PA MSA 3.76 
212 Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 3.76 
213 Greensboro--Winston-Salem--
High Point, NC MSA 
3.76 
214 Oklahoma City, OK MSA 3.75 
215 Charleston-North Charleston, SC 
MSA 
3.75 
216 Louisville, KY-IN MSA 3.73 
217 Detroit, MI PMSA 3.73 
218 Mobile, AL MSA 3.72 
219 Anchorage, AK MSA 3.70 
220 Enid, OK MSA 3.69 
221 Reno, NV MSA 3.69 
222 Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 3.67 
223 Tulsa, OK MSA 3.67 
224 Olympia, WA PMSA 3.65 
225 Tacoma, WA PMSA 3.65 
226 Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 
MSA 
3.65 
227 Wilmington, NC MSA 3.63 
228 Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 3.63 
229 Lynchburg, VA MSA 3.62 
230 Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, 
TN-VA MSA 
3.62 
231 Columbia, MO MSA 3.62 
232 Sharon, PA MSA 3.62 
233 Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 3.59 
234 Decatur, IL MSA 3.59 
235 Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA 
PMSA 
3.57 
236 Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 3.57 
237 Jacksonville, FL MSA 3.57 
238 Iowa City, IA MSA 3.57 
239 Salem, OR PMSA 3.54 
240 Merced, CA MSA 3.53 
241 Joplin, MO MSA 3.52 
242 Sacramento, CA PMSA 3.52 
243 Ventura, CA PMSA 3.52 
244 Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 
PMSA 
3.52 
245 Killeen-Temple, TX MSA 3.51 
246 Gainesville, FL MSA 3.50 
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247 Modesto, CA MSA 3.50 
248 Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 
MSA 
3.49 
249 Gadsden, AL MSA 3.49 
250 Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA 
MSA 
3.49 
251 Asheville, NC MSA 3.48 
252 Yakima, WA MSA 3.47 
253 Billings, MT MSA 3.47 
254 Colorado Springs, CO MSA 3.46 
255 Lexington, KY MSA 3.45 
256 Rochester, MN MSA 3.45 
257 Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 
MSA 
3.41 
258 Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 3.38 
259 Orange County, CA PMSA 3.38 
260 Provo-Orem, UT MSA 3.36 
261 San Diego, CA MSA 3.35 
262 Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 3.35 
263 Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, 
FL MSA 
3.35 
264 Lafayette, LA MSA 3.34 
265 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, 
NC-SC MSA 
3.34 
266 Florence, AL MSA 3.31 
267 Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 3.29 
268 Sumter, SC MSA 3.26 
269 Jackson, MS MSA 3.26 
270 Springfield, MO MSA 3.25 
271 Benton Harbor, MI MSA 3.24 
272 Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 3.22 




Holland, MI MSA 
3.20 
275 Little Rock-North Little Rock, 
AR MSA 
3.16 
276 Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 3.15 
277 Pensacola, FL MSA 3.15 
278 Great Falls, MT MSA 3.15 
279 Pocatello, ID MSA 3.13 
280 Rocky Mount, NC MSA 3.13 
281 Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC MSA 
3.12 
282 Fayetteville, NC MSA 3.12 
283 Hattiesburg, MS MSA 3.12 
284 Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 
MSA 
3.11 
285 Dothan, AL MSA 3.09 
286 Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY- 3.08 
Rank Metro Area TE 
OH MSA 
287 Bremerton, WA PMSA 3.07 
288 Boise City, ID MSA 3.07 




291 Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY 
MSA 
3.04 
292 Montgomery, AL MSA 2.95 
293 Flint, MI PMSA 2.92 
294 Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 2.92 
295 Florence, SC MSA 2.90 
296 Honolulu, HI MSA 2.84 
297 Albuquerque, NM MSA 2.84 
298 Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 2.83 
299 Lawton, OK MSA 2.82 
300 Cheyenne, WY MSA 2.78 
301 Greenville, NC MSA 2.76 
302 Columbia, SC MSA 2.74 
303 Anniston, AL MSA 2.72 
304 Huntsville, AL MSA 2.71 
305 Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD 
PMSA 
2.70 
306 Ocala, FL MSA 2.69 
307 Jonesboro, AR MSA 2.68 
308 Owensboro, KY MSA 2.64 
309 Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC 
MSA 
2.61 
310 Las Cruces, NM MSA 2.61 
311 Casper, WY MSA 2.59 
312 Goldsboro, NC MSA 2.53 
313 Jackson, MI MSA 2.47 
314 Santa Fe, NM MSA 2.44 
315 Decatur, AL MSA 2.37 
316 Jacksonville, NC MSA 2.27 
317 Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 2.14 
318 Dover, DE MSA 1.66 
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Abilene, TX MSA 2.54 8.69 39.43 6.14 
Akron, OH PMSA 2.47 20.74 65.85 11.02 
Albany, GA MSA 2.64 3.48 63.19 8.33 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY MSA 2.41 32.91 60.91 11.33 
Albuquerque, NM MSA 2.55 3.72 31.81 9.72 
Alexandria, LA MSA 2.56 6.96 61.86 6.46 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA MSA 2.49 31.23 53.27 10.85 
Altoona, PA MSA 2.43 39.93 47.78 4.64 
Amarillo, TX MSA 2.55 7.73 63.38 7.49 
Anchorage, AK MSA 2.67 0.61 35.92 18.79 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 2.54 15.54 63.24 19.60 
Anniston, AL MSA 2.42 8.76 54.85 5.93 
Appleton-Oshkosh-Neenah, WI MSA 2.54 21.62 43.67 9.04 
Asheville, NC MSA 2.33 13.69 59.52 7.52 
Athens, GA MSA 2.47 6.94 45.79 9.23 
Atlanta, GA MSA 2.68 4.21 65.61 17.53 
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 2.52 14.56 63.70 11.14 
Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA 2.42 3.64 40.42 7.15 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA 2.61 5.95 45.46 8.81 
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA 2.57 3.87 52.28 15.78 
Bakersfield, CA MSA 3.03 5.34 52.28 8.31 
Baltimore, MD PMSA 2.55 16.01 67.93 15.91 
Bangor, ME MSA 2.32 32.11 29.80 7.66 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA 2.29 9.15 39.57 12.48 
Baton Rouge, LA MSA 2.63 3.97 66.93 9.74 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX MSA 2.59 7.05 70.69 8.00 
Bellingham, WA MSA 2.51 14.57 26.59 8.93 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA 2.49 21.43 73.66 8.75 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 2.73 23.82 73.24 24.88 
Billings, MT MSA 2.43 9.57 30.65 7.29 
Biloxi-Gulfport-Pascagoula, MS MSA 2.60 4.84 51.62 6.72 
Binghamton, NY MSA 2.42 32.66 48.85 7.83 
Birmingham, AL MSA 2.49 8.36 72.92 11.04 
Bismarck, ND MSA 2.44 9.94 24.04 7.07 
Bloomington, IN MSA 2.27 8.58 34.28 8.65 
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA 2.45 19.39 34.97 13.55 
Boise City, ID MSA 2.67 7.41 23.20 10.00 
Boston, MA-NH PMSA 2.48 38.59 65.68 21.66 
Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 2.47 6.86 23.17 21.67 
Brazoria, TX PMSA 2.82 2.33 42.52 13.59 
Bremerton, WA PMSA 2.60 9.40 41.95 11.63 
Bridgeport, CT PMSA 2.63 23.10 73.59 20.68 
Brockton, MA PMSA 2.78 28.15 63.60 15.09 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito, TX 
MSA 
3.40 4.33 39.96 4.81 
Bryan-College Station, TX MSA 2.52 2.67 48.81 8.29 
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Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA 2.42 31.47 76.74 9.08 
Burlington, VT MSA 2.48 22.61 31.08 12.04 
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA 2.49 24.14 59.05 8.31 
Casper, WY MSA 2.42 11.12 29.65 6.34 
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA 2.43 20.73 40.76 10.18 
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA 2.33 13.68 47.36 9.01 
Charleston, WV MSA 2.34 13.93 58.97 8.19 
Charleston-North Charleston, SC MSA 2.55 5.90 47.42 9.50 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC MSA 2.55 6.08 55.16 13.11 
Charlottesville, VA MSA 2.43 11.31 36.29 12.80 
Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA 2.46 8.86 68.95 8.25 
Cheyenne, WY MSA 2.45 13.36 31.88 6.48 
Chicago, IL PMSA 2.73 21.34 80.85 18.21 
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA 2.48 8.04 38.94 6.74 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 2.50 20.92 74.84 12.63 
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, TN-KY MSA 2.69 5.20 39.25 5.61 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA 2.47 24.61 77.32 11.25 
Colorado Springs, CO MSA 2.61 7.25 41.23 12.20 
Columbia, MO MSA 2.38 6.79 40.30 9.24 
Columbia, SC MSA 2.49 4.59 52.15 10.41 
Columbus, GA-AL MSA 2.56 7.15 57.66 7.32 
Columbus, OH MSA 2.45 14.24 63.10 12.28 
Corpus Christi, TX MSA 2.82 4.59 43.80 7.59 
Corvallis, OR MSA 2.43 9.41 31.20 12.50 
Cumberland, MD-WV MSA 2.38 33.70 54.85 4.02 
Dallas, TX PMSA 2.70 3.67 59.36 16.78 
Danbury, CT PMSA 2.73 17.71 49.18 30.88 
Danville, VA MSA 2.39 14.88 34.59 4.54 
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL MSA 2.45 26.13 53.88 8.30 
Daytona Beach, FL MSA 2.32 3.30 56.66 7.25 
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA 2.43 17.81 70.16 10.04 
Decatur, AL MSA 2.52 5.16 58.47 7.91 
Decatur, IL MSA 2.39 21.35 54.24 7.81 
Denver, CO PMSA 2.52 8.96 61.76 16.52 
Des Moines, IA MSA 2.48 19.87 55.50 11.66 
Detroit, MI PMSA 2.58 13.91 84.72 16.14 
Dothan, AL MSA 2.47 4.82 43.40 6.58 
Dover, DE MSA 2.61 9.81 38.40 8.07 
Dubuque, IA MSA 2.51 32.45 40.10 7.21 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA 2.33 34.56 47.20 5.78 
Dutchess County, NY PMSA 2.63 20.89 54.69 17.21 
Eau Claire, WI MSA 2.49 23.31 40.23 6.68 
El Paso, TX MSA 3.18 5.63 36.45 6.33 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA 2.72 19.17 58.40 9.01 
Elmira, NY MSA 2.44 37.95 51.48 6.57 
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Enid, OK MSA 2.42 16.75 31.38 5.08 
Erie, PA MSA 2.51 29.72 64.26 6.44 
Eugene-Springfield, OR MSA 2.42 7.98 29.65 7.85 
Evansville-Henderson, IN-KY MSA 2.43 18.37 55.99 8.16 
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA 2.38 13.59 34.40 7.73 
Fayetteville, NC MSA 2.65 2.86 33.26 6.32 
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR MSA 2.56 6.52 54.10 7.78 
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA PMSA 2.54 37.93 33.99 9.65 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA 2.79 3.22 36.91 8.20 
Flint, MI PMSA 2.54 12.88 76.71 10.69 
Florence, AL MSA 2.40 7.35 44.46 6.60 
Florence, SC MSA 2.59 4.59 42.97 7.33 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA 2.52 7.95 28.74 13.88 
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 2.45 1.05 62.25 12.80 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA 2.31 1.08 70.66 10.60 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL MSA 2.37 1.45 62.10 10.34 
Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA 2.56 7.42 54.55 5.79 
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA 2.49 1.12 33.48 9.07 
Fort Wayne, IN MSA 2.57 22.10 70.88 9.12 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA 2.68 4.14 60.33 13.32 
Fresno, CA MSA 3.10 6.19 54.30 8.55 
Gadsden, AL MSA 2.44 10.50 71.45 5.58 
Gainesville, FL MSA 2.34 3.67 44.71 8.72 
Galveston-Texas City, TX PMSA 2.60 7.72 59.58 12.97 
Gary, IN PMSA 2.63 15.00 84.14 10.20 
Glens Falls, NY MSA 2.48 31.85 62.78 7.41 
Goldsboro, NC MSA 2.55 7.76 45.68 5.38 
Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA 2.44 20.31 43.60 5.66 
Grand Junction, CO MSA 2.47 9.65 29.58 7.09 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland, MI MSA 2.67 17.59 67.18 10.68 
Great Falls, MT MSA 2.41 18.71 38.29 5.39 
Greeley, CO PMSA 2.78 13.69 33.67 9.49 
Green Bay, WI MSA 2.51 13.36 41.36 9.71 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--High Point, 
NC MSA 
2.44 7.76 59.01 9.82 
Greenville, NC MSA 2.43 5.86 35.88 7.48 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, SC MSA 2.49 7.30 46.44 8.82 
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 2.46 25.85 62.35 7.49 
Hamilton-Middletown, OH PMSA 2.61 13.20 46.88 12.95 
Harrisburg-Lebanon-Carlisle, PA MSA 2.43 23.10 70.62 9.90 
Hartford, CT MSA 2.49 19.94 65.05 17.39 
Hattiesburg, MS MSA 2.54 6.08 54.78 6.76 
Hickory-Morganton-Lenoir, NC MSA 2.50 7.46 49.35 6.37 
Honolulu, HI MSA 2.95 4.39 35.83 18.16 
Houma, LA MSA 2.81 6.51 49.50 6.11 
Houston, TX PMSA 2.82 3.37 67.49 15.36 
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Huntington-Ashland, WV-KY-OH MSA 2.41 16.69 59.61 4.89 
Huntsville, AL MSA 2.47 3.42 55.67 12.33 
Indianapolis, IN MSA 2.50 15.51 70.66 12.60 
Iowa City, IA MSA 2.34 14.51 36.09 11.88 
Jackson, MI MSA 2.55 25.80 65.16 8.88 
Jackson, MS MSA 2.64 3.28 62.25 9.90 
Jackson, TN MSA 2.50 8.50 56.37 8.04 
Jacksonville, FL MSA 2.54 4.78 53.94 10.97 
Jacksonville, NC MSA 2.72 1.79 28.26 4.14 
Jamestown, NY MSA 2.45 47.28 52.95 5.56 
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA 2.54 26.53 60.68 9.11 
Jersey City, NJ PMSA 2.60 39.41 65.69 12.77 
Johnson City-Kingsport-Bristol, TN-VA 
MSA 
2.35 10.87 51.25 5.50 
Johnstown, PA MSA 2.41 37.27 69.95 3.82 
Jonesboro, AR MSA 2.46 5.23 48.01 6.17 
Joplin, MO MSA 2.50 19.34 40.64 4.91 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI MSA 2.48 20.32 53.04 9.48 
Kankakee, IL PMSA 2.61 19.41 73.36 7.90 
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA 2.51 12.92 69.12 12.49 
Kenosha, WI PMSA 2.60 21.64 50.26 10.80 
Killeen-Temple, TX MSA 2.72 3.87 41.85 6.13 
Knoxville, TN MSA 2.38 7.50 58.05 8.89 
Kokomo, IN MSA 2.43 24.42 49.45 10.27 
La Crosse, WI-MN MSA 2.46 22.25 36.74 7.47 
Lafayette, IN MSA 2.46 20.17 35.35 8.90 
Lafayette, LA MSA 2.64 6.18 51.24 6.72 
Lake Charles, LA MSA 2.61 6.38 62.03 7.60 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL MSA 2.52 4.23 55.19 6.59 
Lancaster, PA MSA 2.64 25.50 57.99 9.72 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA 2.48 19.03 57.06 11.20 
Laredo, TX MSA 3.75 4.80 29.95 6.16 
Las Cruces, NM MSA 2.85 4.40 28.13 5.32 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA 2.62 0.58 43.32 10.64 
Lawrence, KS MSA 2.37 12.47 26.83 9.04 
Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA 2.73 25.61 41.96 19.57 
Lawton, OK MSA 2.63 6.59 32.04 5.18 
Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA 2.35 35.35 27.60 5.35 
Lexington, KY MSA 2.39 9.85 47.75 10.21 
Lima, OH MSA 2.55 26.66 65.21 7.03 
Lincoln, NE MSA 2.40 16.43 37.29 9.38 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR MSA 2.47 5.38 61.27 8.92 
Longview-Marshall, TX MSA 2.57 6.41 45.28 6.63 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA 2.98 12.90 67.55 15.10 
Louisville, KY-IN MSA 2.44 13.84 64.49 10.47 
Lowell, MA-NH PMSA 2.78 25.77 46.62 20.04 
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Lubbock, TX MSA 2.52 3.46 55.15 7.01 
Lynchburg, VA MSA 2.43 12.85 37.96 7.20 
Macon, GA MSA 2.58 6.05 53.08 8.47 
Madison, WI MSA 2.37 15.07 46.30 13.04 
Manchester, NH PMSA 2.55 24.84 39.74 13.84 
Mansfield, OH MSA 2.46 26.79 67.39 6.18 
McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX MSA 3.60 2.12 49.47 4.74 
Medford-Ashland, OR MSA 2.48 9.08 26.56 8.04 
Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay, FL MSA 2.35 1.26 49.48 9.26 
Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA 2.63 6.37 68.72 10.83 
Merced, CA MSA 3.25 6.96 34.39 6.89 
Miami, FL PMSA 2.84 4.16 73.57 10.82 
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 2.72 13.00 51.97 27.75 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA 2.50 22.91 82.16 12.41 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI MSA 2.56 17.10 57.83 16.88 
Missoula, MT MSA 2.40 12.40 20.24 6.21 
Mobile, AL MSA 2.58 5.49 63.73 7.48 
Modesto, CA MSA 3.03 6.52 34.84 9.08 
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 2.61 10.79 63.35 20.93 
Monroe, LA MSA 2.58 4.49 70.88 7.56 
Montgomery, AL MSA 2.53 6.54 56.33 9.14 
Muncie, IN MSA 2.37 21.72 54.65 7.34 
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA 2.37 1.81 49.82 7.12 
Naples, FL MSA 2.39 0.44 66.20 18.12 
Nashua, NH PMSA 2.66 16.73 32.26 20.55 
Nashville, TN MSA 2.49 6.56 57.05 11.99 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 2.95 14.66 74.38 28.84 
New Bedford, MA PMSA 2.48 39.22 47.48 8.94 
New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA 2.49 23.06 68.97 17.11 
New London-Norwich, CT-RI MSA 2.47 26.78 54.07 13.70 
New Orleans, LA MSA 2.59 13.69 69.25 9.27 
New York, NY PMSA 2.61 34.71 81.82 16.00 
Newark, NJ PMSA 2.73 25.05 80.42 23.80 
Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 2.83 20.30 50.78 15.21 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport News, 
VA-NC MSA 
2.60 6.44 46.20 9.69 
Oakland, CA PMSA 2.71 13.76 62.81 24.00 
Ocala, FL MSA 2.36 1.98 50.60 5.52 
Odessa-Midland, TX MSA 2.70 2.25 51.54 8.51 
Oklahoma City, OK MSA 2.47 7.81 54.45 8.12 
Olympia, WA PMSA 2.50 7.08 36.81 10.81 
Omaha, NE-IA MSA 2.55 19.05 64.69 11.24 
Orange County, CA PMSA 3.00 2.54 36.80 23.48 
Orlando, FL MSA 2.58 2.40 57.04 10.95 
Owensboro, KY MSA 2.47 10.43 49.84 6.18 
Panama City, FL MSA 2.43 2.45 53.22 6.62 
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Parkersburg-Marietta, WV-OH MSA 2.41 20.89 35.86 6.13 
Pensacola, FL MSA 2.50 4.22 52.32 7.70 
Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA 2.47 19.30 71.39 9.78 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 2.58 25.30 72.33 15.89 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA 2.67 1.42 43.72 12.90 
Pine Bluff, AR MSA 2.59 6.17 61.50 5.55 
Pittsburgh, PA MSA 2.37 30.52 67.27 9.20 
Pittsfield, MA MSA 2.29 41.03 44.36 8.78 
Pocatello, ID MSA 2.69 12.23 31.21 7.20 
Portland, ME MSA 2.38 29.08 42.67 11.66 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA 2.54 14.69 48.07 13.10 
Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA 2.44 25.18 31.43 13.54 
Providence-Fall River-Warwick, RI-MA 
MSA 
2.49 30.70 58.69 11.05 
Provo-Orem, UT MSA 3.59 7.77 26.44 11.10 
Pueblo, CO MSA 2.52 19.25 39.37 5.79 
Punta Gorda, FL MSA 2.18 0.83 40.55 7.26 
Racine, WI PMSA 2.59 23.39 58.36 10.85 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC MSA 2.48 5.41 46.17 15.92 
Rapid City, SD MSA 2.49 7.77 30.29 7.12 
Reading, PA MSA 2.55 32.57 58.81 10.21 
Redding, CA MSA 2.52 3.78 25.17 7.21 
Reno, NV MSA 2.53 3.28 33.52 12.89 
Richland-Kennewick-Pasco, WA MSA 2.81 3.20 38.45 10.80 
Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA 2.48 10.00 57.04 13.35 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA 3.07 3.31 46.28 11.54 
Roanoke, VA MSA 2.33 13.72 63.55 8.55 
Rochester, MN MSA 2.53 12.65 47.38 15.10 
Rochester, NY MSA 2.51 30.76 66.32 11.41 
Rockford, IL MSA 2.57 19.35 63.12 10.29 
Rocky Mount, NC MSA 2.59 9.60 42.73 6.66 
Sacramento, CA PMSA 2.64 5.27 55.97 14.08 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI MSA 2.53 19.78 74.46 10.36 
Salem, OR PMSA 2.68 10.00 34.11 7.92 
Salinas, CA MSA 3.14 8.15 54.29 15.24 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA 3.04 9.38 36.91 12.62 
San Angelo, TX MSA 2.52 7.37 34.64 5.82 
San Antonio, TX MSA 2.78 6.22 50.40 9.91 
San Diego, CA MSA 2.73 5.13 54.15 15.71 
San Francisco, CA PMSA 2.47 29.62 60.87 29.03 
San Jose, CA PMSA 2.92 5.27 40.51 34.61 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso Robles, 
CA MSA 
2.49 6.21 49.14 12.04 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA 
MSA 
2.80 8.79 41.49 16.02 
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA PMSA 2.71 12.94 27.07 21.91 
Santa Fe, NM MSA 2.42 6.37 32.32 15.64 
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Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 2.60 9.08 32.89 18.08 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA 2.20 2.51 67.15 11.23 
Savannah, GA MSA 2.56 9.87 57.07 10.40 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--Hazleton, PA 
MSA 
2.37 43.91 55.60 6.35 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA 2.46 12.51 49.62 17.43 
Sharon, PA MSA 2.44 32.05 66.28 5.45 
Sheboygan, WI MSA 2.50 33.71 53.92 7.77 
Sherman-Denison, TX MSA 2.51 10.88 47.86 7.48 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA MSA 2.53 6.18 57.37 7.35 
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA 2.62 32.37 44.69 6.92 
Sioux Falls, SD MSA 2.50 16.43 38.98 8.86 
South Bend, IN MSA 2.50 22.00 60.28 8.90 
Spokane, WA MSA 2.46 18.07 34.58 7.91 
Springfield, IL MSA 2.37 18.38 58.88 10.42 
Springfield, MA MSA 2.48 29.61 64.13 9.62 
Springfield, MO MSA 2.41 11.23 46.74 6.76 
St. Cloud, MN MSA 2.63 17.18 41.24 8.10 
St. Joseph, MO MSA 2.45 31.74 41.60 5.82 
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA 2.52 17.05 74.35 12.16 
Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA 2.62 21.88 64.32 39.20 
State College, PA MSA 2.45 17.40 48.72 8.49 
Steubenville-Weirton, OH-WV MSA 2.36 24.77 59.88 4.46 
Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA 3.00 8.13 54.45 10.65 
Sumter, SC MSA 2.68 4.97 42.09 5.34 
Syracuse, NY MSA 2.50 30.62 69.26 9.53 
Tacoma, WA PMSA 2.60 12.58 45.95 10.43 
Tallahassee, FL MSA 2.39 2.89 45.88 9.53 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL MSA 2.33 3.55 64.47 9.40 
Terre Haute, IN MSA 2.42 33.18 56.81 5.96 
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR MSA 2.50 6.66 45.37 6.16 
Toledo, OH MSA 2.47 25.81 69.10 9.49 
Topeka, KS MSA 2.39 15.74 47.80 8.35 
Trenton, NJ PMSA 2.62 23.53 64.02 22.96 
Tucson, AZ MSA 2.47 3.03 38.82 9.01 
Tulsa, OK MSA 2.50 8.47 58.52 8.94 
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA 2.42 4.57 54.81 7.82 
Tyler, TX MSA 2.59 5.44 53.78 9.06 
Utica-Rome, NY MSA 2.44 38.23 63.52 6.16 
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 2.83 7.00 50.90 17.02 
Ventura, CA PMSA 3.04 3.97 45.52 22.79 
Victoria, TX MSA 2.75 5.76 43.65 8.70 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ PMSA 2.73 21.60 44.35 8.25 
Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, CA MSA 3.28 6.28 41.59 7.64 
Waco, TX MSA 2.59 8.44 52.43 7.47 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA 2.61 9.59 63.12 25.11 
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Waterbury, CT PMSA 2.54 23.66 60.61 13.66 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA 2.45 22.22 65.41 7.07 
Wausau, WI MSA 2.60 22.84 39.79 8.26 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL MSA 2.34 2.03 66.68 16.23 
Wheeling, WV-OH MSA 2.35 35.89 56.29 4.56 
Wichita Falls, TX MSA 2.50 11.84 54.12 5.86 
Wichita, KS MSA 2.54 12.55 58.21 8.97 
Williamsport, PA MSA 2.44 36.03 61.44 5.66 
Wilmington, NC MSA 2.32 4.75 50.13 9.61 
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD PMSA 2.58 12.23 53.55 16.57 
Worcester, MA-CT PMSA 2.54 31.47 53.73 14.70 
Yakima, WA MSA 2.96 12.77 40.64 6.97 
Yolo, CA PMSA 2.71 6.58 23.21 12.99 
York, PA MSA 2.52 24.04 67.01 8.76 
Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA 2.47 23.42 72.85 6.66 
Yuba City, CA MSA 2.87 7.38 32.03 7.16 
Yuma, AZ MSA 2.86 1.82 42.08 5.96 
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Metro Area 
Akron, OH PMSA 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA 
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA 
Baltimore, MD PMSA 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA 
Boston, MA-NH PMSA 
Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA 
Brazoria, TX PMSA 
Bremerton, WA PMSA 
Bridgeport, CT PMSA 
Brockton, MA PMSA 
Chicago, IL PMSA 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-IN PMSA 
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, OH PMSA 
Dallas, TX PMSA 
Danbury, CT PMSA 
Denver, CO PMSA 
Detroit, MI PMSA 
Dutchess County, NY PMSA 
Fitchburg-Leominster, MA PMSA 
Flint, MI PMSA 
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA 
Galveston-Texas City, TX PMSA 
Gary, IN PMSA 
Greeley, CO PMSA 
Hagerstown, MD PMSA 
Hamilton-Middletown, OH PMSA 
Houston, TX PMSA 
Jersey City, NJ PMSA 
Kankakee, IL PMSA 
Kenosha, WI PMSA 
Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA 
Lowell, MA-NH PMSA 
Manchester, NH PMSA 
Miami, FL PMSA 
Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA 
Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA 
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA 
Nashua, NH PMSA 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA 
New Bedford, MA PMSA 
New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA 
New York, NY PMSA 
Metro Area 
Newark, NJ PMSA 
Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA 
Oakland, CA PMSA 
Olympia, WA PMSA 
Orange County, CA PMSA 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA 
Portland-Vancouver, OR-WA PMSA 
Portsmouth-Rochester, NH-ME PMSA 
Racine, WI PMSA 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA 
Sacramento, CA PMSA 
Salem, OR PMSA 
San Francisco, CA PMSA 
San Jose, CA PMSA 
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA PMSA 
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA 
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA PMSA 
Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA 
Tacoma, WA PMSA 
Trenton, NJ PMSA 
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA PMSA 
Ventura, CA PMSA 
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ PMSA 
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV PMSA 
Waterbury, CT PMSA 
Wilmington-Newark, DE-MD PMSA 
Worcester, MA-CT PMSA 
Yolo, CA PMSA 
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Metro Area Region 
Abilene, TX MSA South 
Akron, OH PMSA Midwest 




Albuquerque, NM MSA West 




Altoona, PA MSA Northeast 
Amarillo, TX MSA South 
Anchorage, AK MSA West 
Ann Arbor, MI PMSA Midwest 




Asheville, NC MSA South 
Athens, GA MSA South 
Atlanta, GA MSA South 
Atlantic-Cape May, NJ PMSA Northeast 
Auburn-Opelika, AL MSA South 
Augusta-Aiken, GA-SC MSA South 
Austin-San Marcos, TX MSA South 
Bakersfield, CA MSA West 
Baltimore, MD PMSA South 
Bangor, ME MSA Northeast 
Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA Northeast 
Baton Rouge, LA MSA South 
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX MSA South 
Bellingham, WA MSA West 
Benton Harbor, MI MSA Midwest 
Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA Northeast 




Binghamton, NY MSA Northeast 
Birmingham, AL MSA South 
Bismarck, ND MSA Midwest 
Bloomington, IN MSA Midwest 
Bloomington-Normal, IL MSA Midwest 
Boise City, ID MSA West 
Boston, MA-NH PMSA Northeast 
Boulder-Longmont, CO PMSA West 
Brazoria, TX PMSA South 
Bremerton, WA PMSA West 
Bridgeport, CT PMSA Northeast 
Brockton, MA PMSA Northeast 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San South 
Metro Area Region 
Benito, TX MSA 
Bryan-College Station, TX MSA South 
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY MSA Northeast 
Burlington, VT MSA Northeast 
Canton-Massillon, OH MSA Midwest 
Casper, WY MSA West 
Cedar Rapids, IA MSA Midwest 
Champaign-Urbana, IL MSA Midwest 
Charleston, WV MSA South 






Charlottesville, VA MSA South 
Chattanooga, TN-GA MSA South 
Cheyenne, WY MSA West 
Chicago, IL PMSA Midwest 
Chico-Paradise, CA MSA West 







Colorado Springs, CO MSA West 
Columbia, MO MSA Midwest 
Columbia, SC MSA South 
Columbus, GA-AL MSA South 
Columbus, OH MSA Midwest 
Corpus Christi, TX MSA South 
Corvallis, OR MSA West 
Cumberland, MD-WV MSA South 
Dallas, TX PMSA South 
Danbury, CT PMSA Northeast 




Daytona Beach, FL MSA South 
Dayton-Springfield, OH MSA Midwest 
Decatur, AL MSA South 
Decatur, IL MSA Midwest 
Denver, CO PMSA West 
Des Moines, IA MSA Midwest 
Detroit, MI PMSA Midwest 
Dothan, AL MSA South 
Dover, DE MSA South 
Dubuque, IA MSA Midwest 
Duluth-Superior, MN-WI MSA Midwest 
Dutchess County, NY PMSA Northeast 
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Eau Claire, WI MSA Midwest 
El Paso, TX MSA South 
Elkhart-Goshen, IN MSA Midwest 
Elmira, NY MSA Northeast 
Enid, OK MSA South 
Erie, PA MSA Northeast 




Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN MSA Midwest 




Fitchburg-Leominster, MA PMSA Northeast 
Flagstaff, AZ-UT MSA West 
Flint, MI PMSA Midwest 
Florence, AL MSA South 
Florence, SC MSA South 
Fort Collins-Loveland, CO MSA West 
Fort Lauderdale, FL PMSA South 
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, FL MSA South 
Fort Pierce-Port St. Lucie, FL 
MSA 
South 
Fort Smith, AR-OK MSA South 
Fort Walton Beach, FL MSA South 
Fort Wayne, IN MSA Midwest 
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX PMSA South 
Fresno, CA MSA West 
Gadsden, AL MSA South 
Gainesville, FL MSA South 
Galveston-Texas City, TX PMSA South 
Gary, IN PMSA Midwest 
Glens Falls, NY MSA Northeast 
Goldsboro, NC MSA South 
Grand Forks, ND-MN MSA Midwest 
Grand Junction, CO MSA West 
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-
Holland, MI MSA 
Midwest 
Great Falls, MT MSA West 
Greeley, CO PMSA West 
Green Bay, WI MSA Midwest 
Greensboro--Winston-Salem--
High Point, NC MSA 
South 
Greenville, NC MSA South 
Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, SC MSA 
South 








Hartford, CT MSA Northeast 




Honolulu, HI MSA West 
Houma, LA MSA South 




Huntsville, AL MSA South 
Indianapolis, IN MSA Midwest 
Iowa City, IA MSA Midwest 
Jackson, MI MSA Midwest 
Jackson, MS MSA South 
Jackson, TN MSA South 
Jacksonville, FL MSA South 
Jacksonville, NC MSA South 
Jamestown, NY MSA Northeast 
Janesville-Beloit, WI MSA Midwest 




Johnstown, PA MSA Northeast 
Jonesboro, AR MSA South 
Joplin, MO MSA Midwest 
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, MI 
MSA 
Midwest 
Kankakee, IL PMSA Midwest 
Kansas City, MO-KS MSA Midwest 
Kenosha, WI PMSA Midwest 
Killeen-Temple, TX MSA South 
Knoxville, TN MSA South 
Kokomo, IN MSA Midwest 
La Crosse, WI-MN MSA Midwest 
Lafayette, IN MSA Midwest 
Lafayette, LA MSA South 
Lake Charles, LA MSA South 
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL MSA South 
Lancaster, PA MSA Northeast 
Lansing-East Lansing, MI MSA Midwest 
Laredo, TX MSA South 
Las Cruces, NM MSA West 
Las Vegas, NV-AZ MSA West 
Lawrence, KS MSA Midwest 
Lawrence, MA-NH PMSA Northeast 
Lawton, OK MSA South 
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Metro Area Region 
Lewiston-Auburn, ME MSA Northeast 
Lexington, KY MSA South 
Lima, OH MSA Midwest 
Lincoln, NE MSA Midwest 
Little Rock-North Little Rock, AR 
MSA 
South 
Longview-Marshall, TX MSA South 
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 
PMSA 
West 
Louisville, KY-IN MSA Midwest 
Lowell, MA-NH PMSA Northeast 
Lubbock, TX MSA South 
Lynchburg, VA MSA South 
Macon, GA MSA South 
Madison, WI MSA Midwest 
Manchester, NH PMSA Northeast 








Memphis, TN-AR-MS MSA South 
Merced, CA MSA West 




Milwaukee-Waukesha, WI PMSA Midwest 
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI 
MSA 
Midwest 
Missoula, MT MSA West 
Mobile, AL MSA South 
Modesto, CA MSA West 
Monmouth-Ocean, NJ PMSA Northeast 
Monroe, LA MSA South 
Montgomery, AL MSA South 
Muncie, IN MSA Midwest 
Myrtle Beach, SC MSA South 
Naples, FL MSA South 
Nashua, NH PMSA Northeast 
Nashville, TN MSA South 
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA Northeast 
New Bedford, MA PMSA Northeast 
New Haven-Meriden, CT PMSA Northeast 
New London-Norwich, CT-RI 
MSA 
Northeast 
New Orleans, LA MSA South 
New York, NY PMSA Northeast 
Newark, NJ PMSA Northeast 
Metro Area Region 
Newburgh, NY-PA PMSA Northeast 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-Newport 
News, VA-NC MSA 
South 
Oakland, CA PMSA West 
Ocala, FL MSA South 
Odessa-Midland, TX MSA South 
Oklahoma City, OK MSA South 
Olympia, WA PMSA West 
Omaha, NE-IA MSA Midwest 
Orange County, CA PMSA West 
Orlando, FL MSA South 
Owensboro, KY MSA South 




Pensacola, FL MSA South 
Peoria-Pekin, IL MSA Midwest 
Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA Northeast 
Phoenix-Mesa, AZ MSA West 
Pine Bluff, AR MSA South 
Pittsburgh, PA MSA Northeast 
Pittsfield, MA MSA Northeast 
Pocatello, ID MSA West 










Provo-Orem, UT MSA West 
Pueblo, CO MSA West 
Punta Gorda, FL MSA South 
Racine, WI PMSA Midwest 
Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 
MSA 
South 
Rapid City, SD MSA Midwest 
Reading, PA MSA Northeast 
Redding, CA MSA West 




Richmond-Petersburg, VA MSA South 
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 
PMSA 
West 
Roanoke, VA MSA South 
Rochester, MN MSA Midwest 
Rochester, NY MSA Northeast 
Rockford, IL MSA Midwest 
Rocky Mount, NC MSA South 
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Metro Area Region 
Sacramento, CA PMSA West 
Saginaw-Bay City-Midland, MI 
MSA 
Midwest 
Salem, OR PMSA West 
Salinas, CA MSA West 
Salt Lake City-Ogden, UT MSA West 
San Angelo, TX MSA South 
San Antonio, TX MSA South 
San Diego, CA MSA West 
San Francisco, CA PMSA West 
San Jose, CA PMSA West 
San Luis Obispo-Atascadero-Paso 
Robles, CA MSA 
West 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-
Lompoc, CA MSA 
West 
Santa Cruz-Watsonville, CA 
PMSA 
West 
Santa Fe, NM MSA West 
Santa Rosa, CA PMSA West 
Sarasota-Bradenton, FL MSA South 
Savannah, GA MSA South 
Scranton--Wilkes-Barre--





Sharon, PA MSA Northeast 
Sheboygan, WI MSA Midwest 
Sherman-Denison, TX MSA South 
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 
MSA 
South 
Sioux City, IA-NE MSA Midwest 
Sioux Falls, SD MSA Midwest 
South Bend, IN MSA Midwest 
Spokane, WA MSA West 
Springfield, IL MSA Midwest 
Springfield, MA MSA Northeast 
Springfield, MO MSA Midwest 
St. Cloud, MN MSA Midwest 
St. Joseph, MO MSA Midwest 
St. Louis, MO-IL MSA Midwest 
Stamford-Norwalk, CT PMSA Northeast 




Stockton-Lodi, CA MSA West 
Sumter, SC MSA South 
Syracuse, NY MSA Northeast 
Tacoma, WA PMSA West 




Metro Area Region 
Terre Haute, IN MSA Midwest 
Texarkana, TX-Texarkana, AR 
MSA 
South 
Toledo, OH MSA Midwest 
Topeka, KS MSA Midwest 
Trenton, NJ PMSA Northeast 
Tucson, AZ MSA West 
Tulsa, OK MSA South 
Tuscaloosa, AL MSA South 
Tyler, TX MSA South 




Ventura, CA PMSA West 











Waterbury, CT PMSA Northeast 
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, IA MSA Midwest 
Wausau, WI MSA Midwest 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton, FL 
MSA 
South 
Wheeling, WV-OH MSA Midwest 
Wichita Falls, TX MSA South 
Wichita, KS MSA Midwest 
Williamsport, PA MSA Northeast 




Worcester, MA-CT PMSA Northeast 
Yakima, WA MSA West 
Yolo, CA PMSA West 
York, PA MSA Northeast 
Youngstown-Warren, OH MSA Midwest 
Yuba City, CA MSA West 
Yuma, AZ MSA West 
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